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Abstract University of Durham Ph. D. 1995 
THE SOUTHERN SUDAN UNDER BRITISH RULE 1898-1924: THE 
CONSTRAINTS REASSESSED 
bv 
Lazarus Leek Maiout 
Existing interpretations of modern Sudanese history have been much concerned 
with the disparity between North and South in the three key areas of civil 
administration, education, and economic development. The relatively slower 
development of the South has been seen as primarily a legacy of the early Anglo- 
Egyptian Condominium, and the result of several powerful constraints - physical, 
climatic, linguistic, financial; limited British interest in the region; local disorder and 
resistance; and the character of native tribal organisation. This thesis argues that 
although these constraints were important, in themselves and collectively they do not 
provide a sufficient explanation. Each is extensively re-assessed using evidence from 
the Sudan Archive in Durham, and it is shown that their impact upon the South's 
prospects for development needs careful qualification. Some did not prove to be 
obstacles when the government found reasons to be sufficiently determined; some were 
not as serious as they may appear; some were deliberately exaggerated for 
administrative or military purposes; resistance was often provoked by insensitive 
officials. There had in fact been a long history of British interest in the region, shaped 
by humanitarian, religious, and economic concerns, sustained from the 1890s by fear of 
revived Islamic militancy and intensified by the presence of French, Belgian and 
Ethiopian competitors in central Africa. It is argued that British policy in the Southern 
Sudan is best understood in terms of these factors, and especially of cultural 
preconceptions towards what were considered to be the primitive peoples of the area. 
Contrasts with policy in the North are especially instructive. The South suffered not so 
much from neglect by British officials as from their over-protectiveness. 
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Preface 
A correct reading of history enhances a people's appreciation of their present 
conditions and reinforces their determination to either continue to build upon past 
glories, or to correct past mistakes in order to ensure a better future. For these very 
reasons history can sometimes be falsified and manipulated by individuals or groups 
with vested interest to inspire or demoralise one group or the other. This is true of the 
Sudanese situation. 
Today, contending Sudanese parties peruse colonial documents and literature in 
order to find supporting evidence for their respective claims and allegations, as they 
struggle for political power and access to limited educational and economic 
opportunities. Northerners and Southerners alike try to wrap up these very clear 
objectives in often distorted but effective religious and cultural propaganda which 
whips up external sentiments of kin and co-religionists. One of the areas of 
concentrated research by Sudanese, former British colonial officials, and non-Sudanese 
academics (whose objective reconstruction of the modern history of the Sudan stands 
out in sharp contrast), is the British policy in the Southern Sudan. Attention is 
specifically directed to discovering causes of the imbalance between the North and 
South in certain aspects of development, and by extension, the interregional conflict in 
the country. 
Although there has been much work upon this subject, important aspects still 
require exploration if a comprehensive appreciation of the Sudanese colonial 
experience is to be achieved. It is intended here to continue the search. 
Preliminary work on this project was undertaken in the Sudan while I was a 
postgraduate at the University of Khartoum. However, a brief visit in 1989 to 
Durham's Sudan Archive was enough to convince me that the chief documentary 
sources for the study I wished to undertake were located there. The University of 
Durham agreed that in view of my previous postgraduate work, I could be enrolled for 
research towards my Ph. D. on the basis of six terms of study. It took three years after 
that to find sufficient funds to commence my studies. This was eventually achieved in 
1992, and this project was completed in Durham during the following two years. 
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Introduction 
Existing interpretations of the modern history of the Sudan have been much 
concerned with the disparity between Southern and Northern Sudan in three key 
areas: civil administration, education and economic development. Many have argued 
that the relatively slower development of the South is primarily a legacy of the early 
years of British rule. The principal explanations for the shortcomings have been: the 
disorderly state of the region on the eve of the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest; the hostile 
climate for Europeans; the inaccessibility of many areas; local resistance; the language 
barrier; acute shortage of funds and manpower; an absence of recognised indigenous 
authority among many important tribes through whom the government could govern 
the people; and a relative lack of interest in the region, because it appeared to offer 
few economic prospects. 
However, re-assessment of these explanations in the light of fuller examination 
of the evidence suggests that although the proposed constraints did indeed impede 
and discourage efforts to develop the region, they are not in themselves adequate. 
Almost all the existing explanations need qualification if their specific impact on the 
overall situation in the South is to be properly understood. Moreover, two other 
equally, and perhaps more, important considerations have not been sufficiently 
considered: cultural attitudes and local security. This thesis contends that these last 
two factors, to a large extent determined what British officials thought they had to do 
in the Southern Sudan, and when and how to do it. The inherited and acquired 
attitudes of British officials are shown to have been especially important in influencing 
the evolution of a separate policy for the South from the very inception of the 
Condominium rule. The relationship between these further constraints and those 
conventionally proposed will be examined in the succeeding chapters. At this stage, 
however, a summary of the earlier explanations will be given as an introduction to 
their comprehensive assessment. 
Some scholars and writers believe that British efforts in the Southern Sudan 
were slowed down by problems caused by its turbulent history in the 19th century. 
According to G. N. Sanderson, the reconquest took place when the region was 
'passing through one of the more violent periods of its violent history', caused by 
absence of 'any effective over-rule'. 1 A British missionary, observing from 
neighbouring Uganda in 1886 described this interregnum in the colonial history of the 
Southern Sudan as a state of anarchy worse than the previous devastation under the 
slave-raiding Turco-Egyptian regime. Natural calamities like the catastrophic 
rinderpest of the 1895 are said to have compounded the disaster. 2 The Azande and 
Nuer expansion during this period, the former into the Fertit land in Western Bahr al- 
Ghazal, and the latter into the Dinka country on the east bank of the Bahr al-Jebel, are 
cited as further evidence of the chaotic conditions. 3 Other leading experts on modern 
Sudan share Sanderson's conviction. As M. W. Daly saw it, the Condominium 
administration had to find a solution first to the 'devastating ... local warfare and 
general insecurity' which foreign interventions in the South had created. 4 This need 
becomes still more urgent for G. Warburg, who considered the South to have been 'on 
the verge of a complete breakdown'. 5 In fact, a former Civil Secretary of the Sudan 
Government, Harold MacMichael, whose name is closely associated with the 
Southern Sudan through his issuing of the Southern Policy in 1930, used the 
disturbed condition of the region in the 19th century to defend his government 
performance. Attempting to pre-empt a charge of relative government neglect of the 
South, MacMichael could not see how the British could have applied themselves 
immediately to the region's development needs when 'the great Nilotic tribes ... had 
been harried and decimated by the Dervishes, as by the 'Turks' before them'. 6 
Presented thus, the region's immediate requirements would be the restoration of law 
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and order. Other needs could wait to be addressed later, under more settled 
conditions. 
Once the Sudan had been reconquered, and penetration of the South embarked 
upon, a multitude of inhibiting conditions are said to have cropped up, compounding 
an already difficult situation. Warburg has cited a number of constraints: the vastness 
of the region, combined with lack of funds and manpower, poor communications and 
a hostile climate, made service there a difficult task, only suited for hardened soldiers 
who maintained government presence by means of armed patrols.? Before roads 
could be built overland to connect government stations with one another, animal 
transport was used but this proved a failure; many of them like camels and donkeys 
died, as the conditions in the South were different from their desert environment in 
Northern Sudan. The alternative human porterage was equally unsuccessful, as some 
of the tribes, like the Dinka, considered it too degrading a job for men. 8 That left 
river transport as the main means of communications, but this meant that 
administration was only effectively felt along the rivers rather than deep in the 
interior. Moreover, these rivers were not navigable throughout the year, as the 
floating vegetation known as the sudd blocked the river passage from time to time on 
the Bahr al-Jebel and Bahr al-Ghazal. This could be kept open only by periodic 
engineering work. The climate was certainly debilitating for British officers, as was 
proved by the death through natural causes of three high ranking officers in Bahr al- 
Ghazal between 1902 and 1905: Hunter, Fell and Boulnois. 9 
When C. E. Sevier adds the language barrier and absence of discernible 
indigenous authority to the problems enumerated above, such difficulties are believed 
to preclude 'the early and smooth establishment of an administrative system which 
could be operated by civilians'. These hardships, Sevier continued, could not allow 
the officials charged with the responsibility of running the affairs of the region to do 
more 'than to impose light taxes on each of the Southern societies which were 
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brought 'under control'. Extending control over the whole area 'was "a very slow 
procedure and at the time of the first World War a large number of those societies still 
remained "unpacified" and unadministered'. Sevier concluded that while this process 
was going on'no attempts at introducing economic or educational reforms were made 
during the, first two decades of this century'. 10 
Absence of a lingua franca in Southern Sudan has always been cited as one of 
the formidable obstacles to British administration. Sanderson and L. M. Sanderson 
have described the region with respect to the language situation as 'afflicted with the 
curse of Babel in an acute form'. I I The language diversity is paralleled by the 
indigenous political systems which appear to have defied the political classifications of 
foreign observers and scholars. As the systems existing among the Dinka, Nuer, Ban, 
Acholi, and other tribes did not fit into the very limited Western categories of 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy - with their well-defined legislative, judicial 
and executive branches - scholars have found it easier to lump these systems into 
stateless, acephalous, and even ordered anarchy. 12 It was certainly difficult for the 
British during the first two decades to find acceptable traditional leaders with whom 
to work, with the exception of, say, the Shilluk and Azande whose rudimentary 
kingship systems were the nearest to those they had known in Europe. 
Added to those constraints is the assertion some scholars have made about the 
limited importance of the Southern Sudan to the British in the reconquest. R. 
Robinson and J. Gallagher have argued that 'Britain's over-riding purpose in Africa 
was security in Egypt, the Mediterranean and the Orient'. The extension of British 
rule to the Upper Nile region was imposed on the British Government only by 
extremely important imperial considerations elsewhere. By merely holding the 
Southern Sudan, Britain would effectively control Egypt against both external 
competitors and Egyptian nationalists, and therefore ensure the security of the all- 
important Suez Canal route to British possessions in India. Thus, 'England's rulers 
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pessimistically extended the search for security up the Nile to Fashoda ... and Bahr al- 
Ghazal'. 13 
Robinson and Gallagher have adherents in Collins, Abiem and Sanderson. For 
Collins, 'the British did not appear at Mashira ar-Raqq to conquer the Bahr al-Ghazal 
for Christianity, commerce, or civilisation' but 'to secure the land from the designs of 
King Leopold I1'. 14 The reluctance of the Sudan Government in the early years to 
permit Christian missionary activities in the Southern Sudan, the prolonged restriction 
of the British presence in the region 'to holding rather than administering the country', 
and the delayed involvement in education and economic development until the 1940s 
have been cited by M. M. Abiem in support of the interpretation of British disinterest 
in the region for any objectives other than the declared strategic consideration. 15 
Seen by Sanderson as originally'very reluctant imperialists in the Southern Sudan', the 
British are said to have been spurred into action by French, Belgian and Ethiopian 
colonial ambitions in the region. What determined 'the tempo and strategy', he 
argued, was not 'administrative needs in Africa', but 'the need to define frontiers 
delineated on paper in Europe'. 16 Such 'a low-priority area' could not compete 
effectively with Northern Sudan in the allocation of funds for development, from the 
government's meagre finances (most of which was supplied by the Egyptian 
Government till 1913): 'Indeed, money for any purpose other than frontier security 
was begrudged in the South, which was written off as incapable of development'. 17 
The central government would not waste hard-to-come-by funds when it could be 
profitably 'spent in the North, where it was possible to foresee some possibilities of a 
useful return for the money'. 18 
A combination of the factors so far considered could not augur well for the 
development of the Southern Sudan. Daly has painted a very gloomy picture of the 
region in a passage deserving extensive quotation as much of it is a useful summary of 
the existing interpretations: 
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The sad results of the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist incursions were not 
the only, nor even the most fundamental problems that in 1898 faced the 
new regime in the south. The region was virtually unknown to those who 
were called upon to rule it: British officers of the Egyptian Army whose 
expertise ... 
in administration was usually with the Muslim, Arabic- 
speaking, culturally homogeneous people of Egypt or the Northern 
Sudan. That experience could not have prepared them for the congeries 
of the southern peoples, varying from the large, pastoralist Nilotic groups 
... to very small peoples 
in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and the 
extreme north-east of the region ... 
Diversity of indigenous political systems is also emphasised as a formidable obstacle: 
Ethnic and linguistic diversity was paralleled by political variation ... At the extreme were the 'acephalous' peoples such as the Nuer, to whom a 
political structure was unknown ... The Dinka presented a less extreme 
example... but the authority wielded by hereditary warriors or cult figures 
depended on personal prestige, and the separate Dinka sections united in a 
common cause only on rare occasions. Such social systems were 
encountered by early British administrators with utter incomprehension. 
There must be chiefs: tribal customs and rules might be mystifying or 
repugnant; tribes might be recalcitrant, reactionary, or resistant to change; 
but that a society could have no recognised leader was unthinkable... 
In the light of these problems, Daly concludes: 
It is valid to generalise ... that in 1898 the British in the Southern Sudan 
encountered scores of peoples of whose history, traditions, cultures, 
societies and languages they knew nothing at all. They would later be 
confronted by a central government that ... was unwilling and ... unable to 
provide even the basic ingredients of men and money that might make the 
region intelligible and, eventually, susceptible to administration. For these 
reasons, and because of the unhealthy and often uncongenial 
surroundings, it is not surprising that there was such a rapid succession of 
British personnel in the south during the first generation of Anglo- 
Egyptian rule: the early southern official was as much an explorer as an 
administrator, an explorer under a starless sky, adrift without a 
compass. 19 
A further constraint on British administration is often suggested. Local cultural and 
armed resistance have drawn considerable criticism from scholars and former officials 
of the Condominium administration. Both groups agree that the British record of 
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development in the South leaves much to be desired. But they argue that the 
government efforts to improve the condition of the indigenous people in the various 
fields of development were, to a large extent, frustrated by those peoples themselves. 
For example, MacMichael considered the Nilotic way of life - in which cattle play a 
prominent role in shaping attitudes and determining status in society - as obstructive 
to their social and economic betterment. The government could not be expected to 
do much in a region where the population effectively resisted change by continuing to 
'think and move and have their being in an atmosphere of cattle - and again cattle'. 20 
A former District Commissioner J. S. R. Duncan has attempted to defend his 
fellow commissioners against the allegation that the relative backwardness of the 
region was due to the D. C. 's 'lack of imagination' by arguing that the task of 
administrators was simpler in the North than in the South. He contends that 'the 
Northern Sudanese at least knew what administration was' as 'they were civilised in 
some degree', while 'the primitive Southerner, particularly in Upper Nile Province, 
was quite untamed'. A 'handful of British officers, each with a few soldiers' had to 
deal with people who 'resisted any 'attempt to bring in more advanced form of 
government, preferring war among themselves rather than the more sober state of 
civilised living'. 21 Duncan therefore sees no convincing reason why critics should 
castigate the British officials, when they should instead be praised for a spectacular 
achievement: 
The fact is that these men [Southern D. C. 's] achieved something which 
Northern Sudanese and some British theorists of today could never have 
done: they came out, alone, on top of people who were themselves of 
dominating personality and damped their love of war. 22 
Duncan's line of argument was followed by K. D. D. Henderson, another former British 
official. He maintains that the Southern Sudanese 'original opposition to the 
Condominium government ... 
left them 20 years behind the North', the consequence 
of which was the subsequent inter-regional conflict, seen in terms of 'a politically 
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backward South trying to apply the brakes to a progressive educated Muslim 
North'. 23 
Collins' and R. Herzog's condemnation of Southern Sudanese resistance could 
not be stronger: 
Indeed it was during these years that the British administrators sought to 
control the multitude of diverse, warlike tribes who, proud of their 
independence, were reluctant to give up their anarchical freedom in return 
for good government. In bringing order to the Southern Sudan the 
British administrator faced a host of complex problems which defied 
solution and taxed the common sense and patience of even the most 
optimistic and enthusiastic of the government officials. The territory over 
which the Sudan Government exercised legal jurisdiction was in fact far 
from any kind of control. It was a wild and turbulent land where warfare 
and violence, springing from the way of life of tribal people, were deep- 
rooted and traditional. 4 
These historians single out as a leading factor in the local resistance the 'manipulative' 
tribal chiefs who would exploit the 'superstitious and sorcery-minded peoples of 
Southern Sudan', to wield great power which their followers would not question. 
Such persons were dangerous to the government. Their assumed supernatural 
powers could put them in a powerful position to determine the type of relations their 
people would maintain with the government. That 'a single, primitive personality' 
could be the final authority on very important matters such as acceptance or rejection 
of government authority was a situation no foreign conquerors would tolerate. This 
was actually demonstrated in 1902,1907 and 1910 when pre-emptive strikes were 
carried out against the Lau Nuer prophet DengKur and the two Atwot chiefs, Awo 
Kon and Ashwol Kut. 25 
A few leading Sudanese academics have mixed reactions to British rule in the 
Southern Sudan. While agreeing with most of the other problems that are said to have 
hindered the British in the development of the region, A. L. Loiria has added a new 
factor: the great diversity of the country's political, economic, sociocultural and ethnic 
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aspects. 26 This problem is said to have made the British divide up the country 
territorially into Northern and Southern Sudan, each with 'prescribed sectional 
differences of collective access' to vital economic, educational and administrative 
training. The dichotomy was then perpetuated by the practice of unequal treatment of 
the two parts of the Sudan in respect of those facilities. 27 According to Loiria, this 
differential treatment seemed to have been based on what Governor Stigand of 
Mongalla Province criticised using a 'clever - stupid boys' analogy. In introducing 
development programmes, the British operated at the higher level of the 'clever boys' 
(Northern Sudanese) leaving the 'stupid boys' (Southern Sudanese) in the lurch. This 
glaring inequality made sympathetic Stigand suggest the separation of the two regions 
so that special attention could be paid to the'stupid boys': 
If one has clever boys and stupid boys in the same class, no one can blame 
the masters if they expend their time and trouble on the former who will 
best repay their efforts, to the detriment of the latter. So if one has a 
country which is supposed to be progressive and another which is 
backward bracketed together, all energy and regulations will be made for 
the benefit of the former, with the result that the latter goes to the wall 
Stigand argued that for the 'stupid boys' to improve they should be taught in a 
separate class where the teachers would pay 'undivided attention' to their special 
needs. So the'backward' Southern provinces were to be put in'a class by themselves 
... given what can 
be spared in the way of revenue, and allowed to work out their 
salvation'. 28 Although the Central Government did not adopt Stigand's suggestions, 
Loiria considers them to have been the basis of the Southern policy declared in 1930. 
He contends that the policy'aimed at making control and management of the South as 
inexpensive as possible: no development programs were contemplated and no money 
could be made available for them'. 29 
Even though as Loiria has argued there were no economic and educational 
development programmes, according to A. Alier British policy in the region had at 
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least one positive aspect. 30 This was the combating of the slave trade which is said 
to have been successfully carried out through the policy of isolation of the South. 31 
For M. Wai, even when the British policy in Southern Sudan almost amounted to 
keeping the region 'as a human zoo and to concentrate economic and educational 
development in the North', 32 people should not fail to recognise'the essential merits 
of the policy which were the attempt to preserve the cultures of the people of the 
Southern Sudan; the need to give time to the people ... to gain their self-assurance-. 
33 
In contrast, among Northern Sudanese scholars British policy in the Southern 
Sudan is generally viewed with apprehension as essentially aimed against Northern 
Sudanese interests. The administration is presented as having had an overwhelming 
bias towards the Southern Sudan. According to A. I. M. Ali, this bias goes back to the 
1870s when General Gordon was in charge of the Sudan as a Turco-Egyptian official. 
Gordon is charged with being "the first initiator" of what is now called the 'Southern 
Problem' by deporting Northern Sudanese (in fact slave traders) from the South. 34 
The later isolation of the region by the Anglo-Egyptian Government is seen as a 
continuation of that policy. The objective of this policy, K. Awad, H. M. A. Sharfi and 
A. E. El Bashir contend, was the separation of the South from the North during which 
a war was waged against Arabic and Islam. 35 According to M. Abdal-Rahim the 
British policy in the South 'has saddled the independent Sudan with its most 
intractable problem in creating a form of local patriotism in the South'. 36 
The existence of such divergent views on the role of the British in the Southern 
Sudan is a clear indication that there remains something amorphous about the subject 
that calls for further investigation. The period to be examined is that between the two 
great landmarks of early British rule in the Southern Sudan. The first Governor- 
General of the Sudan under Anglo-Egyptian rule, Lord Kitchener, issued directives in 
1899 to his provincial officials all over the Sudan, the gist of which was to encourage 
the development of the resources of the Sudanese people to 'raise them to a higher 
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level'. 37 Twenty-five years later, the third Governor-General, Sir Lee Stack, had just 
'come -to the conclusion that the time 
has come to fix on a definitive policy of 
development, economic and administrative, for the Southern Provinces-. 38 The 
intervening period formed the crucial founding years of the condominium rule which 
have had a significant bearing on the later history of the region and should therefore 
be studied in depth. 
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Chanter I. - The Pre-Condominium . Southern Sudan 
The Pre-Turco-Er)'Mian Period 
As it has been so strongly argued that the experiences of the previous century 
are crucial for understanding the South under the early Condominium rule, it is 
necessary to begin with a brief analysis of the condition of the region during that 
period. Before 1821, there were neither Southern nor Northern Sudanese because the 
political entity currently known as the Sudan did not exist. The territory now 
occupied by the Republic of the Sudan consisted of a large number of independent 
kingdoms, sultanates, chieftaiships and related systems, varying considerably in size 
and strength. In what is now known as the Northern Sudan there were the 
independent sultanates of Sennar and Darfur under which fell the autonomous petty 
states in Kordofan, the Abdullab state in the region of Khartoum, and the Shaiggia 
confederation farther north. Many of these diverse peoples shared the Islamic faith 
and the Arabic language (though both these factors were minimally experienced in the 
Nuba country, southern Kordofan and southern Blue Nile region). But due to the 
existence of strong ethnic, racial and regional differences, no overall political union 
emerged in the geographical Northern Sudan. This was only achieved later by 
colonial powers to realise their own objectives. In the region now known as Southern 
Sudan, there were the Shilluk Kingdom of Fashoda, the Azande Kingdoms on the 
Nile-Congo divide and the Anuak principality in eastern Upper Nile. But there also 
existed a greater number of peoples whose political systems have been described in 
the Introduction. 
As far back as historical records exist, the Africans inhabiting the different parts 
of modern Sudan formed independent political entities. Tribes raided one another 
either to extend territory or forestall invasion by launching pre-emptive strikes, and 
is 
sometimes to secure additional food supplies. However the period was not as 
disorderly and negative as this description would make it appear. Under such 
conditions, a process of integration and nation formation was slowly evolving. This 
was particularly evident among peoples with close cultural similarity in the 
geographical south. The Shilluk, for example, grew into a powerful kingdom by 
integrating captives and settlers from such neighbours as the Dinka, and to this day, 
the Kwa-Jang or Dinka lineages are still identifiable among the Shilluk. I The Azande 
expanded into a great nation by absorbing the Avokaya, Mundu, Makaraka, Baka 
and Fertit, some of whom rose to high leadership positions in the provinces. 
2 A 
similar process occurred between the Dinka and Nuer. Two of the great Nuer leaders 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Nuer Mer (who enslaved both Nuer and Dinka) 
and prophet Diu (Deng Laka) of the Gaweir Nuer, were Thoi and Ngok Dinka 
respectively. 3 
On the other hand the African cultures of the South and Arab/Islamic cultures 
of the North effectively repelled each other, characterised by warfare along their 
frontier. Although Richard Gray and Collins have asserted that the Southern 
Sudanese suffered from 'powerful neighbours in Northern Sudan' who forced the 
Shilluk to retreat farther south, 4 other sources give the opposite picture. The Dinka, 
Shilluk and Nuba in fact kept their Arab neighbours on the defensive on three fronts: 
- southern Blue Nile, southern Kordofan and along the 
White Nile above Khartoum - 
until after 1821.5 The Shilluk in particular dominated over the Arabs in this 
confrontation. They held sway over the region along the banks up to Kawwa, taxing 
the Baggara Arabs for grazing, and compelling traders from Darfar and Sennar to 
abide by Shilluk rules of river navigation, which restricted ferrying of goods and 
passengers to Shilluk canoes. 6 
The Arabs' inferior military standing before their Southern opponents until the 
1820s is corroborated by contemporary sources. In the words of an Arab chief in 
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Kordofan: 'In the neighbourhood of the negroes we cannot remain, as they would rise 
in mass against us, and destroy us all, in revenge for their kidnapped children'.? In fact 
their fear of the 'negroes' dictated the Arabs' early submission to the Turco-Egyptian 
regime. Quoting from the same Arab chief 'We are forced to choose the least of 
these many evils, and to deliver ourselves into the hand of the Turks'. 8 The Turco- 
Egyptians duly reciprocated by opening a military station on the White Nile 'for their 
protection' against the Shilluk. 9 From such evidence it is clear that when Northern' 
and 'Southern' peoples were alone in their country, the military balance favoured the 
latter. It is important to note this fact because it will be relevant to the assessment of 
later British pre-occupation with devising ways and means of protecting their 
'vulnerable' Southern subjects against detrimental external influences. 
The Turco-EfVptian Period 
Mohammed Ali's motive in undertaking the conquest of the Sudan in 1821 was 
to secure slaves for service in the personal army he was establishing in Egypt, aimed 
at giving him autonomy from his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. Writing in 1823, 
Mohammed Ali reminded his son-in-law, the Daftarder in the Sudan, of what he was 
there to achieve: 'You are aware that the end of all our efforts ... 
is to procure 
negroes. Please show zeal in carrying out our wishes in this capital matter. 110 
Shortly after the effective occupation of the predominantly Muslim Northern Sudan, 
in 1822 the army was accordingly unleashed on the 'pagans' in southern Blue Nile, 
southern Kordofan and Southern Sudan. Their auxiliaries were the local Arabs who 
had old scores to settle with the 'negroes'. With only spears and arrows to oppose a 
disciplined army armed with firearms, the hunted fell easy prey. The opening of the 
White Nile to navigation between 1839 and 1841 compounded the situation, as this 
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breakthrough opened up the region to large-scale and deeper penetration of the 
interior by ivory and slave traders. 
By the 1850s, the plight of the Southern Sudanese could no longer be ignored 
by the Western powers, by now mostly committed to suppressing slavery. Thereafter 
pressure was exerted on the Egyptian government, after which steps were taken to 
curb the activities of slave traders. Partly to improve its image abroad by submitting 
to European pressure to abolish this trade so that legitimate commerce could be 
'introduced, and partly to extend its colonial gains, the Egyptian government began to 
push its administrative control southwards between 1855 and 1865. In 1855, a 
military station was opened on the Sobat for interception and release of captured 
slaves on boats, but it was a dismal failure. The traders simply avoided check points 
by driving slaves overland and rejoining the boats at safer points down stream. Two 
years later, the troops were withdrawn while new steps were planned. In 1862 armed 
patrols were introduced on the White Nile to inspect the whole route. The 
government also imposed an inhibiting tax on all traders and employees engaged in 
the White Nile trade. Furthermore, military operations were conducted against land- 
based slavers, of whom a Northern Sudanese, Mohammed Kheir, who had devastated 
the Shilluk and Dinka country, was killed in 1863. These steps were followed in 1865 
by the formal annexation of the White Nile region to Turco-Egyptian Government, 
becoming a province with Fashoda as its capital. I1 
The annexation of their country did not however improve things for the local 
people. They continued to be raided clandestinely by government officials who 
wanted them for military and domestic service. 12 Western humanitarian pressure on 
Cairo meant very little to corrupt local officials in the South. The result was the 
escalation of violence in the region, during which three Shilluk kings and a governor 
of Fashoda were killed, together with a large number of their followers. 13 An old 
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Shilluk survivor of this violent period related his experience to an American 
missionary in 1902: 
We had here the Turks and they said 'Be submissive to us; we will protect 
you, we will fight your battles for you, we will teach you of God'. But 
they, took our cattle, they destroyed our villages, and carried away our 
women and children into slavery ... 
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Farther South beyond the sudd, the situation was similarly affected and the 
government found itself obliged to intervene. But this time more reliable officials 
were needed for the task. Khedive Ismail accordingly chose two Britons; the explorer 
Sir Samuel White Baker, and General Charles Gordon, to stop the slave trade and 
establish Turco-Egyptian administration in the equatorial region. After his 
employment in 1869, Baker went to the South in 1870 only to be delayed by the sudd 
in the Shilluk country until early 1871. Reaching Gondokoro in the Bari country in 
April 1871, he commenced his work from this centre, which became his 
administrative headquarters. Equatoria was formally annexed in a ceremony on 26 
May 1871,15 followed by attempts to occupy the province effectively. But he 
encountered formidable opposition from powerful traders and some Southern peoples 
like the Bari who simply wanted to be left alone in their native land. The threat 
presented by the Bari was particularly serious and took much of Baker's attention. He 
was visited soon after his arrival at Gondokoro by the Bari leader Loro, alias Alloron, 
who asked the newcomer: 'Flow long are you going to remain here? ' Baker told him 
that the government had come to stay, to which Alloron responded: 'Then who does 
this land belong to? to you or to me? ' When Baker replied that the land belonged to 
the Khedive, the Bari leader was provoked: 'Then you had better be off to Khartoum 
for we don't want any government here'. 16 
That was 'nationalism' - Bari country for the Bari - put simple and straight, 
though Baker looked at Alloron's opposition to have been instigated by slavers with 
whom the Bari were alleged to be in league. However, the fact that Baker found 
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Alloron's people driven away from their main land onto the islands by their Lokoyia 
neighbours17 casts doubts on the alleged unholy alliance. If such relations existed, 
the Ban could have used the slavers' superior military power to keep their dreaded 
domestic rivals off their land. The truth is this was a natural reaction from a landlord 
to question a stranger who just walked into his domain. Intrusion alone was a 
sufficient justification for an initial deadlock between Baker and Alloron. What 
should really be questioned is why some Southern peoples (and they were many as 
will be shown later) chose the abnormal way of embracing strangers without first 
finding out who they were and why they were there in the first place. 
In response to local opposition, expressed in trade and labour boycott, Baker 
resorted to force to compel recognition of government authority and obtain food and 
labour supplies. It started with raids on the Bari, after which force continued to be 
used frequently as he pushed government control further afield. But by the time his 
tour of duty ended in May 1873, Baker's administration by raids had achieved little. 
Romolo Gessi, an Italian who accompanied Gordon to Equatoria in 1874, found 
through information from natives and officers who had witnessed such raids, that 
Gordon's predecessor had done more harm than good: 
A few tribes were defeated, but never subjugated; many at the approach 
of the troops abandoned their villages, taking their cattle with them and 
seeking refuge among the mountains or in the interior of the country. 
Nothing remained for Sir Samuel but to set fire to the huts, which were 
rebuilt twenty-four hours afterwards by the natives, as soon as the soldiers 
had disappeared. 18 
Basing his assessment of Baker's administration on the wealth of evidence his research 
on the Turkia in the Southern Sudan afforded him, Gray has concluded that: 
Virtually all that Baker had accomplished was to effect the transfer of 
nominal sovereignty ... to the Government. Control over the scattered 
stations remained extremely slight, ... 
few neighbouring village 
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communities ... accepted the new alliance, but beyond them hostile and 
violent relationships continued unchanged. 19 
Baker himself did not deny his excessive use of force on his subjects, but he had no 
qualms about it: 
The first steps in establishing the authority of a new government in a tribe 
hitherto savage and intractable were of necessity accompanied by military 
operations. War is inseparable from annexation, and the law of force, 
resorted to in self-defence, was absolutely indispensable to prove the 
superiority of the power that was eventually to govern. The end justified 
the means. 20 
Baker's frankness about his exploits in Equatoria is very significant for the study of 
Southern Sudanese relations with later invaders. He emphasised two important 
aspects of such contacts: power and rights. Later, colonial officials were to spend 
valuable time theorising about why certain peoples in the region did not welcome 
invasions with open arms, preferring passive or armed resistance instead. While the 
causes of conflict could be many and varied, the investigation should start from the 
core of the conflict which even Baker in his ferocious attacks on the tribes recognised: 
"There can be no doubt that in the abstract of the people's rights, any annexation of 
the territory of another is an infringement. '21 What really deserves investigation 
about resistance should be the contributing factors which accelerated it or otherwise. 
Gordon was appointed Governor-General of Equatoria in September 1873. 
Shortly after his arrival at Khartoum in March 1874, he declared the policy of his 
administration: 
... 
I have issued a stinging decree, declaring the Government monopoly of 
the ivory trade, and prohibiting the import of arms and powder, the 
levying of armed bands by private people, and the entry of any one 
without passports - in fact, I have put the district under martial law. 22 
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On assuming power in the province later in the year, Gordon began to extend 
government authority over a wider area by opening new administrative stations. 
These included Sobat in the Shilluk country to intercept slavers' human cargo, and his 
new capital of Lado, situated in a healthier site north of Gondokaro and on the west 
bank of the river. For food supplies and labour, these stations looked to the 
surrounding tribes. Unfortunately, such a hope was based on the assumption that 
since the government was there to protect them from the slavers depredations, the 
people would readily meet its needs. 'In fact, things did not work out that way and 
Gordon had to resort to the old razzia system which Baker and slave traders had 
practised: 
... when we got 
here, the natives who were friendly could not sell or 
would not sell us Dhorra. There was a Sheikh near us and ... I sent and 
took the Dhorra from him. This is fearful work for me, but what can I do. 
I must either throw up the whole matter and come down or else do this. 23 
Similar incidents abound throughout his three-year stay in Equatoria, contributing to, 
rather than mitigating, the suffering of the people. He continued to replenish his food 
supplies by raids: 'Yesterday forced by the want of cows, I had to make a razzia on a 
tribe near here and took 140 cows'. 24 By pursing this line of action, Gordon 'failed to 
solve the ... 
fundamental problem of creating fresh relationships between the invaders 
and the indigenous people'. 25 
On the question of slave trade and slavery, Gordon was not altogether 
consistent. Sometimes he took effective measures to enforce the ban, as in the 
capture and release of 126 slaves on 20-21 August 1874 on the Sobat. 26 At other 
times he approved some benign forms of slavery: 
I think that the slavers' wars, made for the purpose of taking slaves, are 
detestable; but if a father or mother, of their own free will, and with the 
will of the child, sells that child, I do not see the objection to it. It was 
and is the wholesale depopulation of districts which makes slavery a 
curse, and the numbers killed or who perish in the collection of slaves. 27 
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Sometimes, Gordon did not even know what to do about it. As late as 1877 he had 
not come to a specific decision: 'I have not yet made up my mind what to do about 
the slaves and the slave question'. 28 This lack of clear-cut policy was demonstrated 
by two incidents in 1877. A black female slave ran away from her Arab master and 
went to the Governor-General to complain about mistreatment, suggesting in addition 
that she be allowed to be possessed by a kinder person. Gordon consented and 
facilitated the transfer by compensating the old master with 30 dollars, being the cost 
of the slave. A short, while later a slave caravan passed within sight of the Governor- 
General and he acted swiftly: 'I noticed a bronze-coloured boy among the slaves, and 
saw he was an Arab Bedouin. I had him and two others freed'. 29 
Gordon's vacillation over the slave issue was clearly influenced by his cultural 
attitude towards the people he went to liberate. The destitute condition he found the 
people in, following the massive loss of property and manpower through slave 
raidings, left in his mind the impression of a people living in an abject natural state 
which was worse than their condition in bondage. His too sympathetic attitude 
towards the blacks whom'I look on ... as I would on children of three of four years of 
age', 30 a people who had 'nothing to exchange for goods', 31 hindered progress in 
Gordon's campaign against slave trade. He saw his subjects as a people who could 
not yet stand on their own. His administration which could have stood in for a 
protector was too deficient in resources effectively to neutralise the slave traders, 
who, it is implied from the above and succeeding statements and action, were after all 
of a lesser evil than leaving the people alone. For this reason, Gordon was not 
opposed to the practice of slavery in its entirety. If people could be enslaved with no 
loss of lives, he would tolerate it, demonstrating this by himself buying three Shilluk 
boys, two from their father and one from his brother, 32 and suggesting that the 
indigenous peoples should give up their independence for a better life in captivity: 'If I 
were a black up here I wish I were taken by the Arabs'. 33 
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The longer Gordon stayed in the Sudan the more pessimistic he became about 
the future prospects for the blacks. He even went to the point of suggesting 
government withdrawal from the Southern Sudan rather than continue to preside over 
a hopeless situation. When it came to a choice between further pursuing the war 
against the slave trade, and appeasing hostile slavers and their supporters in the 
Northern Sudan (who had been dispossessed of their loot by the operations carried 
out in 1879 by his able Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, the Italian Romolo Gessi), 
Gordon went for the latter. Writing to Gessi in March 1879, he expressed his 
disapproval of the Governor's attempt to, effectively administer the province and 
control traders: 'I am dead against any occupation of these countries. I want no ivory, 
I only want the people to be quiet'. 34 Thus disillusioned, Gordon was ready to 
abandon his original Southern policy of protective isolation. 
In contrast to Gordon, Gessi was optimistic about the economic regeneration of 
the province. He believed that even with the inadequate means at his disposal, he 
could, to a large extent, restore law and order and initiate economic development. 
Accordingly, he appealed against Gordon's proposed withdrawal and when the two 
met in Darfur in June 187935 succeeded in convincing the Governor-General to 
allow him to proceed with the permanent occupation of Bahr al-Ghazal. Having been 
granted his request, Gessi applied himself to his difficult task of administering an 
extensive territory ravaged by slave trade. Then, in the short period between the 
defeat of organised slavers' resistance under Sulaiman Zubair in July 1879 and his 
departure from the province in September 1880, Gessi demonstrated that with 
conviction and determination, the seemingly uneconomic and undevelopable region 
could be controlled and turned into a profitable colonial possession. 
Gessi issued stern orders after the defeat of Sulaiman to restore order in the 
province. These orders were primarily to protect the natives against further 
exploitation by slavers still at large and clandestinely carrying on with their cargo. 
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Two types of crime were identified and appropriate punishment prescribed. The 
death penalty was to be imposed, were persons to be caught slave trafficking, 
abducting children and women, and burning native villages. Those found robbing 
native property or using forced native labour in building projects, cultivation and 
porterage, were to be despatched to Khartoum. 36 These orders were enforced to the 
best of Gessi's ability. Some slavers who were accused of killing their slaves were 
tried, found guilty and shot while a number of traders guilty of the other crimes were 
deported to the Northern Sudan. 37 
With the province enjoying this relative peace, the governor could then turn his 
attention to generating revenue and to small development projects. During that short 
period of less than two years, Gessi raised £90,000 in ivory sales, which covered all 
his expenses. 38 In addition, large quantities of rubber were sent to Khartoum. The 
copper mines within the province at Hofra en Nahas supplied domestic needs, 
augmented by good quality iron ore worked by traditional blacksmiths among the Jur 
and Bongo tribes. For proper exploitation of the latter metal, Gessi planned to send 
for equipment to establish forges from Khartoum. Experiments in cotton, rice, sugar 
and timber production were encouraging and the government subsequently 
established eight looms worked by local apprentices who produced quality cloth. 39 
Gessi's innovations were crowned by the opening of a primary school in 1880 at Dem 
Zubair, former headquarters of Sulaiman, attended by sons of chiefs and soldiers. He 
expected 'in a few years to be able to draw the clerks from the indigenous 
populations'. 40 
The importance of Gessi's innovations lies less in tangible results than in 
advertising the commercial possibilities to any outsider., who might be interested in 
investment in the region. He actually made a formal request in 1880 to a 
representative of commercial interests in Italy. 41 Unfortunately, Gessi did not live 
long enough to see the results of his endeavours. Bahr al-Ghazal was suddenly 
25 
deprived of reaping the fruits of such foresight by the sudden death of its visionary 
governor in 1881 and the rise of the Mahdi, which retarded development as the 
province relapsed into the disorder of the active slave trade days. 
Gordon was equally disappointed with the situation in Equatoria. When in 
1878 the review of his annual budget put the deficit at about £100,000, he decided to 
reduce expenses by ordering the evacuation of the southernmost stations in Uganda. 
Not only did Gordon abandon parts of this province but he even contemplated 
complete withdrawal from it since he could not see 'the ultimate use of the Equator 
province'. 42 However, no further steps were taken along those lines as the final 
decision on such an important matter could only come from Egypt. The next task for 
Gordon's successors was to administer the province. This responsibility fell on a 
German Jew, Edward Schmitzer, best known by his Muslim name of Emin. 
Appointed governor of Equatoria in 1878 after having served under Gordon as envoy 
to Uganda in addition to being the provincial Chief Medical Officer, Emin's role was 
to supervise his scattered stations, take action against the slave trade whenever he had 
the chance of success and to maintain good relations between his urban settlers and 
the nominally-administered rural population. His diplomacy worked for there was 
relative peace between the two communities as the urban population scaled down 
robbery in the countryside. 43 
Emin shared Gessi's conviction that the Southern Sudan could pay for the cost 
of its own administration, if only the means to develop its resources could be 
obtained. His immediate plans were to start with what he could manage locally, such 
as the cultivation of cash crops: coffee, cotton and sugar, and the collection of india 
rubber. Like Gessi, he established looms for the production of cotton cloth. 44 He 
also opened a school at Lado in 1881.45 The small development projects embarked 
upon had by 1882 shown a net profit of £8,000, a great improvement when compared 
with the annual deficit of £32,000 when he became governor of the province in 
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1878.46 But when the province was on the way to recovery, the Turco-Egyptian 
administration was challenged by the Mahdists and development stalled. 
The Southern Sudanese colonial experiences under the Turco-Egyptian rule 
suggest several instructive comparisons with the period of the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration. Baker's and Gordon's attitudes towards the native were shared by 
British officials of the Anglo-Egyptian Govnerment. Those experiences of the 19th 
century are therefore of special significance to the proposed comprehensive analysis 
of constraints on British development initiatives in the South. On the other hand 
Gessi had demonstrated that a difficult situation like that in Bahr al-Ghazal could be 
brought under control within a short period by a government with humble means. 
With a force estimated at only 2,765 men, 47 Gessi reclaimed Bahr al-Ghazal from 
Sulaiman whose fighting strength was put at 6,400 with additional 9,000 men in 
reserve. 48 Moreover, his force was less well equipped than the Anglo-Egyptian 
forces with superior firearms for its regional adversaries: tribal warriors mostly armed 
with spears and arrows. Furthermore, Gessi and Emin operated and achieved 
successes in the same climatic conditions which, it is maintained, impeded the later 
British officials - and without the advances in the treatment and prevention of tropical 
diseases which occurred between the 1870s and 1900s. So although the constraints 
of harsh climate, lack of funds, manpower shortages, and tribal resistance certainly 
must not be discounted, some scepticism is justified towards the argument that these 
alone imposed a very slow pace upon the extension and work of the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration in the region. 49 
The criticism that many Southern Sudanese peoples had no recognised leaders 
capable of making decisions on behalf of their respective societies did not appear to 
have been so acute a problem during the Turkia. Indeed colonial officials complained 
that the tribes had chiefs who were too powerful. Some chiefs who resisted being 
moulded into characters acceptable to the colonial masters were either replaced with 
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docile ones or physically eliminated. Baker replaced Alloron with Morbe in 1871 for 
opposing him. 50 A government official in Equatoria hanged a chief in 1875 for 
objecting to his followers being engaged for forced labour. 51 Chief Alloron was 
eventually killed in 1884 by the Emin's administration for his resistance against foreign 
presence in the Bar land. 52 The death of Shilluk kings has already been cited. 
Such treatment of chiefs during the Turkia had important consequences for the 
Condominium period. Chieftainship in times of crisis had clearly become a very 
dangerous position, and its risks came to outweigh its original merits of prestige and 
authority in local society. In the course of time some tribes developed a defensive 
response: they concealed their true leaders, and sometimes when selecting new ones 
deliberately did not appoint the best men. For example after losing so many kings, the 
Shilluk in 1891 presented prince Kur Nyidhok, known as Kur Rac (Kur the Bad) to 
the Mahdists as candidate for their next king, while declining to nominate the better 
candidate, his half brother, known as Kur Doc (Kur the Good). Their calculations 
were that Kur Rac would be taken away'sooner than later' by the Mahdists, who were 
expected to withdraw back to Omdurman after their looting spree, after which Kur 
Doc'under whose reign people will sleep, would be installed'. 53 
Whenever researchers assess the indigenous power bases in the Southern Sudan 
in the early 20th century, it would be advisable to consider what the institution of 
chieftainship had experienced in the hands of previous foreign invaders. What the 
British administrators observed were not always the 'natural' power structures: these 
had often been disrupted and weakened, or else tribes had acquired the habit of 
disguising them. Consequently, it was all too easy for officials to misunderstand the 
character of local societies, and to underestimate the potential strength of indigenous 
patterns of authority. 
Although warfare among Southern Sudanese and slave raids disrupted life in the 
region, the condition of the people was not as helpless as some scholars have made it 
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appear. There was certainly devastation in many areas. Yet it was during this time 
that courageous incidents of regional solidarity against foreigners occurred. The Bari 
- Lokoyia traditional feuds which Baker tried to exploit to secure the former's 
collaboration dramatically turned into an alliance against the government. 54 These 
traditional enemies, the Dinka and Nuer, co-operated to jointly almost exterminate the 
government garrison of Bor in 1884,55 while the Dinka reinforced the Bari in 1885 to 
attack the towns of Lado and Rejaf. 56 
On the whole, however, the Turco-Egyptian rule left deep and permanent scars 
on the Southern Sudan through enslavement and by imposing the stigma of social 
inferiority upon its peoples. Moreover, the foreigners' policy of playing one people 
against the other to realise their own objectives left Southern Sudanese more divided 
than ever before. Thus from within the South and in relation to the peoples of 
Northern Sudan, the peoples of this vast country remained independent of one 
another throughout this colonial period. The peoples of the Sudan were the Azande, 
Bari, Beja, Dinka, Fur, Nuer, Nuba, etc; they were Arabs and blacks, 'pagans' and 
Muslims, with no common identity. The only thing which these peoples who had 'no 
ties of race, language, culture, religion - or sympathy' shared was a colonial master 
whose rule helped create hunters and a game reserve for slave hunts'57 out of the 
colonialised peoples of the modern Sudan. 
The Mahdia 
In a country where the visible absence of a nation builder in both its recent and 
early history is embarrassing to Sudanese leaders desperate for sources of inspiration, 
even an event of such doubtful objectives as the Mahdist movement is seen as a great 
national achievement. In reality, this misunderstands the character and extent of the 
Mahdist rule. It is true that the descendants of the Mahdi and his followers are now 
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Sudanese within recognised geographical boundaries, but this was a later 
development. 'The frontiers of the Mahdist state were never permanently fixed'. 58 In 
fact, virtually the whole of the Southern Sudan was never occupied by the Mahdists. 
With the exception of the two stations of Bor and Rejaf on the Bahr al-Jebel, there 
were only infrequent armed incursions which were never sustained. One mission to 
the South under commander Karamalla withdrew from both Equatoria and Bahr al- 
Ghazal in 1886 following the death of the Mahdi, after which the region 'became 
much as it had been prior to the Egyptian occupation, the tribes became independent 
of each other and were ruled by their own chiefs'. 59 Another military expedition 
under Zaki Tamal was sent into the Shilluk country in 1891 to raid for food and 
slaves. After devastating the land during which many people were killed including the 
king, Yor Akoc, the Ansar withdrew in 1892 taking along a thousand cattle and three 
hundred slaves. 60 A third expedition was despatched against the Dinka in 1894 but it 
was heavily defeated, its commander Abu Mariam, being among the dead, and the few 
survivors fled to Darfur. 61 
The towns of Bor and Rejaf served as bases for raids into the countryside for 
booty when the soldiers were not engaged in fighting against the Belgians who had 
appeared in Equatoria at this time. Disorder increased around these centres for the 
Khalifa began to exile convicts to Rejaf. 62 Typical of this chaos was the massacre of 
Bor Dinka chiefs the Ansar following the heavy defeat of the latter by Dinka warriors 
as they tried to rob cattle and grain in the villages. 
63 It is evident from these 
examples that Southern Sudan was not an integral part of the Mahdist state. It was 
dar harb or non-Muslim territory where looting, capture and enslavement of the kuffar 
or pagans was sanctioned by Islam. 
That aside, the Mahdi and his successor the Khalifa Abdullahi did not intend to 
confine their movement to a definite geographical area. Theirs was a world-wide 
religious revolution bent on destroying the old order and replacing it with their brand 
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of Islam. In accordance with the tradition of the Prophet of four Caliphs, the Mahdi 
appointed one of them from North Africa, a certain Mohammed al-Mahdi Sanusi 
(who nevertheless declined the offer). 64 If the Mahdi thought his mission was limited 
by political geography, he would have looked for a suitable candidate from within the 
areas he controlled. Only the belief in the universality of what he stood for would 
make the Mahdi choose an Arab on the Mediterranean coast for a job in Omdurman. 
Secondly, there is evidence to show that the Mahdists intended to operate above 
territorial considerations and without a specific identity, save for a 'state' which had 
no land attachment. Ultimatums were sent by the Khalifa to a number of world 
leaders in 1887, among whom were the Emperor of Ethiopia, the Ottoman Sultan and 
Queen Victoria, to embrace Mahdism or face invasion. 65 The Khalifa actually 
followed up these threats with the 1889 abortive invasion of both Ethiopia and Egypt. 
The situation would have been different if the will to subdue those targeted countries 
had been backed up with sufficient military might. But since the would-be converts 
proved too strong for the Mahdists, the Mahdia became a Sudanese situation by 
default. 
Being preoccupied with their divine mission to the external world, and 
threatened by internal opposition and economic hardships, the Mahdists had no plans 
to create a political entity with a specific name from the welter of tribes and races 
found in this open-border country. In consequence, the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest 
found the peoples known later as Sudanese, as still 'heterogeneous collection of tribes 
in an ill-defined area of Africa'. 
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When some Sudanese scholars like Abdal-Rahim accuse the British of saddling 
'the independent Sudan with its most intractable problem by creating a form of local 
patriotism in the South', 
67 they should pause to reflect on how the 'cherished' 
Sudanese national identity came into being. This did not exist in 1898, but was 
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created by British rule. If there is anything to blame the colonial masters for, it should 
be their unilateral decision to bring together peoples who had little in common. 
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Chanter II: British Motives and Objectives in the , Southern Sudan 
The over-riding strategic importance of Egypt to Britain cannot be contested. 
Even long before the opening of the Suez Canal enhanced its importance by 
shortening the sea route to India, Egypt had attracted the attention of many keen 
observers. In 1852 it was predicted that 'the Englishman, straining far over to hold 
his loved India, will plant a firm foot on the banks of the Nile'. I But according to two 
British co-authors, H. S. L. Alford and W. D. Sword, the British never desired 'to 
undertake the immense responsibility of the government of Egypt, as long as that 
country' was 'secure from foreign invasion'. 2 When, however, that threat was 
considered to be imminent in 1881, Britain could no longer 'stand aside and allow 
Egypt to be controlled by any of the continental powers, unless compelled thereto at 
the point of sword'. 3 
Such statements provide further support of Robinson and Gallagher's position in 
Egypt proper, and as long as such arguments are restricted to Egypt, one has no 
objection. It is when this paramount strategic consideration of the occupation of 
Egypt is extended to explain the occupation of the Sudan that doubts arise. Robinson 
and Gallagher's argument that the occupation of the Sudan was dictated by the same 
British quest for security as in Egypt, is only partly valid. The relevance of the Sudan 
in general and the South in particular to British security guarantee in North Africa 
could easily be established. It was a popular Victorian belief concerning the Nile: that 
Egypt could be threatened by an enemy power sitting on the upper reaches of the 
river, and diverting its course. This fear was promoted by the likes of the eminent 
Victorian explorer, Samuel Baker who in a series of The Times articles in 1888, 
argued that the Nile could be dammed and the obstruction of the flow could cause 'the 
utter ruin and compete destruction of Egypt proper'. 4 The strategic- importance of the 
Upper Nile region was therefore not lost on Cromer, who declared that 'whatever 
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Power holds the Upper Nile Valley must, by the mere force of its geographical 
situation dominate Egypt': 5 
The Mahdist state was a security menace to Egypt and had to be toppled in 
order to realise peace on Egypt's southern border. Indeed the advance on Khartoum 
was accelerated by the suspicion that the Mahdists were about to launch an offensive. 
The defeat of the Italians by the Ethiopians at the battle of Adowa in March 1896 
encouraged the Mahdists to besiege other Italian forces at Kassala in eastern Sudan. 
This development was viewed with disquiet by the British, as the success of the 
Mahdists would react unfavourably on Egypt. Alford and Sword expressed the 
British disquiet at this development: 
If Kassala fell into the hands of Dervishes, the latter would be let loose to 
overrun the Nile valley on the frontier of Egypt, and threaten that country 
itself ... the 
Dervishes suddenly assumed an offensive attitude, and it was 
rumoured that a large body of Dervishes were contemplating an 
immediate advance on Egypt. 6 
The security demands to push defensive lines farther up the river, and to create a 
diversion in favour of the demoralised Italians, were catered for by the Foreign Office 
March 1896 announcement of the start of the contemplated invasion of the Sudan. 
Further rumours of a Mahdist offensive then accelerated the advance to Khartoum. 7 
There was a second threat to that of the Mahdists. The scramble for Africa was in 
progress, and the southern parts of this former Egyptian colony were coveted by three 
other colonial powers besides Britain. The French, Belgians and Ethiopians each 
wanted to carve out parts of the Southern Sudan which appealed to them. Since the 
Sudan was so strategic, the British had to re-double their efforts either to forestall 
competitors, or to wrest the region from any weaker rivals who might have preceded 
them into the region. The outcome was the Fashoda incident of 1898 and subsequent 
discussions with the Belgians. 
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However, security considerations were not the only factor in the British 
occupation of the Southern Sudan. The reconquest was also undertaken for motives 
which though of lesser importance to the strategic one, were nevertheless 
instrumental in quickening the pace of the invasion. Gordon's death at Khartoum in 
1885 at the hands of the Mahdists was one of the most sensational and resented 
incidents of the Victorian period. Since then there had been persistent calls to avenge 
his 'murder' and when the move against the Khalifa was under way, it was widely 
regarded as a mission to punish the Mahdists. Moreover, reports reaching Britain 
about the condition of the Sudan during the thirteen years of the Mahdia, most 
notably the testimony of two escaped Mahdist prisoners, Ohrwalder and Slatin, 
aroused much sympathy for the Sudanese victims. Wingate amplified such evidence 
of the Khalifa's misrule so effectively in reports to the War Office and Foreign Office 
that the liberation of the Sudanese from the Khalifa's tyranny became one of the 
objectives of the reconquest. 8 
While Egypt's security needs and distaste for the Khalifa's misrule are generally 
considered to be the chief motives for the British occupation of the Sudan, there were 
further important motives which require greater emphasis than they receive in the 
existing interpretations. The Southern Sudan in fact had been of special interest to 
the British since the 1850s for economic, political, religious and humanitarian reasons. 
The British Vice-Consul in Khartoum and ivory trader in the Southern Sudan, John 
Petherick, drew the Foreign Office's attention to the potential for commercial 
development in the region. In a memorandum he submitted to the Foreign Office in 
1859 seeking promotion to Consul, Petherick cited the promotion of commerce as the 
top of his next agenda. His submission won him the promotion. The Foreign Office 
further showed their support for the Consul's trading activity in 1861 when the 
Foreign Secretary, John Russell recommended that the Government should accept 
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part Petherick's requirements for his commercial operations 'amongst turbulent and 
warlike tribes'. 9 
The slave trade also brought the Southern Sudan into British public notice. 
British determination to suppress the slave trade in the lacustrine kingdoms of 
Buganda, Bunyoro and Karagwe, made Murchison, President of the Royal 
Geographical Society, and the explorer, Speke, suggest to the Foreign Office in 1863 
that Egypt should be encouraged to extend its occupation farther south to Gondokoro 
and beyond. At the time, however, the British Government could not adopt the 
proposal for the simple reason that it knew from reports from Jeddah and Khartoum 
that the Egyptian Government secretly condoned the slave trade. 10 
Christian missionaries were particularly worried about the effects of the slave 
trade upon their attempts to introduce Christianity into the region. The Protestant 
millionaire missionary Robert Arthington, believed the Southern Sudan would be the 
best starting point for spreading the Gospel in central Africa. But in a report on the 
White Nile slave trade to the Foreign Secretary, Clarendon, in 1866, Arthington 
complained that: 
this abominable system of most wicked cruelties hinders us from planting 
mission stations promptly along the Upper Nile and sweeping with the 
Gospel ... around 
Victoria Nyanza, through the interesting kingdom of 
Rumaniki ... even 
forward to the East Coast. 11 
Clarendon passed the report to the Consul-General in Cairo, Stanton, to recommend 
how best the situation could be handled. This recommendation came in the form of a 
suggestion that a new Consul be appointed at Khartoum who, to use Gray's words, 
'might be able to organise, beyond the boundary of Egyptian authority, a coalition of 
tribes who would be strong enough to resist the slave traders and with whom 
legitimate commerce might be promoted'. 12 Stanton further suggested the name of a 
Foreign Office official, G. Palgrave, as the most suitable candidate for the job. 
Palgrave, however, put forward his own, more extensive plans. He supported the 
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'Khartoum mission 'in view of the Abolition of Slave Trade' which he described as 'a 
popular move, and creditable to ourselves'. But as he saw his would-be mission, the 
humanitarian motive would serve as a screen behind which other interests could be 
achieved. 
... the real and ulterior 
Political importance of such a Post, both as regard 
the Sudan, a district always ready, troops and all to separate from Egypt 
... 
is self-evident. Also much furtherance to English trade, direct and 
indirect. When the crisis comes, which must come in some form sooner 
or later, this Post will be hardly less useful to us, than those which regard 
Cairo and the Isthmus. 13 
The Foreign Office realised that this project would be costly in terms of funds and 
decided therefore to put it quietly aside. 14 But although active British involvement 
in the Southern Sudan was held back by parsimony, the region continued to feature 
high in the thoughts of important figures. For the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, 
Baker's annexation of Equatoria was significant because it 'extended British influence 
in Egypt', and looked forward to a British opening-up of the interior of Africa which 
would pass 'mainly through Egyptian territory'. 15 The explorer, Stanley, in 1885 
urged 'all who lament the death of Gordon' to raise sufficient funds for a mission to 
the Southern Sudan through the Congo so that the tribes in the area could be 
organised into 'a confederacy for their own self-preservation'. A Cardinal who 
supported the idea looked to the merchants of Britain'to provide the tribes ... with the 
first elements of civilisation and also of self-defence'. 16 
The British interest in the Southern Sudan was a component in the thinking 
which produced the Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan. The reign of the 
Khalifa intensified the surging humanitarian, religious and economic interests of the 
earlier period, as shown most clearly in the outcry from the British public to rescue 
the Sudanese from the Mahdist misrule. In fact the Southern Sudan had additional 
interest for the British immediately prior to the reconquest. While concerned 
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Christians had in the past thought they had the time to debate how and when to send 
missionaries into the region, by the 1890s the situation had turned into what some 
saw as a desperate struggle against Christian exclusion from the region. Islamic 
penetration of central Africa both from the east coast and down the Nile from the 
north was' considered by Kitchener in 1892 to be a big enough threat in adjacent 
Uganda to sound the alarm to the Christian world: 
Unless the Christian powers hold their own in Africa, the Mohammedan 
Arabs will I believe step in, and in the centre of the continent will form a 
base from which they will be able to drive back all civilising influences to 
the coast, and the country will then be given up to slavery and misrule as 
is the case in the Sudan at present. 17 
The evident strength of this sentiment suggests that when Kitchener planned and 
executed the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan, he carried with him a 
significant religious motivation. Subsequent policies of the Condominium 
Government indicate that such concerns were shared by other British officers and 
officials. 
Information compiled by Wingate in the Egyptian military intelligence since 
1883 on the situation in the Sudan revealed new facts about the Southern Sudan. Of 
special significance was the information supplied by Slatin Pasha18 on which Wingate 
based his confidential 'Memorandum on the Bahr al-Ghazal' of 7 April 1895. Three 
central points of the memorandum are noteworthy for what they reveal of British 
interest in the area: manpower supply, the strategic significance of Bahr al-Ghazal, 
and commercial prospects. The population was estimated at between five and six 
million19 of 'the most warlike' peoples in the Sudan 'capable of making excellent 
soldiers'. Although the notes question the reliability of such population estimates, the 
figures quoted appeared to have influenced official policies in certain areas. 20 But 
faulty though they were, the figures and description gave Wingate an additional 
incentive for the reconquest. Bahr al-Ghazal would be a source of recruitment of 
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local forces for furthering colonial objectives. Moreover, feuds among the various 
tribes were believed to prevent their combination against external aggression, making 
it easier for 'an European power' to 'obtain an ascendancy in the province and create 
an efficient local army'. 21 Wingate's intelligence sources had confirmed the presence 
of the French and Belgian forces on the fringes of Bahr al-Ghazal, and he feared that 
if these European powers preceded the British in occupying the region, that local 
manpower would be lost. Thus in what appears to have been an attempt to 
accelerate the invasion of the Sudan, Wingate further advertised what might be called 
his proposed war machine in the Southern Sudan. 
... the 
European nation which sooner or later extends its sphere of 
influence over these distant lands will find a recruiting ground for troops 
who for reckless bravery and endurance it would be hard to find an equal. 
This is a point worth bearing in mind by extensively colonising European 
nations desirous of obtaining auxiliaries who are less tied down by 
feelings of patriotism than perhaps any other class and who have been 
truthfully described as creatures who 'eat, drink and fight but never 
pray'. 22 
Wingate's rather exaggerated praise of Southern Sudanese military prowess would 
certainly appeal to an extensively conquering world power like Britain which relied 
heavily on local auxiliaries to maintain law and order in the colonies. 23 In fact, 
Wingate was later to be embarrassed when he could not meet requests from London 
and British authorities elsewhere in Africa to recruit Sudanese for military service 
outside the Sudan. 24 But although those later failures tend to portray Wingate as 
having a false image of the situation, in the 1890s he was fully convinced of the area's 
military potential. Slatin's reports agreed comfortably with Wingate's own practical 
knowledge of the Southern Sudanese. As a senior officer in the Egyptian army which 
had substantial numbers of blacks of Southern Sudanese origin in its different units, 
Wingate could not have failed to recognise their valour. The 9th Sudanese Battalion, 
founded in 1884 out of Dinka and Shilluk youths, performed military feats which 
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earned them the highest esteem in the army. The first commander of this battalion, 
Hunter Pasha, described his soldiers as 'always worth two of any other, in fighting' 
and to have actually 'taught the Egyptian Army to fight'. These were soldiers who 
'gave of their best to the others, and grudged nothing - neither life'. 25 Would a 
colonial power who knew where to get such soldiers, and was capable of getting 
them, hesitate to secure that source of supply and deny it to other colonial 
competitors? The acquisition of cheap military manpower must be included among 
the factors in the occupation of the Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian governments. 
Wingate's memorandum also drew attention to the riches of Bahr al-Ghazal 
which any- occupying foreign power would reap, a confirmation of what Gessi had 
earlier maintained. The region was described as the 'most fertile province', endowed 
with many streams, extensive forests and plains where elephants and cattle abound, 
and an 'exceptionally good' soil producing the important commercial crops of cotton 
and rubber among other agricultural products. Here a new dimension to the strategic 
importance of the Southern Sudan was revealed. Whereas diversion of the course of 
the Nile had been the primary anxiety of Egypt's over-lords in realtion to the Sudan as 
a whole, Wingate knew this concern had little real bearing upon the South. All the 
major streams which pass through the region from sources in the highlands of central 
Africa and Congo (Zaire) drain into the great swampy depression of central Upper 
Nile, known as the sudd region. It would take exceptional engineering ingenuity, 
certainly at that time, to hold back the discharges of such rivers effectively. He 
concluded therefore that the would-be possessors of Bahr al-Ghazal 'would not be in 
a position to deflect the Nile to any extent which would materially affect Egypt'. 26 
But that did not mean that Bahr al-Ghazal had ceased to be of importance to Egypt. 
Rather Wingate's memorandum made the region seem much more important, not only 
to Egypt and by extension to Britain, but as will shortly be seen also to Britain 
independently from the Egyptian connections. 
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Bahr al-Ghazal continued to be considered a valuable possession to Egypt, 
largely because of its economic potential. The memorandum maintained that Bahr al- 
Ghazal was the most profitable part of the Sudan; without it the acquisition of the rest 
of the country would be a waste of effort. Its possession was therefore 'absolutely 
essential'. If a foreign power unconcerned with Egyptian interests were to take 
charge of 'the vast resources of this great province' which were estimated 'at a much 
higher value in both men and material than those of any portion of the Nile valley', this 
would 'render in a large measure valueless the occupation by Egypt of the remainder 
of the Egyptian Sudan'. 27 
Behind Wingate's invasion-oriented document, he appeared to have entertained 
a hope of the Sudan ultimately becoming an exclusively British possession. He was 
not alone in this regard. The idea was current in the British army, where it was 
known beforehand that the fall of Khartoum would be followed immediately by the 
occupation of the Southern Sudan. The objective of this drive southwards was to 
create 'a colony under the British flag'. 28 This was not immediately apparent during 
the reconquest and while Wingate remained subordinate to Kitchener. But when he 
became Governor-General his political leanings towards an independent British 
administration of the Sudan could easily be discerned. 
Two instances provide sufficient demonstration. The debate which the Belgian 
occupation of the Lado Enclave and a portion of Bahr al-Ghazal provoked in 1905 
between Khartoum and Cairo forced Wingate to address the issue directly. He 
subsequently articulated his views about Bahr al-Ghazal during a debate with Cromer, 
in a language only just short of open confrontation. The two men had diametrically 
opposed views on the Southern Sudan. Cromer had originally opposed extending the 
reconquest to the Southern Sudan which he considered as 'large tracts of useless 
territory which it would be difficult and costly to administer properly'. 29 Only the 
French threat in the Upper Nile changed his mind. Adverse developments in Bahr al- 
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Ghazal between 1902 and 1905, which included the death of senior British officers by 
war; accident and natural causes, only revived his original pessimism. After the death 
of the governor of the Province, W. A. Boulnois and another officer, H. H. Fell, 
Cromer would have nothing to do with Bahr al-Ghazal again: 'The beastly country is 
not worth occupying at the cost of more Fells and Boulnois'. 30 Thus when the 
Belgian troops who had preceded the British in occupying the western bank of the 
Bahr al-Jebel could not easily be persuaded to withdraw from the river stations of 
Lado and Rejaf by 1905, Cromer considered Bahr al-Ghazal was up for barter. He 
readily suggested trading it for the Belgian withdrawal from the Lado Enclave 
through which runs the main source of the Nile, which Britain wished to control in 
line with their overall regional strategy. Like Wingate and Slatin, Cromer did not 
believe that Bahr al-Ghazal was a great significance to the Anglo-Egyptian 
government as far as Egypt's water security was concerned. Clearly disappointed 
with the Sudan Government's reluctance to support his suggestion on Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Cromer told Wingate: 
I can't help thinking that all your people miss the real point - they argue 
that the Bahr al-Ghazal is not a mere marsh - that it is a valuable 
possession etc. I daresay but the real point to my mind is - how far is its 
possession necessary in order to secure Egyptian water supply? 31 
The Consul-General was only being diplomatic, it was actually in Wingate that he had 
the principal opponent of the policy of abandonment of the region. Wingate's original 
stand on Bahr al-Ghazal had not changed. The region continued to be seen as 'a 
country capable of much commercial development'32 and its loss could only be 
accepted under duress, should things go that far. Furthermore, he could not imagine 
how the Sudan could lose the numerous and warlike people of Bahr al-Ghazal 
without jeopardising internal security. So, while the fate of the Lado Enclave and 
Bahr al-Ghazal was being determined in the Anglo-Belgian negotiations, Cairo and 
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Khartoum stated their respective positions in the hope of influencing the outcome. 
Accordingly, Wingate countered Cromer's argument with this plea: 
My earnest appeal is that no decision be taken which involves the loss of 
the country N of the Congo - Nile watershed without the most careful 
consideration - otherwise I think a step will be taken which will be 
regretted later. I fully appreciate all the strong points you bring forward 
and no one feels more strongly than I do the loss of valuable lives - but on 
the other hand everyone of these men who have been there and who 
understand the situation will tell you the same thing, viz that for the peace 
and security of the Sudan the retention of the Bahr al-Ghazal is 
essential. 33 
The Governor-General even assumed a militant attitude by suggesting that instead of 
negotiating with the Belgians, the British should 'sit tight', refuse arbitration, and see 
whether anyone would 'force us to accept it'. 34 Bent on resistance, Wingate went 
further to initiate moves towards confrontation with the forces of the Congo Free 
State. Writing on leave from Scotland in 1905 to the Acting Governor-General, 
Henry, Wingate instructed the former to alert the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 
Province, A. Sutherland to be prepared 'under all the circumstances'. 35 Henry 
himself was told to prepare at his level for a fight over the Bahr al-Ghazal by 
preparing a detailed defence scheme. 36 
By taking such an uncompromising attitude on the question of Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Wingate ably demonstrated that he was not a mere protector of the Egyptian water 
supply, but an ambitious Briton inspired by the desire to extend the British Empire. 
He would not have taken that tough stand on the future of the region when the 
custodian of Egyptian interests, Cromer, was willing to throw it away, unless he 
believed it had considerable potential. For him, the reconquest was not undertaken 
only for the single motive of ensuring the Egyptian water supply. There were 
political, commercial and religious motives to be considered alongside the strategic 
one. 
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Besides what he had already said about the special significance of the Sudan to 
Britain, Wingate later explicitly expressed his political dream regarding the Sudan. 
He considered the sacrifice of the lives of British officers during the Mahdia and the 
reconquest, of whom Gordon, Hicks, Stewart and Earle were mentioned in name, to 
have not been in vain. The defeat of the Khalifa: 
... gave us a vast territory 
in the heart of Africa to administer, and made 
us responsible for the good government of millions of Sudanese, who ... 
can in no circumstances be abandoned by us. In spite of Cairo's claims to 
the contrary, the Sudan is an Empire heritage for our sons -a land which 
owes us order, security and prosperity. 37 
Wingate's long-conceived objective of making the Sudan an exclusive British 
possession was further advanced in 1908 when he made a formal request to the 
British Government for the separation of the country from Egypt. The Government 
rejected the proposal, probably because it was opposed by Wingate's immediate 
superior in Cairo in the person of Gorst, the Consul-General. Gorst may have resisted 
the proposal on the purely practical ground of the difficulty of altering the 
Condominium agreement. 38 But the Governor-General in his disappointment 
attributed his failure to Gorst's parochial interests. He claimed to 'fully understand' 
the Consul-General's mental attitude on the issue, which was that Gorst 'would 
naturally foresee, in such a separation a possible diminution of his own control'. 39 
Whatever the reasons the Foreign Office had for rejecting his suggestion, Wingate 
clearly demonstrated that he had pre-conceived colonial ambitions for the Sudan 
which he wanted to realise. 
The foregoing investigation has established that the leibnotiv of the British 
concern in the Sudan was the desire to get involved in determining its future for the 
mutual benefit of both the colonising power and the subject peoples. The reconquest 
was the fulfilment of that ambition. In previous intepretations, the supposed absence 
of pre-conceived British motives and objectives are held to be part of the explanation 
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for the late start of development programmes in the Southern Sudan. But in reality 
such determinants were there in force in the reconquest of the Sudan. It follows that 
alternative factors must be sought in explaining what confined the Condominium 
government for so long to holding rather than developing the region's economic 
resources. 
It should be pointed out at this juncture that whatever adverse effects the 
supposed British lack of interest in the Sudan had on development in the Southern 
Sudan, the same should apply to the Northern Sudan. In reality the two regions 
experienced different treatment, hence the present search for causes of economic, 
educational and administrative disparity between them in the following chapters. An 
attempt will also be made to find out what happened to those earlier objectives which 
have been identified here. Meanwhile, the rest of this chapter will draw attention to 
certain significant parallels in the British occupation of the two Nile Valley countries, 
Egypt and the Sudan. This analogy will be useful in the analysis of the situation in the 
Sudan in general, and in the Southern Sudan in particular. 
If we were to accept Robinson and Gallagher's argument that the British 
occupied the Nile Valley countries for the ultimate purpose of safeguarding interests 
in India, this alone would still not explain satisfactorily the lack of tangible 
development in the Southern Sudan. Original strategic and security motivations were 
not incompatible with subsequent policies of social reforms and economic 
development. Here common characteristics of the British presence in Egypt and the 
Sudan can be identified. The decision to occupy them was taken unwillingly. Once 
the occupation had been completed, prompt action was taken by the governments in 
both countries to improve the condition of the local people as part of the overall 
strategy to ensure stability. Local power centres were identified early and attempts 
made to bind them by economic tethers to the colonial power. 
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Britain occupied Egypt because the Arabi revolution was a potential danger to 
the sea link with India through the Suez Canal. The Government went in 'protesting' 
and even after they had suppressed the revolt and installed a reliable Egyptian 
administration, they were still 'utterly against it. Furthermore, the government had 
'not the smallest intention' of remaining in the country for 'one moment longer than 
they could help'. 40 Yet the British stayed on well into almost the second half of the 
20th century. The French had ambitions in the area and it would have been unwise 
for the occupying power to leave the door open. More significantly, -it was realised 
that lasting peace and ability in that strategic location could not be achieved only by 
superior military power, but by realistically addressing problems of reform and 
development which triggered disorder. Accordingly the British embarked 
immediately on reforms. The Egyptian army was reorganised in 1883 with a British 
General, Sir Evelyn Wood, as its first Sirdar. 41 More important were Cromer's 
economic reforms. His ambition was 'of leading the Egyptian people from bankruptcy 
to solvency and then onwards to affluence, from ... Oriental methods ... towards the 
true civilisation of the West based on the principles of the Christian moral code'. 42 
By 1898 the improved economic condition enabled the Egyptian government to 
undertake the reconquest of the Sudan in conjunction with the British. Cromer had 
realised his dream of leading Egypt to solvency. Clearly even though the British went 
to Egypt for strategic reasons, this preoccupation did not preclude but even 
stimulated engagement in development programmes. 
The British also went to the Sudan unwillingly as is evident from Cromer's 
opposition and from Salisbury describing the Bahr al-Ghazal in 1898 as 'wretched 
stuff. 43 After the fall of the Mahdist state, security conditions made withdrawal 
inappropriate (if it had ever been contemplated). The Mahdists continued resistance 
through sporadic revolts till 1921. In the Southern Sudan the Belgians had to be 
watched lest they encroached on the Anglo-Egyptian territory. A state of insecurity 
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existed in the Sudan-Ethiopian frontier caused principally by the slave trade and inter- 
tribal raids. To these were added the resistance of some Southern peoples. 
As in Egypt, the British began with the intention of implementing a policy of 
reform and innovations. Improving the social and economic condition of the 
Sudanese was high on Kitchener's list of priorities. 44 It is what the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration did in this regard that is the focus of the current investigation. 
Kitchener's appeal did interest, his subordinates and successors and that is why the 
existing literature tries to justify the causes of disparity in the dispensation of the 
limited hand-outs to needy Sudanese. 
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Chanter III: Soave Inhihitinn Factors 
The natural and human obstacles enumerated in the Introduction did indeed 
present considerable challenges to the British in their penetration and administration 
of the Southern Sudan. However, such difficulties varied from one locality to 
another, depending largely on the terrain, distance from the base of operation, and 
knowledge of the different areas and peoples. It was easier, for example, to reach the 
Shilluk and Dinka of the White Nile and Sobat region than the Lau Nuer farther 
inland in eastern Upper Nile. Similarly, it needed less effort to befriend the smaller 
agricultural Fertit tribes in southern-western Bahr al-Ghazal than the cattle-owning 
Dinka in the swamps of central and northern parts of the region. The resulting 
different levels of response continued in one form or the other well beyond our 
period, but government officials of the time were careful not to generalise. A report 
on Bahr al-Ghazal Province for 1925 declared that: 
the state and mentality of the tribes in this province vary between wide 
extremes. While the cattle-owning tribes are extremely conservative and 
apt to resent control of any kind, the cultivators living in the , 
forest 
country are much more amenable. To write in general terms therefore is 
difficult ... 
1 
Some of the difficulties presented by the terrain had not been overcome in places like 
Upper Nile Province even by the late 1920s. In the hand-over notes to his successor, 
C. A. Willis, the out-going Governor, K. C. P. Struve, warned of transport problems: 
There is a tendency in Khartoum, of which you may be aware, to consider 
that conditions in the Southern provinces are uniform. People joy-ride 
through ... Mongalla and the more accessible parts of the BOG, and then, 
without visiting our inland parts, ask why we don't have roads like those 
provinces, or ... why D. 
C. s don't travel in cars or why we can only work 
from December to May ... 
2 
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Struve's complaint confirms that the conditions which obtained in one part of the 
South differed from those existing in other areas of the same region. Our 
investigation will therefore focus upon how British officials fared under what have 
generally been seen as the inhibiting factors of ignorance; poor transport and 
communications; language barriers and shortage of manpower. 
(a) Knowledge of the Area 
Although it has been maintained that Southern Sudan was an unknown region 
to 'those who were called upon to rule it', this can be contested. Other authorities 
suggest that opportunities for prior knowledge about the land, its peoples, and 
problems, were available to British officials through sources they could not have 
missed. There was a huge 19th century literature on the area, of which some has been 
cited in the Introduction. As Wingate wrote, 'various geographical expeditions ... 
greatly extended the knowledge of this dark country'. These included Baker's 
'wonderful exploits, adventure and discoveries in the regions of the White Nile' which 
'have been over and over again referred to in the numerous works which the strange 
circumstances connected with Emin Pasha and his deliverance, have given to the 
world'. 3 
Moreover the British personnel who occupied the South during the early years 
were soldiers of the Egyptian army, which had ample information. A map of Africa 
prepared as early as 1877 for the Egyptian army 'shows a wealth of details in the 
Upper Nile basin which contrasts sharply with the surrounding blank spaces' of the 
interior of the continent. 4 In reality, the region was 'by far the best-explored and 
best-known region of the African interior', next only to Southern Africa. 5 
Besides, there were other possible sources of information open to officials. One 
was contact with soldiers of Southern Sudanese origin in the different units of the 
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Egyptian army. The Handbook for Egypt and the Sudan, published periodically since 
1873 was another handy source of information for field officers. The book describes 
in considerable detail some of the peoples of the region like the Shilluk, Dinka, Nuer, 
as well as describing many rivers and villages. 6 
What could be doubted, perhaps, would be the uali of knowledge obtained 
from such sources, and the individual's ability to absorb it. But such a deficiency 
could be made good by practical knowledge subsequently acquired in the field. The 
argument that British- officials' ignorance about the Southern Sudan militated against 
the introduction of more constructive methods of administration needs careful 
qualification, if it can be maintained at all. 
(b) Transport and Communications 
Once the Sudan had been partly occupied, securing the Upper Nile region 
against other foreign powers put transport and communications on top of the Anglo- 
Egyptian priorities. It should be reiterated that it was partly, and very significantly, 
the fear of possible French advance through the Bahr al-Ghazal to establish a foothold 
on the Nile above Khartoum that had forced the march on Omdurman. The contest 
for the Upper Nile had by 1898 turned into a race between the British and three other 
powers: the French, Ethiopians and Belgians. The Anglo-Egyptian army of the 
reconquest had not completed its task before a new one was imposed. Only a week 
after Kitchener's victorious entry into Omdurman, disquieting news was received from 
the Upper Nile region. What the British had feared - the occupation of that part of 
the Nile valley by another European colonial power - had become a reality. 
A Mahdist steamer, the 'Taufikia', returning from the South to report to the 
Khalifa was captured on 9 September 1898 by the new masters of the Sudan. It was 
actually the captured crew of the 'Taufikia' who broke the news of the presence of 
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other Europeans at Fashoda. Kitchener sailed for the South the next day with a large 
force.? On arrival at Fashoda on 19 September a tense situation developed between 
the two forces, with Kitchener ostensibly upholding the Egyptian territorial rights, and 
Major Marchand, the Commander of the French mission refusing to evacuate the 
area, having fulfilled one of the 1884 Berlin Conference's conditions for the partition 
of Africa - effective occupation of territory. While the issue was being discussed in 
Europe by their respective governments, the two forces shared the town of Fashoda: 
But while the smaller French mission was confined to their camp and the immediate 
neighbourhood, the stronger Anglo-Egyptian force operated far and wide in the 
region. 
The Fashoda incident was a warning to the British to occupy the Southern 
Sudan effectively before the French example could be followed by others. 
Accordingly, Kitchener created on 19 September anew military district of Fashoda 
"with H. W. Jackson as its first military administrator. On 20 September, Kitchener 
also established Sobat station above Fashoda as a sub-district under the latter. 8 
The occupation of the Shilluk kingdom of Fashoda was preliminary to the 
ambitious feat of bringing the whole of the Nile Valley under direct control. It was 
especially ambitious because the geographical limits of the Nile Valley were as yet not 
precisely determined. The most pressing question facing the Anglo-Egyptian 
authorities now became: 'What precisely was meant by the geographical term 'the Nile 
Valley and where were the boundaries to be drawn? '9 
The erection of adequate transport and communications were a pre-requisite for 
control of the Upper Nile region. These had to be attended to first, because only with 
easy movement of troops and efficient communications with the headquarters could 
the situation be controlled effectively. The process was initiated in 1899 when the 
Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, through its British Under-Secretary, Sir William 
Garstin, released a sum of £ 10,000 to the Sudan Government for Sudd clearing on the 
59 
rivers. Garstin was not interested in the navigation of the rivers per se. The Egyptian 
Government was more concerned with increasing the water supply for Egypt. Many 
streams branch off from the main river, conveying large volumes of water into the 
sudd swamps, where some is lost through seepage and evaporation. The Ministry 
hoped that the Sudd-cutting operations would succeed in sealing off some of the main 
spill-channels with the ultimate aim of confining the Bahr al-Jebel to one single 
stream, which would increase the discharge downstream for Egyptian irrigation. 10 
Sudd-cutting was entrusted to-military teams, assisted by hundreds of Mahdist 
prisoners. Operations started in December 1899 under Major Peake. By April 1900, 
a navigable channel had been opened to Gondokoro on the Uganda border. 
" 
Further Sudd-cutting was conducted by Major Matthews between 1901 and early 
1902, and by Lieutenant Drury in 1903, to widen the passage. 
12 Meanwhile, 
Lieutenant Fell in charge of sudd-cutting on the Jur river in Bahr al-Ghazal region, 
made rapid progress and by 1902 the river was navigable to Wau, the main 
government centre. 
The Sudd was indeed a formidable obstacle, but it proved a hurdle that could be 
overcome easily. With the principal waterways open to navigation, facilitating the 
rapid penetration of the interior, the Sudan Government was now braced for the race 
to the borders. But different border areas received different degrees of attention from 
the administration, with the magnitude of the external threat to the Anglo-Egyptian 
interests being the determining factor. 
1. . Sudan-Ethiopian 
Frontier 
Kitchener's two-day visit to Fashoda in 1898 saw the beginning of the British 
permanent presence in the Sobat valley. The opening of the two government 
stations of Fashoda and Sobat was followed soon after by reconnaissance of the 
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area. Two army majors, Maxse and Smith, led boat patrols up the Sobat, Pibor, 
and Baro rivers between September and December, during which a third 
government station was established at the old General Gordon's station of 
Nasser near the Ethiopian border. 13 Eastern Upper Nile was vital to the 
Anglo-Egyptian Government in many ways. Ethiopia had of late displayed a 
strong tendency to expand westwards at the expense of the Sudan. This had to 
be monitored at close range by regular patrols of the frontier, and by 
negotiations to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement of the border. 
Moreover, it was not lost on the British that Ethiopia had facilitated the 
abortive French invasion of eastern Upper Nile in 1898, on the incentive that a 
large portion of the Sobat region was to be her share of the booty should the 
venture succeed. 
In addition, Ethiopian slave traders from the highlands used to descend on 
border tribes, raiding deep into Sudan territory to prey on the Nuer, Anuak and 
Bier tribes. Again the problem could only be contained if the borders were 
clearly defined and agreed. It was 'hoped that when the line has been 
demarcated there will be a cessation of constant raids across the frontier for 
slaves'. 14 If those difficulties could be removed, this would enable the 
realisation of one of the prime movers of British imperial expansion - 
commercial exploitation. 15 
Negotiations to delimit frontiers between the two countries started in 1900. 
While those negotiations were proceeding, the Sudan Government began 
preliminary survey work in the border area, in order to obtain the necessary 
information for the final resolution of the issue. Two survey teams set out. 
One team under Major Gwynn covered the region from the Blue Nile to Nasser 
on the Sobat. He went to work on the same project on the Ethiopian side of the 
border in 1901 with the consent of the Government of Ethiopia. 16 The other 
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team led by Major Austin commenced its work from Fashoda up the Sobat and 
Baro rivers to Gore in Ethiopia. 17 The work of demarcation continued after 
the 1902 boundary agreement between the Sudan and Ethiopia. But due to 
shortage of manpower to cover the long border of about 800 miles, it was only 
in 1909 that this task was finally accomplished by Major Gwynn. 18 
Nevertheless, a small number of committed army officers had registered another 
triumph over hostile, environment during the first decade of the occupation of 
the Sudan. They explored, mapped and surveyed swamps and mountainous 
terrain under tropical humidity, disease and other discomforts caused, for 
example, by untreated water and insects. Where the Anglo-Egyptian 
Government had a definite programme to be executed and a sense of urgency, 
the officials were not deterred by the hostile condition of the land. 
2. The Nile-Con To Divide 
The political situation in the Bahr al-Ghazal region was, perhaps, more serious 
because of the presence of the French and the Belgians in the neighbourhood. 
The delay in invading the region until two years later suggests that apart from 
the problem of the sudd, it was a difficult situation that demanded careful 
mobilisation of resources. It also appears that the British were not prepared to 
inflame Anglo-French relations further by moving against French positions in 
the region'which they had occupied in some force'19 while negotiations were in 
progress. But the Anglo-French treaty of March 1899 minimised the possibility 
of clashes between the two powers, and it was decided in 1900 to send an army 
of occupation to Bahr al-Ghazal. The force was commanded by Colonel 
Sparkes and its mission was: 'to explore and occupy some of the districts lying 
between the river and the Nile-Congo watershed, included within the Soudan 
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territories as defined by the Anglo-French Treaty'20 Marchand had reached 
Fashoda through that region and had therefore 'to be seen off the premises in 
the Bahr al-Ghazal'. 21 The occupation was also undertaken 'to frustrate 
Belgian designs in the region'. 22 
Despite transport problems and lack of co-operation from some of the peoples 
of Bahr al-Ghazal to provide porters, after the troops had embarked from the 
navigable part of the Bahr al-Ghazal river at Mashra ar-Raqq, Sparkes made 
rapid progress. Once he reached Wau in January 1901, porterage was no 
longer an acute problem. He was soon welcomed and accorded unreserved 
support by the Fertit tribes: the Golo, Bongo, Belanda and Kresh. These were 
the remnants of peoples who survived the slave trade by taking shelter with one 
or the other of their two powerful neighbours, Dinka and Azande, and who now 
regarded the Anglo-Egyptian Government as bringing them salvation. They 
became faithful subjects, serving the government in different capacities. It was 
from them that regular food supplies were purchased, and carriers and labourers 
obtained. 23 
Within the year the old slave trade centres were occupied: Rumbek, Dem 
Zubair and Shambe. In June Sparkes was at Tembura, in the Azande country 
on the Congo-Nile watershed. 24 Much of the region had been annexed to the 
Sudan Government by 1902, with only the loss of two British officers, Scott- 
Barbour killed by the Agar Dinka and Hunter dying from natural causes. But 
on the whole, conditions in the region were considered stable enough for the 
government to transfer Bahr al-Ghazal military district to the civil 
administration. 25 1 
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3. . Sudan-Uganda Border 
The drive to ensure the security of the Nile waters went at a slower pace in 
the area of the Bahr al-Jebel source. Major Peake's 1900 successful opening of 
a navigable channel to Gondokoro and Rejaf enabled the government to extend 
its territorial limits southwards to just a few miles north of the Uganda stations 
of Gonokoro. Here the station of Mongalla was established 'to observe 
Congolese activities in the Lado Enclave'. 26 Since dislodging the Mahdists 
from Rejaf in 1897, the Belgians had entrenched themselves on the west bank of 
the Bahr al-Jebel with their other centre at Lado. 
The Belgian occupation of the area was in accordance with the 1894 Anglo- 
Congolese agreement, under which Britain leased the Lado Enclave and parts of 
Bahr al-Ghazal region to the Congo Free State for the duration of the reign of 
King Leopold. But conditions had changed. Britain had accepted the 1894 
arrangement mainly to deny the French access to the Nile, but with the total 
exclusion of the latter from the region following the 1899 agreement, Britain 
considered this arrangement to be redundant and tried to ignore it. But it 
became a contentious issue involving protracted negotiations. While diplomacy 
took its course between London and Brussels, Cairo and Khartoum were not 
passive onlookers. When in 1905 diplomacy was seen to make little impact on 
Leopold, Cromer and Wingate initiated economic war on the Nile. They 
suggested to the British Government the blockading of the Belgian use of the 
Nile trade route to the Mediterranean which was cheaper than the Congo route 
to the Atlantic. 27 London consented and a ban was accordingly issued on 7 
December 1905, authorising the officer commanding at Bor station in the sudd 
region to stop Belgian steamers and those which traded with them from passing 
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either northwards or southwards of that point. 28 The restriction was lifted in 
April 1906 when the Belgians became amenable. 29 
With the Belgian threat provided for in the surveillance stations along the Bahr 
al-Jebel, no other immediate plans existed for the region south of Mongalla. 
This was not in the main due to the lack of transport, but arose for the obvious 
reason that there was extra British security in the Uganda direction, which 
precluded any immediate danger to the main source of the Nile. A government 
report for 1901 noted a further reason: 
... the 
boundary between the Southern Sudan provinces and Uganda 
still remains undefined, but relations with the Nile provinces of that 
Protectorate are still so comparatively underdeveloped that the 
settlement of this question does not press. 30 
4. Connecting the Provinces 
By 1906, the Sudan Government had occupied extensive areas of the 
Southern Sudan. This now necessitated the creation of larger administrative 
units for the more efficient discharge of duties. The military district of Fashoda 
to which were added in 1900 the districts of Bor and Mongalla, was upgraded 
in 1903 to provincial level, becoming Upper Nile Province with Kodok 
(Fashoda until December 1903) as its headquarters. Under this province were 
the Shilluk, the White Nile and Sobat Dinka, the Lau, Sobat and Zeraf Nuer, the 
Bor and Aliab Dinka, a portion of the Bari and Lokoro of Lafon Hills. 
The upgrading of Bahr al-Ghazal military district has already been mentioned. 
Under the province were the Azande, Dinka, Jur and Fertit tribes. Bahr al- 
Ghazal Province was by far the larger of the two Southern Provinces. It 
bordered the Congo Free State in the South, French Central Africa in the 
South-West, Darfur and Kordofan Provinces in the North, and Upper Nile in 
the East. Transport difficulties partly resulted in some of the inland districts 
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remaining unattended for a long time: this was true of North-Western districts, 
and the lands of the Nuer of Eastern district. 
A further step was taken in 1906 when a new Province of Mongalla was 
created out of the two Upper Nile districts of Bor and Mongalla, with the latter 
as its capital. Only four tribes constituted the new province: the Bari, Aliab, 
Bor and Lokoro. It appears the separation of these two southernmost stations 
from Upper Nile Province was dictated by transport difficulty from a 
headquarters hundreds of miles farther north across the sudd. The river route 
was not always reliable, given the rapid appearance of new floating vegetation 
on the middle passage in the sudd swamps. Also, those two stations had the 
responsibility of representing the Sudan Government in their frequent contacts 
with the Belgian and Uganda authorities. Raising the status of the posts to that 
of a province would give local authorities additional powers which reduced 
delays in government business. 
The three Southern Provinces of Upper Nile, Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal 
were connected with one another and with Khartoum by telegraph lines. By 
1903 a line had reached Taufikia near the junction of the Sobat and White 
Nile. 31 Another line from Wau reached Tonj and Mashra ar-Raqq in 1905,32 
and by April 1906, it had reached Rumbek. 33 It was extended to Mvolo in 
1907 and crossed the Bahr al-Jebel to Bor where a river cable was laid to 
Mongalla. 34 Bor was connected with Taufikia in 1908.35 With the completion 
of this system, the Southern Sudan had been brought into direct link with 
Khartoum. Wingate who was on tour in Mongalla Province in May 1908, when 
the Wad Habouba uprising occurred in the Gezira, was able 'to keep in touch 
with the ... uprising throughout'. 
36 
This is not to say that the government was satisfactorily served in the area of 
transport and communications. Far from it. The telegraph lines were 
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vulnerable: forest fires consumed poles, others were pulled down by wild 
animals or the wires were cut by natives for ornaments. 37 In those early years 
the roads were only 'dirt tracks' which were passable during the dry season 
only. 38 Nevertheless in this early phase the progress in transport and 
communications was remarkable. Steamer transport made at least those tribes 
along the rivers easily accessible, so if there were benefits denied by poor 
transport to peoples in the hinterland, they could have been reaped by the 
Shilluk, some Dinka and Nuer, and the Ban. The government was certainly not 
so helpless in terms of transport as is sometimes claimed. What could have 
caused problems were the choice of priorities like those which Matthews, 
Governor of Upper Nile Province. complained of 
... this tourist service up here is blocking our path of progress. 
Our 
moves of people, building material, and supplies are decidedly 
crippled by the tourist boats being so "exclusive" ... though 
I try to 
do all I can for passing voyagers, my conviction that they should not 
be here only deepens with time. 39 
To a large extent, lack of . proper roads and mechanical 
transport for 
government officials and troops was offset by the availability of porters from the 
local people. To almost every military or policy patrol, 'friendlies' were usually 
attached as porters and drivers of captured cattle. The military patrols were 
mostly punitive expeditions against recalcitrant or hitherto unpacified peoples. 
Hence their great attraction to 'friendlies', as the possibility of acquiring a few 
cattle or grain in reward, or restitution for past grievances against domestic 
enemies, were too good a temptation to resist. Government-sponsored raids 
were not incompatible with their then existing practices in inter-tribal conflicts. 
Examples abound. The Sobat Dinka in 1902 accompanied troops in a raid 
against the Lau Nuer of prophet Dengkur (Ngundeng). 
40 In the area of 
Rumbek, government soldiers were attended by so many 'friendlies' in the 1902 
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patrol against the Agar Dinka that the patrol commander had to send some of 
them away. 41 The assistance which the Azande chief, Tembura, rendered to 
the Sudan Government in the Yambio Patrol of 1904-1905, helped determine 
when to launch the offensive. Boulnois who commanded the force informed 
Wingate in December 1904 that 'with Tambura's carriers at out disposal, the 
opportunity was not to be lost in pushing up some of the troops'. 42 
Even those natives who were not willing to carry loads for government agents 
were not left alone. The docile ones who had from the outset readily offered 
their services became over-worked. Some therefore began to complain that if 
the government did not extend porterage to their other compatriots, they would 
strike. 43 Given - also a rising demand for more labour which the continuing 
territorial and administrative expansion necessitated, the government resorted to 
force. An eye witness reported in 1905 that people were secured by 
surrounding villages by night and seizing and driving men away. 44 While the 
troops hurried from place to place to secure the country, they 'could not afford 
to wait upon the time-consuming processes of diplomacy and persuasion in 
dealing with Southern groups inclined to oppose its advance'. Force, or the 
threat of force, 'was therefore freely used'. 45 
The above examples have shown that although the Sudan Government faced 
transport difficulties, it was an effective government that did not hesitate to 
resolve problems, if a remedy was within reach. It became even easier if the 
solution could be provided by pressure upon the natives. After all, in the words 
of Collins, the British'had come to the Upper Nile to conquer, to secure, and to 
control'. 46 
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(c) The Language Problem 
The assertion that language difficulty hampered British plans for Southern 
Sudan also requires qualification. Some of the British officers who served in the 
region during the early years, did have difficulties adjusting from the Arab-Islamic 
background of Egypt to the new Equatorial African setting. But even if Arabic was 
their preferred means of communication with the Sudanese, the South was not badly 
off in this respect. Arabic was spoken in many parts of the Bahr al-Ghazal, Northern 
Upper Nile and Mongalla, as a legacy of the days of slave trade and the Mahdist raids. 
The language had spread in Equatoria so rapidly that General Gordon thought Arabic 
would become 'the language of these countries'. 47 This process of Arabicisation 
would increase with subsequent contact with the Anglo-Egyptian soldiers of the 
Sudanese Battalions. 
The British could use Arabic-speaking Southern Sudanese as interpreters. A 
few examples prove the point. Kitchener's mission to Fashoda in 1898, included 
Major Ali Jaifun, a Shilluk veteran of the Sudanese Battalion to Mexico in the 
1860s. 48 The many Dinka and Nuer in the army translated for the British when in the 
Dinka and Nuer areas. 49 The Fertit population of Western Bahr al-Ghazal was 
predominantly Muslim. The chiefs with whom the government worked spoke Arabic, 
and so were many of the local dignitaries, some of whom were ex-Mahdist soldiers 
who returned to their respective tribes after the fall of the Khalifa. 
50 
Some areas had competent local Sudanese or Egyptian officials, the mamurs, 
who resided with the local people, where they were visited occasionally by their direct 
heads, the British Inspectors from provincial headquarters. With the exception of a 
few problems like petty corruption, 
51'the mannirs played a significant role as the 
point of contact between the British and the tribes. Some mamurs learnt the local 
languages fast, making it easier for the government message to reach the people. A 
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government report for 1906 described an Egyptian, Ahmed Ragab, who had mastered 
the Dinka language as 'one of the most useful assets of our Southern administrative 
machinery', 52 and so was another non-commissioned officer, Fadl Mullah, whom the 
Governor of Mongalla, Owen recommended in 1908 to take charge of a district. 53 
Among the British officers, there were a few quick learners in the local 
languages. Owen was working on the final version of the Bari grammar in 1905, 
which was ready by 1908.54 Captain Wilson had by 1906 published an English-Dinka 
vocabulary for official use. 55 Another officer, O'Sullivan compiled in 1906 Dinka 
laws and customs, an important contribution to knowledge which attracted scholarly 
interest in Britain. 56 
Moreover, the Christian missionaries who helped the government in the work of 
'civilisation' in the region by teaching Southern Sudanese 'the elements of common 
sense, good behaviour, and obedience to Government authority'57 had little difficulty 
coping with the 'curse of Babel'. It did not take them long to acquire a working 
knowledge in one local language or the other. For example, American missionaries 
had by 1908 started on the Shilluk translation of the Bible with the help of a fluent 
Arabic-speaking Shilluk woman. 58 Archdeacon Shaw of the C. M. S. had completed 
the translation of St. Luke's Gospel into Dinka by 1910.59 With the help of the 
missionaries and government officials, the anthropologist, Dr. Seligman, whom the 
Sudan Government engaged in 1909 to study some tribes of the Southern Sudan, 
conducted a successful two-year preliminary survey of the Nilotic tribes. 60 
Although previous interpretations have presented language as a serious 
hindrance to British administration in the South, the foregoing examples show that it 
has been accorded too prominent a role. It cannot be accepted that the British 
soldiers in the region 'were totally ignorant of any local language'. 61 In any case, 
there was no real demand for a lingua franca in the Southern Sudan during the early 
period of British rule, for this was a time when the use of force was the mainstay of 
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the administration. The indigenous peoples 'could detect but little diference between 
the old Turkish Government, the Dervishes, and the Sudan Government' because they 
all raided'. 62 It was a time of minimum dialogue. 
(d) British Manpower 
It has also been argued that the limited number and inexperience of British 
personnel impeded progress in the South, making development in such fields as 
education seem remote prospects. Sanderson and Sanderson have stated concisely 
the general academic verdict. 
Until the First World War few British officers and officials were available 
for administrative work; a region the size of a large European country 
might have perhaps half a dozen. In the early days these administrators 
were in no way a professional elite; they were simply British officers 
serving in the Egyptian army and seconded for special duty ... 
Not all of 
them were competent, or ... willing administrators ... 
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Some of this seems to indicate an unwarranted prejudice against the soldiers. Their 
administrative incompetence and lack of the qualities of a professional elite are a 
matter of opinion, and would not be accepted by all. Suffice it to cite a contrary view 
from a long-serving British soldier whom a countryman described in 1925 as a man 
'who knows more about the Soudan and its people than any other living 
Englishman'. 64 According to H. W. Jackson 
One thing the British Public will never understand: that the East can only 
be governed by the personality of its rulers ... That 
is why, when at first 
we rule by young soldiers ... we are so successful. They only try to 
govern in a patriarcal [sic] way, and institute rough and ready justice. 
The people understand this, and are contented. then [sic] comes the 
inevitable sequence. The civilian succeeds the soldier, and immediately 
calls for more of what he calls "efficiency", and to obtain this he increases 
his European staff, and introduces laws and regulations they don't 
understand, and loathe. At the same time he tells them he is going to 
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educate them so that they may govern themselves. He tries to educate 
them, but he never really means to let them govern themselves. 65 
In the light of such differences of opinion on the relative abilities of soldiers and 
civilians, we should try to avoid making assessment of British successes and failures 
along lines of professional demarcation. Such judgements should rather be based on 
policy and individual records. But even if we accept the Sanderson and Sanderson's 
criticisms they would still not adequately account for the differences in the level and 
quality of British administration as between Southern and Northern Sudan. Those 
types of administrator-soldiers were not found in the Southern Sudan alone. An 
analysis of the list of provincial governors (Appendix II) shows that in terms of 
quality, place, and duration of assignment, all the Sudanese provinces put up with the 
problems of'inexperienced' soldiers at one time or the other. There were only fifteen 
civilian governors. Moreover, the 'rapid succession of British personnel' was not 
confined to the Southern Sudan, as the list again shows. If we compare the rate of 
transfers in and out of the region during the period 1898-1924, with that of three 
northern provinces, chosen at random but of the same period of establishment, the 
difference is negligible. Upper Nile and Berber had ten and twelve governors 
respectively. Bahr al-Ghazal had nine while Kassala had seven. Mongalla had seven 
and White Nile five. Since the personnel rotated within the provinces, any negative 
impact due to incompetence of soldiers and lack of continuity in the administration 
caused by rapid transfers would therefore be condominium-wide rather than regional. 
As for the shortage of staff, this was indeed a problem the British had to put up 
with in their vast possession. But again this was not unique to the Southern Sudan: it 
was also a problem in the more extensive Northern Sudan. However, the government 
circumvented this problem by the practice of shifting personnel. The number of men 
available would fluctuate from region to region according to the needs of the moment. 
A local situation could result in a sudden increase of manpower, temporarily 
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intensifying shortages in other areas. This would only last until, say, an emergency 
had been contained or project accomplished. In the 1904-1905 contest for Bahr al- 
Ghazal with the Belgians, for example, the government deployed the largest force 
ever assembled in the South. 66 Five years later the government mounted the largest 
military operation since the reconquest against local resistance in Kordofan 
Province. 67 
Moreover, the British always formed a tiny minority in the rest of British 
possessions in' Africa and the rest of the world, but nevertheless maintained their 
administrative power and got things done as they wished. The Indian experience cited 
in Chapter II is a case in point. Their tactics of control over their numerous subjects 
are best expressed by the following observation by an Azande: '... you put the 
Egyptians in the front when you conquered the dervishes and you put the ex-dervishes 
in the front rank when you conquered us and now one or two British rule many 
hundreds all over the Sudan'. 68 Besides using collaborators, the British had another 
powerful ally at all times. They'were governing the Sudan by'bluff ... '69 
By advancing those arguments, one does not suggest that manpower shortage 
and the other factors discussed did not have a negative impact on British 
administration in the Southern Sudan. The intention is to point out that those 
problems were not unique to the South nor did they effectively arrest government 
progress in the region. Lack of personnel, due to financial limitation on an 
administration that relied heavily on Egyptian subvention till 1913, was for example, a 
factor affecting the acquisition of new territories and their effective occupation. 
Wingate' ready response to any suggestion of expansion in the region was to delay it 
till there was enough money. When Owen in 1910 pressed the Central Government 
to authorise the occupation of the Beir (Murle) country to curb their raids on the tax- 
paying Bor Dinka, the Governor General firmly objected: 
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Our policy in the Sudan, which I must insist on being understood by all 
Governors who, like yourself, have in their Provinces a great deal of non- 
effectively occupied country, must be never to advance into such 
unoccupied districts unless you intend to stay there, and in the present 
case I repeat I am not in a position to effectively occupy the IIEIR 
country. I fully agree with you that sooner or later this must be done, but 
the time is not yet. 70 
Inadequate finances and manpower similarly restrained Wingate from expanding along 
the Sudan-Ethiopia frontier, even after the demarcation of the boundary had been 
completed. Effectively to protect such a long frontier with a small force of only about 
1,000 men, was in his opinion 'preposterous'. What he saw as feasible was to leave 
'the greater part of the frontier ... to take care of itself, while the government 
'trust to 
its subjects to do the best for themselves'. 71 Yet Wingate found himself moving into 
the area sooner rather than later. 
I was hoping against hope that this extension of our responsibilities in an 
Easterly direction would have been postponed for some time, but I greatly 
regret that these Anuak raids have forced our hands and unless we take 
immediate action we shall be involved in far more difficult and costly 
operations which would tax our resources severely. 72 
The Anuak problem was only one of several factors which spurred the government on 
to a forced march in the Southern Sudan. Wingate had earlier told Gorst on another 
occasion that 'whether we like it or not we are forced to go on extending the sphere 
of our effective occupation'. 
73 What these compelling influences were will be fully 
identified, and their interaction analysed, in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter IV. - Resistance, Domestic Objectives and External Constraints in Eastern 
Upper Nile and Western Nuer Land, 1898-1924 
According to Warburg, the Sudan Government during Wingate's era 'had 
neither the power nor the means to establish its authority in the south'. I Until 1912 
Wingate would not authorise more expenditure in order to occupy new territory 
which he believed would yield 'little or no corresponding revenue'. 2 These statements 
indicate three further constraints which are supposed to have 'inhibited British 
Government of the Southern Sudan. These are: tribal resistance, lack of funds and 
absence of local incentive for the British in the region. 
These three subjects are so interwoven that in discussing one it is impossible not 
to consider matters- relating to the others. This is because they together determined 
the British decision on whether to concentrate or to expand government authority. 
On the one hand, concentration meant less expenditure, as conquest of new areas 
would be costly to undertake. On the other hand, additional territory might bring 
more revenue, more labour for agricultural, transport and military service and more 
commercial opportunities. The issue of tribal resistance was the key element on 
which the two other factors hinged. It will therefore be important to clarify the 
circumstances under which armed resistance occurred, while the magnitude of the 
problem posed to the Sudan Government needs clarification. To highlight those 
'blurred' parts, the subject will be re-examined under the following three broad 
categories: 
(a) Governors Afatthew. c and Owen on Tribal Policy 
In considering the problem of tribal resistance, the approaches of two governors 
are especially significant and suggestive. The armed resistance of the Eastern Nuer, 
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Murle, and Anuak peoples has been much discussed as an element in the relative 
backwardness of the Southern Sudan. It is maintained that the Nuer were so 
predetermined against the Anglo-Egyptian Government that they would not listen to 
its overtures of peace. When a 'peaceful mission', the 'first of a series of unsuccessful 
attempts to open negotiations', went to contact the Lau Nuer leader, 'prophet' 
Dengkur in 1902, it was attacked. 3 If persistent Nuer resistance from 1913 
culminated twenty-two years after the reconquest in 'a full-scale war' which required 
intervention by the RAF, 4 the British predicament can easily be appreciated. Yet the 
situation was not so difficult as has often been supposed. 
When the Nuer were first met in 1898 by a government expedition to Nasser, 
the impression which the British officers carried away was that the people were 
'exceedingly shy and primitive ... and by no means friendly to us'. 
They were said not 
to have 'shown any other feeling than one of fear and anger at our advent'. 5 But why 
would the Nuer be expected to react otherwise to the sudden appearance of 
foreigners whose intentions were unknown? In any case, the visit was too short and 
did not cover a wide enough area to have enabled the observers to gauge Nuer 
feelings correctly. When Nasser was visited by another government mission in 1901 
the response was different. On his way to the village of Chief Yowe, II. A. Markham, 
the leader of the mission, was supplied with guides by the chief of Nasser. On arrival 
at his destination, Markham found his host had died a few days earlier and it was his 
brother and successor who met the government envoy. He described the meeting 
thus: 'I stayed outside his village and sent for him, and he turned up with the whole of 
his following' after which talks 'touching a great deal on friendly relations' were 
conducted. After the talks, the new chief was entrusted with government letters, 
possibly on border problems, to be delivered to the Ethiopian side. 6 
The Nuer had shown that they could co-operate if a channel for peaceful 
contacts could be established. This did not occur to Major A. Blewitt, the 
80 
Commandant of Fashoda District, whose inclination was more to the use of force than 
to diplomacy to get things done. After his summons to prophet Dengkur, issued in 
early 1902, had neither brought the Nuer leader to Fashoda nor produced any other 
reply, Blewitt ordered an attack on the tribe in April. The invaders were not opposed. 
Prophet Dengkur and his people went into hiding and kept their distance throughout 
the devastation of his country. The troops meanwhile occupied themselves in burning 
villages and confiscating cattle, sheep, goats and ivory - all valued at £600 - 'which 
should more than pay all expenses'.? This was very typical of the system of 
administration by patrols which, in Sanderson's 'plain language' meant 'punitive 
expeditions which burned villages, carried off cattle and destroyed crops'. 8 When the 
expedition returned to base at the end of April it had not confirmed the security 
reports - partly supplied by Dinka 'friendlies' and victims of Dengkur's raids in 
traditional feuds - that a fierce armed confrontation awaited the government. 
9 The 
troops brought back only an unimpressive picture of the Lau people they had had no 
chance to talk to. 
Yet subsequent reports on the mission to Dengkur included impressions of the 
Nuer which seem to have been added as a retrospective justification for the invasion. 
'They are sunk in barbarism', claimed the report, 'and retain to the full all the inherited 
customs of their savage ancestors'. 
10 It appears there was another consideration in 
Blewitt's attack on prophet Dengkur. Here was an influential local leader who owed 
his political authority to his spiritual powers as a prophet. Given that the Sudan 
Government had not yet completely defeated religious fanaticism in the country, pre- 
emptive strikes against signs of religious militancy could justifiably be undertaken any 
time. The Times, The Daily Mail and The Manchester Guardian of 7 June 1902 
carried stories about the military operations in Upper Nile, and all justified the military 
option on the ground that Dengkur had been posing as a small Khalifa. 
ll This 
opinion suggests the existence of a Khalifaphobia in British minds. British officials in 
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the Southern Sudan had come to equate Nilotic religious leaders known as 'prophets' 
or 'Kujurs' with the local Islamic religious leaders in Northern Sudan known as 'fikis', 
whom Wingate described as 'a most shameless set of ... religious teachers who are 
supposed to be invulnerable, supernaturally endowed and able to work miracles'. 12 
In reality the Lau Nuer threat to the Sudan Government at this stage was more an 
attitude of mind than a practical situation on the ground. This was to be shown by 
subsequent events. 
Blewitt's'successor, Major G. E. Matthews, was of a different temperament. 
Governor Matthews favoured a policy of persuasion and co-operation with tribal 
leaders to control his subjects, an approach which agreed with Kitchener's policy 
outlines to provincial authorities. Once in the province, Matthews was able to defuse 
the tension that had been built up following Blewitt's high-handed tribal policy. To 
mark his departure from that past, the governor rounded up in 1904 and imprisoned 
some of the Dinka 'friendlies' whom he discovered to have blown out of proportion 
the Dengkur's situation. 13 In fact by the end of 1903, seeing a change in the 
government policy, the Lau and Zeraf Nuer were willing to submit. 14 Matthews' 
diplomacy soon produced good results. A delegation of Nuer chiefs went to 
Khartoum in May 1904 to pledge their support for the Sudan Government. Among 
the delegation was 'an important Nuer Chief, to use Wingate's language. They met 
the Governor General who gave them presents before they returned to Upper Nile. 15 
Two patrols marching peacefully in the Nuer country in 1905 and 1906 under the 
respective officers, Wilson and O'Sullivan, were all that Matthews needed to assure 
himself that his Nuer policy was gaining ground. 16 Ile followed up these visits in 
1907 by himself visiting the Zeraf Nuer leader, 'prophet' Deng Laka (Diu) who, as a 
token of friendly relations with the government, promised to give the government one 
ivory of every elephant his people would kill. 17 Relations between Matthews and the 
Lau Nuer became so close that some circles in far-away Khartoum even misread the 
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signs to mean that the governor had become a candidate for the seat of 'prophet' 
Dengkur after the latter had died in 1906.18 
Even the Nuer on the Baro river who paid tribute to Ethiopia were so 
impressed by what they saw on the Sudan side of the border that they requested to be 
taken under the control of the Sudan Government. They complained to A. J. Asser, 
the Adjutant General who was on a visit to the border area in 1909, that they were 
Sudanese yearning to go home if that could be arranged. One chief was actually 
ready to move immediately to the Nasser area. 19 
Governor Matthews had therefore succeeded in extending the authority of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Government in Upper Nile without recourse to the use of force. 
Wingate was a witness to that achievement: as he wrote, 'Matthews has been able to 
get into touch ... with 
his Nuers and has been able to argue the question out with 
them, and got them to suspend ... their raiding'. 
20 It is worth stressing at this stage 
that Matthews' eight-year tenure of office in Upper Nile Province was a period of 
relative peace. And this peace was achieved because the governor refused to use 
force. He chose to address the minds of the subjects, and those Sudanese he had 
discussions with were capable of reciprocating. The Sudan Government gained in 
two respects from Matthews' policies in the province: a Southern province registered 
for the first time surplus over expenditure, 21 and security was established. But the 
peace did not last. 
The governor of Mongalla Province which shared a border with Upper Nile 
Province, took the very opposite view to that of Matthews with regard to maintaining 
peace among warring tribes. He prescribed a military solution. In defence of his 
policy of peaceful penetration, Matthews had once told Wingate: 
You know my views about these so-called raids. We cannot stop them 
yet, they must occur over and over again without our knowledge in the 
wide expanses of unexplored Southern Sudan. But we shall stop them 
some day if people locally will exercise patience. It may not be in my time 
or that of my successor, but it will come some day. 22 
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But Owen did not agree with this approach: 
Matthews does not believe in the possibility of Government preventing 
blood feuds and intertribal fighting. I cannot understand why he takes this 
view, and cannot and never have found any difficulty in stopping it if 
taken in time. I am perfectly sure we can stop it as far as the Nuers and 
Dinkas are concerned without any difficulty, and make both peoples 
happy and contented. 23 
Owen went to Mongalla with a policy of aggressive territorial expansion. It has 
already been seen that the Governor General had to issue harsh instructions to curb 
Owen's expansionist tendencies. Owen's policy was to be achieved through extending 
government protection against local adversaries to loyal government tribes which paid 
taxes. To be protected were the Bor, Twic, Nyarweng and Ghol Dinka against Beir 
(Murle) and Nuer raids. Until 1912 the Beir were still outside government control, 
while the Nuer were in Matthews' province. Owen had already in June 1908 
persuaded the Central Government to despatch a military force against the Beir in 
retribution for their raid on the Bor Dinka. His orders to the officer commanding the 
Beir Patrol were specific: the tribe 'must be punished and made to feel it; and to 
realise once for all that they cannot raid another tribe with impunity'. 24 
For immediate occupation was the Twic, Nyarweng and Ghol country north of 
the Bor Dinka. These tribes shared borders with the Zeraf and Lau Nuer. Owen 
wanted to open stations in the area to offer the Dinka protection against Nuer raids. 
He accordingly pressed the Central Government to allow him to establish a station at 
Kongor, giving as justification what he saw as a desperate security situation in the 
area. But the way Owen presented his case did not go down well with the Central 
Government, 'for the Civil Secretary, P. R. Phipps, in a letter to Wingate expressed his 
disapproval: 
... 
Sending an isolated post into a district where he himself was threatened 
by 800 men and the village he was in was raided the moment he left seems 
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to show Owen is prepared to take risks I do not think we as a 
Government can afford. 25 
Phipps' argument was derived from Owen's June report on his visit to the Twic 
country, a report which he had evidently inflated in order to force the government to 
take the line of action he himself had proposed - for the governor's own statements 
had so 'frightened them at Khartoum' that he had to tell the truth. 'There was nothing 
in them', [those statements], he assured Wingate, 'except to emphasise the importance 
of placing a post there at once'. 26 If the Central Government had not demanded 
clarification, Owen's report would have gone into the records as a true situation and 
influenced decisions accordingly. Some records on which some of the historical 
judgements being reviewed are based, might have similar origins to Owen's original 
statements. 
Owen was not deflected; rather, he continued to push ahead with his plans. The 
Kongor post was opened in December 1908 to protect the Dinka from Nuer and Beir 
raids. 27 In April 1909 a second station was opened farther north at Duk Fadiet 
where provincial boundaries between Mongalla and Upper Nile Provinces had been 
agreed to follow the frontier between the Dinka and Nuer tribal territories. But in 
enforcing this segregation, the government entered into conflict with the Nuer who 
were expected to move out of occupied Dinka land. Some resisted expulsion, 
culminating in the Lau attack on Duk Fadiet in June 1910 before they were finally 
moved out of Mongalla Province in 1911 and their leader arrested. 
28 
Owen's active intervention in traditional tribal conflicts escalated the violence. 
Warfare continued between the Dinka and Nuer; Beir raids on the Bor Dinka became 
more frequent, striking four times in two years between 1909 and 1910.29 The 
Gawar and Ghol continued to raid each other, with the warrior sons of Deng Laka, 
Macar and Wol, being killed in 1914 by Ghol. 
30 In 1916 the Lau raided deep into the 
Bor Dinka country to within a few miles of the district headquarters of Bor, 31 and the 
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government, unable to control the raids, had to distribute rifles to the Dinka at 
Kongor and Duk Fadiet to enable them to withstand the Nuer. 32 
Owen's methods of administration had far-reaching consequences for the Sudan 
Government in eastern Upper Nile. His efforts to stabilize tribal relations were 
doomed to failure from the start. He plunged into quarrels which had roots in the 
past, taking sides with 'government tribes' against 'other tribes' without prior 
investigation to ascertain the causes of the conflict. Sanderson and Sanderson's 
graphic description of the behaviour of British officials in the Southern Sudan in the 
early years when 'these new 'Turks' made their blundering way through the complex 
geography of Southern local politics-33 is not true of Matthews; but it is well-suited 
to Owen's handling of tribal conflicts. The Government came to be seen as an active 
third party in the raids and counter raids, sometimes even appearing as the chief 
protagonist. Those people who thought that the government sided with their enemies 
did not give up but tried other means to maintain their position, It is this attempt to 
adjust to the new situation, threats from across the border, and the Sudan 
Government's special concerns in the region, which combined into a complex situation 
discussed below. 
(b) Revenue, Security and the Empire 
Eastern Upper Nile had its own special conditions which shaped Sudan 
Government administration. The region had considerable economic potential. Trade 
in ivory, coffee and rubber within the area and from across the Ethiopian border could 
be conducted profitably. Fully aware that uncontrolled commercial activity in such 
commodities as ivory had in the 19th century developed into the abominable slave 
trade, the new administration was determined to prevent a relapse into that state. The 
British were also aware that the same commodities were being coveted by other 
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European competitors from the Ethiopian side, so they had to devise ways and means 
of controlling them. 
The first significant step was taken in 1902 when the boundary agreement 
between the Sudan and Ethiopia resulted in the lease of a block of Ethiopian territory 
rich in such articles of trade, to be used for commercial purposes. 34 This was 
followed in 1903 when ivory and rubber were declared government monopolies in 
Fashoda and Bahr al-Ghazal Provinces. 35 To stop illicit trade, the region was 
declared a closed area to foreigners except by permission of the Governor General. 36 
These measures were meant both to ensure stability, and to enable the government to 
exclude others from exploitation of the resources. However, declaring a monopoly 
was one thing; enforcing it was another matter. In trying to realise these objectives, 
the Sudan Government officials found themselves fighting an uphill battle, for other 
interest groups had preceded them. 
It was the Upper Nile Governor, Matthews, who first realised that the Sudan 
Government was at a great disadvantage. The tribes sold their ivory for cows but the 
government had no cows: and the tribes would not sell them their cows for money, 
being Nilotics known for their love of cattle. On the other hand, traders in Ethiopia 
were able to buy their ivory with cattle, so the Sudanese ivory found its way across 
the border into Ethiopia, with consequent loss of revenue in taxes. To check this 
movement, Matthews petitioned the Central Government to authorise importation of 
cattle for use in the ivory trade. 
37 He did not have to campaign hard, for the Central 
Government was equally keen to exploit the economic potential of the region. Their 
expectations had been raised by early shipment of goods from the commercial enclave 
of Itang and Gambella, of which one single consignment of coffee caused a sharp 
drop in coffee sales in Khartoum. 38 
Wingate had by 1906 made up his mind how best the government could 
develop trade on the Ethiopian western frontier. A solution was found in the 
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appointment of commercial agents, some of whom encouraged the opening of 
markets along the Ethiopian frontier. By 1908 four markets were operational. One 
official became a travelling inspector in the area, visiting Ethiopian officials through 
whom he identified areas of better trading opportunities; he also encouraged peaceful 
interaction among the diverse`communities. 39 However, those measures did not 
impress Governor Matthews. As the man on the spot, he knew that Wingate's 
prescription was not effective enough. Valuable ivory was still being smuggled into 
Ethiopia by traders in the Nuer and Anuak country and more effective steps were 
deemed necessary. Again Matthews submitted a proposal to the effect that the 
Sudanese side of the frontier should be controlled, in order to prevent this exodus of 
ivory. 40 
It is remarkable how the reluctant imperialist changed into an expansionist, 
giving one a glimpse of Matthews's priorities in the province. While 'several large 
districts inhabited by the [Nuer], and hitherto unknown' had just been explored near 
Matthews' base at Malakal, 41 no steps were at first taken to administer them. In 
contrast he concerned himself with extending control into the Anuak and Garjak Nuer 
country hundreds of miles away. Matthews knew what he was there to achieve - not 
administration per se, but administration which should aim to be as far as possible 
financially self-supporting. So areas and peoples which seemed to offer little material 
return were left largely on their own for the time being, while administrative effort 
was concentrated upon those areas that seemed capable of contributing towards the 
cost of occupation. 
After the governor's repeated requests, the border region began to receive more 
attention from the Central Government. But in order to take appropriate 
administrative steps, it was deemed necessary to send a fact-finding mission to the 
area first. Accordingly, Asser made the visit in the summer of 1909. He found that 
things had gone from bad to worse. Not only was the Sudan Government losing 
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revenue across the uncontrolled frontier, but rifles were being smuggled into the 
country, with obvious dire implications for internal security. Asser gathered that after 
the Sudanese tribes had discovered that the highland Ethiopian cattle did not survive 
in the Sudan lowlands, they pressed for a change in the medium of exchange. Hence 
the introduction of rifles. The new currency was very attractive to the local tribes in 
three respects. Its possession made it easier to hunt elephants and accumulate tusks 
for trade; it would reinforce their ability to protect their property against predators, 
and it would enable them to replenish their food supplies by raiding vulnerable 
neighbours in the interior. The situation persuaded Asser to recommend action that 
would stop 'this undesirable trade and also ... secure the passage of the 
Sudan ivory 
through the Sudan'. To prevent ivory leaving the country through the back door, 
Asser recommended. the stationing of government representatives in the Nuer country 
at places such as Nasser and Jokau 'to act as traders and buy up the ivory for trading 
goods'. On the arms issue, so long as the rifles remained confined, to the Southern 
Sudan (where the people were assumed to be incapable of uniting against foreign 
aggressors), he saw 'no sign of danger' and did not 'anticipate that there will be any'. 
But any future development of the rifle trade in the Garjak Nuer country towards 
Northern Sudan (where common Islamic religion and Arab culture might easily 
produce a'national' leader against the British), would require special attention. As he 
put it: 'I should say that the Southern Nuer country is not of great importance, but the 
other, with its outlet at Melut and towards the North, for a rifle trade is of decided 
importance'. Thus, to monitor such a development he suggested the stationing of 
police at strategic loctions. 42 
Arms trafficking in the region offered an opportunity for the Financial 
Secretary, E. Bernard, to settle scores with a formidable commercial competitor. An 
Ethiopian business man, Ydlibi, was established in the area where he made a fortune 
in ivory, coffee and rubber. His success over his Sudanese counterparts was indicated 
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by various acts of retaliation. Two are worth citing: Governor Mathews held up a 
large consignment of rubber belonging to Ydlibi's Ethiopian Trading Company for 
three months at Gambella, until Asser later authorised its passage through the Sudan. 
In an apparent boycott, Sudan's steamers used not to call at the Company's station en 
route. 43 Ydlibi's fame or notoriety is further revealed by Asser's statement to 
Wingate: 'I very much doubt if I can tell you anything about Ydlibi which you do not 
already know. '44 This was the same man associated with the trade of rifles, and 
Bernard found in Ydlibi's illegal business'a useful weapon for his destruction'. 45 
Wingate recognised the urgent need for more active government involvement in 
the region. The negative aspect of the arms trade was felt shortly afterwards in the 
Sudan. The Anuak had acquired a large number of rifles and were using them against 
the nominally administered Lau Nuer, who had devastated the Anuak lands in the 
past. The Anuak arms build-up, estimated at 10,000 by 1911, had even frightened the 
unadministered Garjak into seeking government protection and accepting to pay 
tribute. The Anuak raids on the Lau during 1911 and early 1912 took them across a 
distance of about 250 miles from the Ethiopian border to the neighbourhood of Bahr 
al-Zeraf, sending the Nuer appealing for government support. 46 While taking a 
defensive posture, the Nuer themselves quietly acquired rifles which they later turned 
on both the Anuak and the Southern Dinka (Ghol, Nyarweng, Twi and Bor). 47 The 
government was therefore morally bound to come to the rescue of the Lau, 
particularly as they paid taxes. 
It was not the plight of the Nuer alone that swayed Wingate. He was under 
strong pressure from the British Government to combat drunkenness among native 
Sudanese as this state of mind encouraged crimes. 48. Accordingly an order was 
issued in 1908 prohibiting the sale and consumption of liquor by Sudanese. 49 But 
this produced an illicit trade in alcoholic drinks across the Ethiopian border into 
eastern Upper Nile. By 1912 it had been confirmed that the Anuak and Nuer had 
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access to liquor from that source. The plan to increase government presence in the 
border area was therefore partly to seal off this source of alcoholic infiltration. 50 
More important, perhaps, was what Wingate saw as a 'self-evident political 
danger'. The seriousness of this concern is borne out by the impatience with which he 
bothered the Agent and Consul-General, Kitchener, sending him three letters on the 
same day about the same border situation. S1 Wingate was anxious about a rumoured 
German encroachment into the Gambella trading district. To minimise any political 
risk or loss of revenue from such an intrusion, he suggested that Ethiopia be asked to 
accept the employment of British officers to administer the Anuak country northwards 
to the Beni Shangul area in Northern Sudan. However, this suggestion was rejected 
by Kitchener on the ground that it -would provoke hostile nationalist reaction in 
Ethiopia. 52 It is also possible that Kitchener did not approve the proposal because 
such a move would expose prematurely the ultimate aim of British policy in Ethiopia, 
which, as will be seen below, only became clearer from 1913. 
All those considerations propelled the Sudan Government to take action along 
the Sudan-Ethiopian border. Wingate suddenly found sufficient funds to finance two 
military patrols, of which one, the Beir patrol, had been shelved since 1910 due to 
lack of funds. In early 1912 military operations were carried out against both Beir 
and Anuak with the objective of establishing 'without delay a permanent system of 
control along the Border'. 53 The Beir were duly conquered and subsequently 
administered from the newly established Pibor post on the Pibor river. But in the case 
of the Anuak no administration followed their defeat, and this needs further 
explanation. Occupation of the Anuak country might easily be construed by the 
suspicious Ethiopian Government to be the start of a British occupation of the 
Kingdom. And complete victory over Akwei, the Anuak leader, and his warriors 
would have entailed pursuing them across the border into Ethiopia where they had 
taken refuge, thereby giving substance to Ethiopian suspicion. Kitchener had foreseen 
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such a likely course of action and in his approval letter sternly warned Wingate 
against violation of the border: 
I would only remark that ... you will be careful to restrict as far as 
possible your operations to the necessities of the case, and that 
instructions will be given to avoid any complications with the Abyssinians, 
and that no infraction of their frontier will be allowed to take place. 54 
Such a warning could be disregarded, with borders being secretly crossed to track 
down recalcitrant groups, and deny later that violation ever took place. Kitchener, far 
away in Cairo, would believe it. Nevertheless the order was strictly adhered to, not 
on its own merits, of course, but in conjunction with other pressures, though Wingate 
pretended to be in charge of the situation. Unable to take any further action against 
the Anuak after they had crossed the border, the Governor General turned his failure 
into a new policy: 
I believe that we should pacify the tribe without further fighting. This is 
naturally the course I should prefer, as we are far too busy and occupied 
to worry about them so long as arms are not being passed across the 
border into the Sudan. 55 
In fact, Wingate was not in full control of the situation on the frontier. While the Beir 
and Anuak patrols were still under way, Kitchener had notified the Sudan 
Government that henceforth, the cost of military operations in the Sudan would be 
shared between the Military and the Sudan Government. 
56 Cairo must have judged 
the condition of the Sudan to be stable enough to justify dropping her from what 
could have been some sort of open-ended emergency budget. The change was a great 
blow to Wingate's plans; for he had no money for a costly and long war: 
Under the new arrangement ... the tendency will naturally be - in time of 
financial stringency like the present - to subordinate political to financial 
considerations - the occupation of the Abyssianian Frontier from Akobo 
to LAKE RUDOLF and thence to NIMULE is a case in point. 57 
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Pressure came also from the business sector. The Sudan commercial agent at 
Gambella, Walker, complained to Thesiger in Addis Ababa that the operations against 
the Anuak had adversely affected trade in the area and strongly advised against 
further military action in the neighbourhood of the trading centre. The Sudan 
Government was informed and did not insist. 'In view of the serious effect on 
Gambela trade of further operations against the Anuaks on our side', Wingate told 
Clayton, 'I am inclined to think that our best plan is now ... to get Thesiger to put on 
all the diplomatic pressure he can ... to 
force the stoppage of arms traffic on the 
frontier'. 58 Henceforth, Wingate pursued a conciliation policy with the Anuak -a 
policy of 'letting by-gones be by-gones', 59 after which the Anuak remained a free 
people until their great leader Akwei died in 1920. 
Despite the abandonment of his programme of effective administration of the 
eastern Upper Nile due to circumstances beyond his control, the Governor General 
continued to fight for the Sudan Government in other areas. Wingate had not been an 
Intelligence officer for nothing. He was soon to prove his worth as a planner. Here 
was a situation in which an understaffed administration had been suddenly deprived of 
external financial support, yet was still expected to control so vast a country as the 
Sudan. Contrary to what the authorities in Cairo might have imagined about the 
Sudan as an effectively occupied territory, the bulk of the Southern Sudan still 
remained unoccupied. The situation along the whole length of the Southern Sudan- 
Ethiopian frontier has already been described. The Dinka of northern and central 
Bahr al-Ghazal, and the Nuer of the Eastern district were still unadministered. Added 
to these vast districts were the equally extensive lands east of the Bahr al-Jebel which 
were soon to join the Southern Sudan from Uganda. As had happened earlier with 
the now occupied districts, armed patrols were the rule. Under the new financial 
arrangement the government could do very little to occupy new areas. 
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Wingate nevertheless found the solution. He had to circumvent Kitchener's 
decision. As Sirdar of the Egyptian army, the Governor-General could make such 
departmental changes as he thought appropriate. In tackling the problem before him, 
Wingate had a precedent to draw upon and did not hesitate to apply it to the situation 
before him. To the Adjutant General he wrote: 
Our policy should be to consider the occupation of the Nuer and Anuak 
country as a new item of expenditure, very much on the lines on which we 
arranged for the re-occupation of the Bahr al-Ghazal. You will remember 
that in that case we made it a purely military occupation and I wish to do 
the same, if possible, as regards the Nuer and Anuak country, and I think 
the precedent is a perfectly sound one. Later on, as matters become 
settled, we will endeavour to administer it like the rest of the Sudan, and 
in that case it will fall into normal lines, but for the present, and in view of 
the very unsettled state of the country, I propose to keep it entirely on 
Military lines and, as such, to endeavour to arrange for it to be an 
additional military charge. 60 
Having thus justified funding for the Sudan's security needs, Wingate was faced with 
the challenge of presenting a compelling case for the release of the funds by Cairo. In 
this matter, he proved an adept. The arms trade in the Garjak Nuer country, north of 
the Anuak, offered him a rare opportunity to build up his case. It is to be recalled that 
Asser had earlier hinted at the gravity of the situation in the Sudan, should arms 
change hands in those Southern areas adjoining Northern Sudan. The Garjak country 
presented that reality by 1912, and every effort had to be made therefore to prevent a 
spill over into 'developable' Northern Sudan. The strategy was to report in detail, not 
without a bit of imagination, 
61 the extent of this arms trade, the level of insecurity 
which that trade had created, and the challenge the Garjak presented to the 
government. 
In early 1913 Wingate had been relieved of the delicate balance he had to 
maintain between attending to his administrative responsibilities, and ensuring British 
interests in Ethiopia through a policy of appeasement. The relief came from Addis 
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Ababa where Thesiger 'strongly recommended that the fear of arousing Abyssinian 
susceptibilities should no longer be considered a ground for refraining from taking 
such measures as are necessary for the protection' of Sudan's interest. He further 
pressed Wingate to take immediate steps, as 'any further delay ... could only be 
harmful to our prestige in the eyes of the frontier tribes'. 62 Thesiger's apparent 
indifference to Ethiopian reaction to any military action by the Sudan Government 
seems to stem from his foreknowledge of the following British plan, which threatened 
the very existence of the Ethiopian state. In July, the Foreign Office convened a 
meeting which Wingate and Clayton, Sudan Agent in Cairo, on the Sudan 
Government side attended. The subject for discussion was partition of Ethiopia, 
should the Empire break up as a result of an internal power struggle following the 
death of the senile King Menelik. 63 How committed the Foreign Office was to the 
idea cannot be ascertained and in any case it does not concern us here. What is 
important is that the Sudan Government became free to initiate border policies 
without fear of spoiling British plans in Ethiopia. Incidentally, it was Wingate who 
advised the July meeting against early intervention, arguing that the Sudan 
Government was too preoccupied with internal problems to assist in this venture. 
With the Ethiopian diversion sealed off and his war efforts supported, the 
Governor-General turned to the Garjak question in earnest. These were a people not 
yet administered and the outcome of initial contacts had still to be seen, but already 
there were moves to subdue them, a policy the Adjutant General did not approve of. 
'I have heard a lot of talk of taking on the Garjak sub-tribe', Asser told Wingate, 'but 
one can't ... expect savages who 
have never been administered to welcome us 
suddenly with open arms'. 
64 A logical argument, but Asser should have known that if 
the powerful were to take into account views and feelings of the weak, there would 
have been no imperialism. In fact the Garjak did not resist when a patrol was sent 
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against them towards the end of 1913, after which a post was established. 65 Yet they 
continued to be Wingate's principal internal security concern. 
By April 1914 the Governor-General felt he had built up a strong enough case 
to seek approval for 'an effective military occupation of the Garjak country'. His 
subsequent despatches painted a very grim picture of the security situation in the 
region. On 5 April, Wingate warned Kitchener that any further delay in the 
occupation of the Garjak country 'would involve a loss of prestige that would have 
the gravest effect on the administration of the Nilotic tribesmen of the Southern 
Sudan'. 66 The next day the situation was presented so desperately that even the 
evacuation of the Nuer country could not be discounted: 
If some such action as I now suggest ... 
is not taken ... I think that 
in all 
likelihood we may find ourselves in the very unpleasant position of having 
to abandon the country between the Bahr al Jebel and Bahr al Zeraf and 
the Abyssian frontier. 6 
Later in the month, Wingate was frantically canvassing for more support to block 'the 
stream of rifles' which was 'increasing daily'. 68 Not long afterwards, his compelling 
presentation won him the approval of the British Government, 69 and so prevented a 
repeat of what the Governor General had made to look like another Gordon crisis in 
the making. 
Once approval had been secured, the looming danger of the pre-May period 
seemed suddenly to have become manageable, giving the Sudan Government respite 
to discuss plans in a much more relaxed atmosphere. The Council met under Stack, 
the Civil Secretary, to decide on the next course of action and it recommended taking 
on the Anuak first instead of the already publicised priority target. Surprisingly, it 
transpired that Wingate had privately favoured going again for the Anuak and readily 
endorsed the recommendations while away in Cairo. But as such a sudden reversal 
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would be embarrassing, it is implied, Wingate decided to stitch the two opposing 
positions together: 
It is very important, however, that if we decide on this line of action, 
which I may say in my own mind I have practically decided to do, we 
should make all our preparations as it were for taking on the Garjaks first, 
as this would put the Anuaks off the scent, and by this means we should 
only move to Bonjak at the last moment. 70 
With Kitchener's support the Governor-General had earlier applied to the British 
Government for the use of British air power in the planned military operations against 
the Garjak. 71 Very little else was heard about the military options until the originally 
proposed date for the commencement of operations in September had almost passed. 
It was only then that Wingate tried to reactivate the project, and that was only to give 
a reason for the delay. His explanation was that no operations could be conducted 
until it had been ascertained beyond doubt that the Turks would not 'jump off on the 
German side of the fence'. 72 That made sense as far as international considerations of 
the war period were concerned, but it does not explain why what was in fact aimed at 
the Anuak was being pursued under the cover of action against the Garjak. An 
explanation of this strategy will be attempted shortly. In any case the World War 
soon overshadowed Wingate's domestic war efforts and by November the Anuak- 
Garjak expedition had been postponed. 73 
The Garjak campaign was eventually carried out in 1920. The Nuer had during 
the War intensified their raids on their neighbours and by 1918 they had silenced the 
Anuak. 74 They then turned against tribes in Sennar Province, carrying away in one 
raid in November 1918 about 240 Burun women and children, suspected by the 
government to be for sale as slaves in Ethiopia in order to acquire more rifles. 75 It 
therefore became an urgent problem to be attended to by the Sudan Government, 
mindful of repercussions of such activities on the security situation in Northern 
Sudan. But the subsequent operations, in which the RAF bombed villages and cattle 
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camps, 76 were more a sheer show of technological superiority by a victor fresh from 
a bigger war than a response proportionate to the danger presented by obsolete 
Ethiopian rifles. Within the year the Garjak had been pacified. 
(c) The Western Nuer Resistance 1922-1924 
The Nuer tribes on the west bank of the Bar al-Jebel received their first 
government official as late as 1922. Although it is maintained that this delay occurred 
because 'they were effectively shielded from British intervention by the belt of Dinka 
to the west and south of them', 77 direct contact would still have been possible, if 
either of them was interested. The Nuer were accessible by river, being found on the 
banks of the Bahr al-Jebel and Bahr al-Ghazal. Whether they would resist the 
government or not was not put to a test so the description made about them by a brief 
visitor in 1917 that they were 'the most truculent natives I have till now come 
across', 78 should be treated with caution. 
Due to the shortage of British staff and perhaps also because there was no 
urgent need to occupy an inland area that did not present an immediate security 
problem to the government, the western Nuer had been left alone. They continued to 
pursue their economic mode of life - that of raiding for cattle. Such practices were 
normal in pre-condominium days, but the times had changed. Eventually, in 1915, the 
Sudan Government's attention was drawn to the area by a series of devastating raids 
on the administered Dinka of Eastern district of Bahr al-Ghazal Province. As a result 
of those incidents, sixteen Dinka chiefs threatened to cease paying taxes if the 
Government did not protect them. 79 Such raids continued through the War period, 
and after the War the government decided to end them by occupying and 
administering the region. The task was entrusted to Captain V. 11. Fergusson, the 
inspector of the adjacent Eastern district in 1922. 
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Fergusson did not meet initial opposition on entering the new district. It was a 
'peaceful penetration', 80 and for almost two years the situation remained calm. 
However, those 'cordial' relations came to an end in 1923. Conflict arose from three 
issues: cattle rustling, tribal authority and Fergusson's agricultural policy. Fergusson 
insisted on the Nuer returning stolen cattle to their Dinka owners, and to stop raiding 
others in the future. Such orders proved difficult for some of the Nuer to implement. 
Resistance followed and he had to enforce compliance. Fergusson introduced a 
system of administration whereby the district was divided into areas and chiefs 
appointed for each. But in this direction he was opposed by'prophets' who would not 
accept being replaced or controlled, and Fergusson hit them hard. The District 
Commissioner also introduced cotton growing in order to raise revenue for the 
district and to introduce the natives to cash economy. The initiative was a good one, 
but the Nuer could not as yet comprehend its benefits. They resented it because they 
could not within such a short time relate the new development to their cattle 
economy. Fergusson's methods of implementing his agricultural policy also provoked 
ill feeling. He made cotton growing compulsory in areas where it would grow well. 
Those who failed to comply were fined a calf each and in 1924 one section of the 
tribe was fined 200 head of cattle, 81 not a loss that could be borne with a lot of 
patience. 
As a result of Fergusson's administrative policy, a strong resistance grew in the 
district and ultimately claimed his life in 1927. But the situation developed into what 
it became partly because he was something of a warmonger himself. He was 
determined 'to discipline' the Nuer, 82 and made this apparent during the conflict by 
trying to goad them into a fight. While he considered it 'most regrettable that such a 
useless community of people should necessitate the government spending money on 
them in the form of a patrol', Fergusson stage-managed the conflict: 
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Our'objective is to do everything in our power to induce them to fight in 
force so as to inflict heavy casualties and by so doing break their morals 
[sic] to such a degree as to make the necessity for future operations 
unnecessary. To destroy all property ... 
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The foregoing pages have provided a basis for making the following observations. 
First, the argument of 'obstructive' resistance by the Southern Sudanese finds very 
little support in the Anuak, Beir and Nuer cases. True, there were a few clashes 
between the government and some Southern Sudanese, but with the exception of the 
Lau Nuer raid on Duk Fadiet, the tribes fought only on the defensive. The offensive 
actions were taken by the government, and these were always successful. This was 
hardly an administration emasculated by local opposition. Secondly, not a single 
tribal resistance lasted beyond a few months. Moreover, such incidents were small 
scale, leaving other areas quiet, with other tribes working hand-in-hand with the 
government. The northern Dinka, Shilluk and for Dinka districts are examples of 
such safe areas. In fact tribal resistance often originated as inter-tribal wars which the 
government initially joined as a peace maker, but in the process absolute impartiality 
was difficult to observe because the government generally sided with the weak. All in 
all, the outbreaks of tribal resistance arose from more or less petty crimes such as 
cattle rustling and trade in contraband goods, which every established government 
would normally try to control. But in the case of the Southern Sudan they were made 
to appear enormous, sometimes by design. 
Wingate clearly manipulated the Anuak and Garjak situation to exploit the 
ignorance and emotions of those far away audiences, in order to maintain the prestige 
of, and obtain assistance for, the Sudan Government. He had largely to manufacture 
a military crisis, for instance, in order to impress departments like the 'War Office, 
which, for 'some obscure reason ... appears to 
dislike the Sudan and all that we do 
there'. 84 Thus, the locally manageable Anuak situation was blown out of proportion 
in order to make it possible to tighten control over economic resources in the area, 
and was only unwillingly suspended when the policy conflicted with higher British 
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interests in Ethiopia. Likewise, the Garjak situation was projected prominently at a 
particular time in order to ensure the retention of the Sudan Government on the 
Egyptian list for financial assistance. In a clear attempt to let Cairo and London feel 
the pain where it hurt most in the Sudan, Wingate drew Kitchener's attention to the 
fact that the arms danger he was talking about had already reached Northern Sudan's 
door steps. Armed natives on the White Nile were reported to have just attacked a 
mamur and his police from the White Nile Province, killing a sergeant. 85 Such a 
development towards the country of potential Muslim 'fanatics' would be carefully 
noted in Cairo and London. Once funding for military purposes had been guaranteed, 
the Garjak threat became priority number two, after that of the Anuak in whose 
country the economic war had already started. 
The western Nuer armed resistance arose where a British 'medal hunter' 
manipulated the security situation under his charge in order to advance his career. 
Military victories offered the best chance of progress open to a Political Service 
official whom his seniors knew to have 'managed to get through life without passing 
any examinations'. 86 
Thirdly, the evidence presented has partially challenged the umbrella contention 
that the British had no interest in the Southern Sudan except as an outpost for 
safeguarding Egyptian interests. The activities on the Ethiopian border were in part 
attempts to realise those commercial interests in the region, which had been conceived 
before the reconquest and confirmed by early experiences on the ground. 
Fourthly and finally, in the slow penetration and occupation of the South, a new 
hindrance which has hitherto eluded identification has been revealed. External 
considerations continued to influence Sudan Government actions in the region long 
after the international threat to the Nile waters had ceased to exist. What to do and 
when to do it came to be determined more by concerns beyond the Sudan border than 
by internal constraints. 
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Chanter V" Resistance; The Azande, Fertit, Dinka and the Inheritance front 
U, anda, 1900-1924 
This chapter will consider the resistance of the Azande, Fertit and Dinka 
peoples, and the problems faced by the Sudan Government in the integration of the 
territory acquired from Uganda Protectorate in the 1914 boundary adjustment. It will 
assess the effect of these matters upon the British administration in the Southern 
Sudan. 
(a) The Azande Resistance, 1903-1905 
The strategic importance of the Zande land to the Anglo-Egyptian Government 
has already been emphasised. The Khartoum government gave clear directives on 
how the territory should be acquired. Considering its slender resources and the huge 
demand that a campaign of military conquest would impose upon its budget, Sparkes 
was instructed not to use force but to secure the submission of the tribe by peaceful 
means. I The important questions are: to what extent did officers in the field follow 
these instructions, and how did the Azande respond to their actions? 
In accordance with his orders, as soon as Sparkes arrived at Wau in January 
1901 he sent out letters of friendship to the different Azande chiefs. Sultan Tembura 
responded four months later by sending a peace delegation to him in May, after 
which Sparkes returned the visit in June accompanied by just a small escort of two 
officers and twenty-five troops. The size of the escort clearly indicated that no use of 
force was contemplated. Tembura impressed his guests with a display of his 4,000 
strong army, of whom one thousand were armed with rifles. 
2 
Yet despite his seemingly unassailable military strength, Tembura was 
vulnerable. He had a formidable foe in Sultan Yambio, a rival Azande leader further 
107 
south. Since the 1870s, Tembura had been keeping his domestic rivals at bay by 
allying with one foreign power or the other. He allied with Gessi to expel Arab slave 
traders from his country, after which he was rewarded with rifles to consolidate his 
position against Yambio and other Azande leaders like Ndoruma and Gedi. When the 
French passed through his territory on their way to Fashoda in 1897, he signed a 
treaty of friendship and co-operation with Marchand after which a French station was 
established near his headquarters, and he was given rifles, ammunition and military 
instructors. 3 The arrival of the British in Bahr al-Ghazal gave Tembura another 
chance to forestall his enemies by befriending these powerful newcomers who had 
ejected the French. 
Tembura's overtures were handsomely rewarded. A military pact was soon 
concluded between him and Sparkes, putting his country under the protection of the 
Sudan Government and promising 'all assistance for maintaining the integrity of his 
country against aggression or occupation by any party'. 4 From Sparkes' perspective, 
the policy of peaceful penetration had worked in one part of the Zande land, and he 
could feel satisfied with having successfully carried out the first stage of his 
assignment. 
The response from Sultan Yambio was not as cordial and prompt as Tembura's. 
The message had reached him, but the reply was longer in coming back. The delay 
seemed to have been caused by domestic problems: he was preoccupied with a 
Belgian intrusion into his domain. 5 When the Sultan's envoy at last arrived at Wau in 
July 1902, he conveyed Yambio's acceptance of British overlordship and Sparkes 
reciprocated by despatching Captain Armstrong to his village in February 1903. 
Unfortunately, Armstrong was killed by an elephant on the way and his small escort 
of only twenty soldiers was forced to retreat after being harassed by the forces of one 
of Yambio's autonomous sons, Mangi. 
6 
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Nevertheless the small size of the patrol again suggests that the Sudan 
Government representatives in Bahr al-Ghazal did not expect confrontation with 
Yambio, who had given sufficient assurances of friendship and co-operation. Even 
Wingate in distant Khartoum knew that Armstrong party was organised 'more on the 
lines of an embassy than of a force to meet and overcome difficulties'. 7 Despite his 
delayed reply, it would appear that Yambio was positively inclined; but that others 
sought to sour relations between him and the Sudan Government. The chief culprit 
was Sultan Tembura who believed he had much to lose by close relations between the 
two. He had become the de facto government adviser on Azande affairs since 
Sparkes instructed him 'to keep me fully posted in it all, 8 and he used that 
opportunity effectively to protect his monopoly of being the only protege, as will 
become clear. 
The Belgian encroachment into the region had by 1903 become such a serious 
issue that all the British authorities - Khartoum, Cairo and London - reacted strongly 
by sanctioning the immediate occupation of the remaining Azande land on the Congo- 
Nile divide. By October 1903 Belgian troops had appeared in Rumbek district 
towards the Bahr al-Jebel, while Captain Lemaire established a post at Muolo on the 
district's common border with Mangi's territory. 9 This development had to be 
arrested by a more rapid and effective occupation, so Wingate initiated the move by 
requesting Cairo's authorisation of a force for the mission. With Cromer's consent, in 
early 1904 the Yambio Patrol, commanded by Major P. Wood, set out to annex the 
country of Sultan Yambio. However, the patrol did not reach its destination because 
complications developed on the way. Apparently Wood felt slighted by Rikita, 
another of Yambio's son in charge of a frontier district. On his way to Rikita's village, 
he was met by the chiefs messengers who conveyed their master's greetings and a gift 
of ivory. Wood rejected both the gift and the greetings on the grounds that the ivory 
was of poor quality and the delegation was only of common Azande instead of the 
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Avongara royal clan. As a result, the British forces' passage was barred, and clashes 
occurred during which several people were killed on both sides. 10 
Tembura's influence can be detected in the behaviour of both Wood's patrol, 
and the earlier one of Armstrong. Both seemed almost designed to provoke 
hostilities. Armstrong had been instructed not to extend a promise of Government 
protection to Yambio. 11 Yet such protection was freely and readily given to 
Tembura himself in 1901. Wood's actions en route to Rikita's village also suggest 
malicious advice from Tembura's agents. A foreigner like Wood who had never been 
to the Zande land before, would not distinguish common Azande from the royal clan. 
It was in Tembura's interests to provoke a confrontation between Yambio and 
the British. After the second attempt to reach Yambio failed, Tembura began to 
agitate for military action against his rival: 'To go to Yambio must be for fighting him 
and if you are determined to do so, please let me know as we all shall be with you like 
slaves and know his ways'. His ultimate objectives were very clear: 'When Yambio is 
dead I shall be a much bigger man, for numbers of people will come to me'. 12 The 
British found they had to speed up the invasion of Yambio's country if they were to 
'maintain T's ... confidence 
in us,. 13 Henceforth, the campaign against Yambio had 
the dual objective: colonial territorial acquisition on the one hand, and advancement 
of Tembura's struggle for supremacy among the Avongara contenders on the other. 
Realisation of those objectives by the British-Tembura alliance turned out to be 
a remarkably easy task. The invasion of Yambio's country was preceded by elaborate 
preparations: road clearing, bridge construction, food and transport provision, after 
which the final offensive was launched in late December 1904. The advance was not 
opposed, and Yambio's capital, Bilikiwi, was reached on 8 February. 
While the Anglo-Egyptian forces advanced, Yambio was also engaged in fierce 
fighting to keep the Belgians out of his territory. He was defeated by the Belgians at 
the battle of Mayawa on the Nile-Congo watershed and, realising that he could not 
110 
stand another defeat without destroying his country, Yambio sent his son, Prince 
Gangura, to the British to reiterate his earlier pledge of loyalty. On arrival at the 
British camp, Gangura was met with the most unexpected reception. fie was seized 
soon after conveying his message, a cord was placed around his neck, and he was 
ordered to reveal his father's location. But Yambio had scented the danger early, for 
he escaped from his house before the invading troops closed in on the town. When 
the troops arrived with Gangura on 8 February, only Yambio's guards were at the 
house. Some of these guards protested at the way the prince was being treated, but 
this was soon brought to an end when the commanding officer, Fell, gave orders to 
fire on them. Two sentries were killed and the rest either fled or surrendered. The 
troops then spread through the town looking for the fugitive Sultan, who was easily 
located hiding in a nearby bush on 9 February and fatally shot while resisting single- 
handedly. 14 
It is therefore difficult to accept the assertion that in the final stages of the 
occupation of his country, Yambio 'accelerated ... hostilities and skirmishes'. 
15 lie 
tried to preserve the independence of his country, but he also knew when the game 
was up. Young army officers who had looked forward to a good fight with the 
'cannibals', 16 were left disappointed and still spoiling for a fight. Four months later, 
Major A. Sutherland, a senior officer in the expedition, remained bitter that the 
sudden demise of Sultan Yambio had deprived the troops of an opportunity to 
impress potential resisters with Government military superiority: 
It is most unfortunate that the Belgians came and fought the Niam 
Niams' 7 ... If we could 
have given the Niam Niams a good beating it 
would have made an excellent impression on the Dinkas who cannot 
understand our going down there with a large force and coming back 
without a single slave. 18 
The Yambio situation constituted a small security problem to the government, but it 
was made to seem explosive by the attitudes and actions of such people like Major 
111 
B. C. Carter, an officer known to have had 'too dangerous an eye to be on his own in 
such circumstances'. 19 While admitting that his 'capturing Yambio was debited 
against [him] as mere bloodthirstiness', Carter was unrepentant. He wanted tougher 
measures taken to ensure the security of the occupying force, for he feared 'being shot 
300 odd miles from a doctor or a steamer'. 20 Accordingly, Carter applied to the Civil 
Secretary for more powers to deal with the Azande: 
The Americans, you will remember, found that the only good Indian was 
a dead one. We need not go so far as that but I may say plainly that 
unless the British Officer engaged on the spot are given a reasonable free 
hand in such matters, it is worse than useless beginning anything. 21 
'Please let me know your views', Carter pleaded, adding rather defiantly that he would 
not 'care to take any steps without orders'. 22 A few days later, a Zande man was shot 
dead and Carter informed Wau on 11 May that the man would have speared a soldier 
if he had not been pre-empted. 23 Carter's request was rejected. 24 
Once Yambio had been killed, the establishment of government authority in the 
new territory was effected with only a few problems, most of which emanated from 
government policies and actions. The Anglo-Egyptian Government became active in 
two areas: liberation of Yambio's 'slaves' and reorganisation of administration. 
Repugnant and repressive as the means initially employed by the Avongara royal clan 
to create their states appeared to the British, they were accepted by the Azande 
themselves. Tembura imposed himself over a population that was predominantly non- 
Azande: his subjects were mostly the vassal Belanda, Bongo and Ndogo tribes, but 
they had become an integral part of the new Azande nation with whom Sparkes and 
his successors made agreements. The eastern Azande state ruled by Mangi was even 
more non-Azande in composition. 'Most of the people in Magi's districts are slaves', 
Boulnois reported, 'and in some cases one Niam Niam Zande was in charge of a 
whole village of slaves'. 25 These 'slave' tribes - Avonkaya, Mundu, Baka and 
Makaraka - were, nevertheless, settled quietly under their Azande overlords. But in 
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the subsequent British drive to break the power of the Avongara rulers, the subject 
people were encouraged to rebel against their chiefs with promises of government 
protection. 26 
After the Azande 'imperialists' had been removed or weakened by the 
'liberators', chaos set in as the freed 'slaves' turned on their fallen masters. And with 
little feeling of remorse, Governor Boulnois felt 'inclined to leave them to settle their 
differences' as long as the 'revolt of the slaves ... reduced the power of Mangi and the 
Zandehs under him'. 27 Here, as in other parts of the Southern Sudan in the early 
years of the British occupation, 'the activities of the administration tended to 
perpetuate violence and even to increase its scale'. 28 However, Boulnois eventually 
found involvement in local struggle unavoidable. The area was still being contested 
with the Belgians, and should the situation be allowed to degenerate into anarchy, it 
could be exploited by the other colonial competitor to its own advantage. It therefore 
became incumbent on the governor to see that they 'all settled quietly without 
fighting'. 29 Sutherland inherited this state of insecurity following his appointment as 
governor on the death of Boulnois at the end of April. It was because of this concern 
that Sutherland objected to a suggestion by Carter in 1906 for the troops to be 
withdrawn from the Yambio territory. Sutherland was 'totally opposed to this' 
because 'if we return from there after the Belgians do' he argued, 'a state of chaos will 
ensue in which the strongest men who are those who have been more in contact with 
the Belgians than with us - will get the upper hand'. 
30 
Administrative arrangements were established after the fall of Sultan Yambio. 
Three districts of Tembura, Yambio, and Maridi, were created, each with a leading 
chief. Sultan Tembura retained his position while two Azande commoners, Oku and 
Yango, were appointed at Yambio and Maridi respectively. But these other two 
chiefs had to be propped up by the government in the face of serious opposition from 
the Avongara clan. At one stage Sutherland had to issue a stern warning to the 
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opposition that 'any interference with Oku will be considered as a declaration of war 
against the Government'. 31 But in the end some of the complaints were seen to be 
genuine, and from time to time changes were made to pacify local pressure groups 
and to make the chiefs more dependent on the government that appointed and 
removed them at will. 
There were a few continuing problems for the British in Zande land but these 
were easily-manageable administrative issues. Their resolution did not demand 
external assistance, but' could be settled within the province. There was a great 
difference between what the literature maintains about the Zande resistance, and what 
actually happened when the British had occupied the country. 
(b) The Fertit Resistance 1907-1912 
Tribal resistance in the Fertit territory is significant in two respects. Firstly it 
occurred among peoples who initially had warmly embraced the Anglo-Egyptian 
Government. What altered those cordial relations could be traced to a breakdown of 
communication between the ruler and the ruled. There was a much more difficult 
conflict to resolve than initial disagreement, which could be patched up as the 
contending parties come to know each other better. Secondly, the situation had the 
potential for wider political implications of the Northern Sudan type: Islamic militants, 
relative cultural homogeneity, and a threat from the autonomous Darfur Sultanate not 
presented by other tribal opposition to the government. 
Western Bahr al-Ghazal is inhabited by tribes of the same Fertit group whose 
initial contacts with the occupation force at Wau have already been mentioned. In 
this area lived a conglomeration of refugees from the Azande and Fur imperial 
expansion, free booters known as Mandala, and survivors of the days of slave trade. 
As the area had been a traditional slave-hunting ground for the Arabs and Fur from 
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Kordofan and Darfur, and served in the 1870s as the operational base of the notorious 
Jaali slave trader, Zubeir Pasha, most of the inhabitants became Muslims - at least 
nominally, for they acquired Arab names and customs. Living in such a state of 
insecurity, the Fertit welcomed the government as a liberator. They sent a delegation 
to Khartoum in April 1900 to declare their support for the government. 32 When 
Major Boulnois entered the area in March 1901 and established a post at Dem Zubair, 
he was invited by two leading chiefs, Naser Andel and Musa Hamid, to open another 
station at the village of Gossinga: Major D. C. E. Comyn completed the annexation of 
Western Bahr al-Ghazal (also known as Dar Fertit) in 1904-1905, during which the 
posts of Kafia Kingi, Raga and Kabuluzer were established. 33 
Apparently- in line with the general Sudan Government policy of avoiding 
provocation of Muslims, Comyn and his successor H. Walsh did not appoint new 
chiefs but - as long as they co-operated - continued to work with the existing ones. 
However, the vulnerability of these small tribes was so taken for granted that 
Government officials began to exert more authority and make excessive demands on 
them. There were many contentious issues in this area. Labour demand was very 
high and the population was small. Slave trade and illegal firearms traffic across the 
common border with the French territories had to be contained. Indeed, the two went 
together: slave raiding encouraged the import of rifles. In the course of time the local 
people acquired the technology for making rifles, 
34 a very uncomfortable 
development which the government would not allow to develop further. Combating 
such developments could only succeed with the full co-operation of the local leaders. 
The anticipated co-operation of the chiefs did not, however, reach the 
satisfactory level the officials had expected. Either the chiefs did not perform well, or 
the demands made on them by the officials were too high, or both. Quarrels ensued, 
culminating in the arrest of Andel Abdullahi and Murad Ibrahim in 1905 and 1908 
respectively for non-co-operation with the government. A third chief, Musa Ilamid, 
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resented what he felt was too much government presence in his area. While the 
administrative capital of the district was at Dem Zubair, Musa had continued to enjoy 
some autonomy in his village of Raga. But with the transfer of the administrative 
centre to Raga in 1906, the situation changed. Musa felt overshadowed and restricted 
as he came under the direct supervision of the inspector, with the attendant numerous 
demands on obedient subjects. Tension grew until in 1907 he was accused of having 
masterminded the murder of a soldier in the town, after which he attempted to flee 
into the French territory before he was arrested and exiled to Khartoum. 35 
The chiefs had grounds for complaint against the way some government 
officials conducted themselves among the natives. The intention could be good - like 
the liberation of slaves which Comyn attempted - but the discharge of duties could be 
over-zealous. Of such conduct, Governor Sutherland complained: that'Comyn is too 
impulsive and seems to have upset everybody ... He should 
know better than to go 
into a Sheikh's harimat himself to hunt for slaves as he did recently'. 36 Such actions 
like violating the privacy of Muslim women was an act little short of insane, for it 
could lead to physical attacks upon offenders. The inspector could go unharmed but 
such a blunder could easily be exploited by malcontents, who were numerous in 
Western Bahr al-Ghazal. 
Two of these hostile elements are worth mentioning. There were the Fur claims 
to the territory based on an old association when parts of the Dar Fertit was a 
dependency of the Sultanate of Darfur. Sultan Ali Dinar revived this claim after his 
return from imprisonment at Omdurman in 1898. He even questioned the Anglo- 
Egyptian Government's right to patrol the region of the copper mines, llufra at- 
Nahas. He further endeared himself to the Fertit by protesting to the Sudan 
Government against mistreatment, and the arrest and deportation of their leaders. As 
a direct challenge to the Sudan Government, Ali Dinar made his own appointments 
and confirmations of Fertit chiefs. 
37 
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The Ansar refugees in the district also incited people to rebellion against the 
British. After the defeat of the Khalifa, many Ansar from the Fertit tribes and 
immigrants of West African origin, returned to the area and continued to oppose the 
Anglo-Egyptian Government. And according to an authority on the region's history, 
these Mahdist elements became 'a ready reserve for rebels', making the Muslim 
dimension 'a unique feature of the Western Districts resistance'. 38 This smouldering 
fire of resistance was set ablaze by what the people saw as overbearing actions of 
local British officials. The Fertit split into those in favour and those against the 
government, with the latter crossing into French territory. From there they waged 
guerrilla warfare against the pro-government Fertit, until the rebel leaders Murad and 
Andel were killed in action by government troops in 1912.39 
Although the forces arrayed against the British posed a considerable security 
problem in the district, the local government force was equal to the task of 
maintaining law and order, and to collect taxes. Local interests worked effectively 
against the emergence of a united Muslim rebel front to oppose the government, 
which the officials exploited to their advantage. Government officials were careful to 
limit their quarrels to those immediately implicated in opposition while becoming 
generous to neutrals and allies. Dismissed chiefs were replaced from within the ruling 
clan or family, 40 to narrow opposition. In addition, the small size and mixed 
composition of the Fertit populations was advantageous to the government. After the 
1912 revolt, 'no other leader emerged to unify the peoples of Dar Fertit, and by 
isolating their petty chiefs, the British successfully kept them powerless and 
peacefül'. 41 
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(c) Dinka Resistance 
Dinka resistance was perhaps the only opposition that exhibited wide regional 
dimensions and it therefore created more concern to the Sudan Government than the 
other tribal revolts. Believed by government officials before the reconquest to be 'the 
most warlike and powerful tribe', with a population estimated at several million, it was 
feared that the Dinka could raise a revolt that would cost the government much in 
resources. Such concerns were always at the back of the minds of government 
officials when dealing with a Dinka situation. Three stages in Dinka resistance can be 
identified: the stage of localised and assumed resistance; brief attempts to link Dinka 
dissatisfaction with the government to the urban anti-colonial movement; and budding 
Dinka 'nationalism'. Each of these stages dictated a distinct response from the 
government. 
The Agar Dinka revolt of 1902 had a significant impact on subsequent British 
policy towards the whole tribe. It would be an over-simplification, however, to 
attribute the British image of the tribe to the single incident in which a British officer 
was killed. This served rather as a confirmation of what they had suspected all along. 
The initial contacts between Sparkes and the Rek Dinka at Mashra ar-Raqq did not 
impress the former. There was no jubilant reception accorded to the representatives 
of a government that had removed the raiding Mahdist rule. They were met instead 
by 'apathetic and sullenly unco-operative if not openly hostile' on-lookers who in 
addition refused to supply porters. 
42 To brave all the hardships and hazards of the 
unknown only to be met on arrival in such a manner was a great disappointment. 
British frustration with the Dinka was expressed in the liberal use of derogatory 
adjectives. Several months before the Agar clashed with the Sudan Government at 
Rumbek, those Dinka were referred to as 'those treacherous' and 'pigheaded brutes'. 
It was therefore decided to send an additional force from Wau to Rumbek'to parade a 
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bit in front of the Dinkas'. 43 The opportunity came soon enough for government 
forces to demonstrate their undisputed military supremacy. 
Scott-Barbour, who was in charge of the district, was killed in January 1902 by 
one Agar section which had accused the inspector of taking sides in intersectional 
quarrels involving cattle stealing. The government reacted swiftly and devastatingly. 
Forces from within Bahr al-Ghazal Province and from Khartoum carried out 
successful operations against Chief Mayen Mathiang, who led the resistance. Many 
Dinka were killed including the chief, villages were burnt down and cattle taken. By 
July the Agar resistance had collapsed. 44 
This Agar revolt of 1902 was to be the only Dinka offensive throughout the first 
decade of the Anglo-Egyptian rule, yet the Dinka continued to be viewed with 
suspicion by the government. Other sections of the tribe played helpful roles that 
would normally have earned praise and enhanced their chances of being accepted as 
good subjects. The Dinka around Wau responded positively to the government call 
to supply the town with food. In 1903 for instance, they supplied so much grain that 
the local authorities decided against importing food from Khartoum. 45 Their 
willingness to co-operate was further shown by their supplying bulls to be trained for 
transport within the province. 46 The bulls must have been paid for, but considering 
the near-spiritual attachment the Dinka have for their cattle, this was a significant 
concession. 47 When Wingate visited Bahr al-Ghazal in 1904, several Dinka chiefs 
came from distant regions to meet him at Wau. 
48 Likewise, when a Dinka district in 
northern Bahr al-Ghazal which had not been visited before was entered at last in 
1904, Chief Mayar Amet, who had been assumed to be hostile, 'came into Wau to pay 
his respects, as fast as he could lay legs to the ground'. 
49 
Still, these services and demonstrations of loyalty did not alter government 
suspicion of the Dinka. They fell short of the level of submission reached by the Fertit 
tribes around Wau. The Fertit were considered as 'far more useful members of 
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society than the Dinkas' because the former were 'willing' and could 'be relied on'. 50 
As for the Dinka they were 'the worst', predicted to take a long time 'before they can 
be improved'. 51 Government officials believed that the Dinka could not be easily 
won over: 
... the character given to the 
Agar branch applies equally well to all the 
Dinkas; they would make fine soldiers, but are not desirable citizens ... They accept the Government as unavoidable evil, but they would far 
rather be without. 52 
Faced with such prejudice, it was difficult for the Dinka to placate the government. 
Thus those chiefs who went to Wau in 1904 to show their support for the government 
were seen by Governor Boulnois as'none of any importance'. 53 The important ones, 
if appears, were those whom the governor imagined to be still holding out, even if 
they did not exist. In another situation, a friendly reception accorded to a government 
mission in the country-side in 1905 by a leading Agar chief, Wot Tiang (Wol Athian) 
was largely swept aside by Governor Sutherland's attitude that 'you cannot trust the 
Dinkas much'. 54 Dinka reluctance to serve the government in the only area they were 
believed to be useful in - military service - did not improve their standing either. 
Government patrols traversed the countryside looking for recruits for the army. Yet, 
six months of hard effort in 1904 to get men who could fill the 100 to 150 under- 
establishment of the Sudanese Battalions secured only 45 recruits55 When the tribe 
could not be persuaded to enter military service in large numbers, most likely because 
military service had in the past been a form of slavery, relations with the government 
deteriorated further. 'Unless the Dinkas change their attitude considerably, warned 
Sutherland, 'we shall have to give them a lesson'. 56 
It was under such clouds of mistrust that the penetration of the vast Dinka 
country was undertaken. Patrols were sent against the Atwot and Rek of Chief 
Ajaaker between 1907 and 1913. Immediate reasons were insubordination and 
aggressive acts against government agents. But the more fundamental motive for 
government action was the removal or intimidation of spiritual leaders like the Atwot 
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leader, Awo, as the prelude to the establishment of permanent administration in their 
territories. , Both Awo and Ajaaker were suspected by officials to be responsible for 
the tribes withholding support from the government. Thus after Awo's death during 
operations in 1907, Wingate believed his disappearance would facilitate a settlement 
with the Atwot. 57 However, sporadic revolts continued to occur from time to time in 
different Dinka areas throughout the War period, 58 though they were effectively 
contained as soon as they appeared. Some of the incidents occurred because both 
sides pre judged each other. The government presumed those Dinka who remained 
aloof while following their own way of life to be anti-government, until contact 
proved otherwise. For their part, the Dinka saw the government at a distance as 
cattle raiders, 59 from whom they should keep clear. As tension developed some of 
the more politically-aware Dinka realised the futility of the localised sectional revolts, 
and tried to inject new spirit into Dinka resistance. Associated with this move are two 
names: Mirsal and prophet Arianhdit. 
Abd al-Latif Mirsal was a Dinka army officer, commissioned in 1911 as second 
lieutenant in the 12th Sudanese Battalion. In Wau garrison where he was stationed in 
1915, Mirsal observed the struggle between recalcitrant Dinka sections and the 
government, and thereafter decided to champion his people's cause. According to his 
own version of events, he had disagreed with his British commander over purely 
administrative matters. In order to reduce the tension between them, 
Mirsal applied 
to an Egyptian deputy commander for a three-day local leave to be spent with 
his 
relatives in the Dinka villages. But he over-stayed this 
leave by three days, and the 
governor ordered a search for him. Mirsal maintained that 
he decided of his own free 
will to return, only to be arrested, chained, and sent to Khartoum. 
60 
The Intelligence Department had a different version. According to officials. 
Mirsal left in August 1915 with seven Dinka chiefs to join Ali Dinar against the Sudan 
Government. 61 Suspecting, rightly, that Turco-Egyptian anti-British wartime 
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propaganda had infiltrated the army, 62 Wingate urged the Adjutant General to exert 
more efforts in order to remedy the situation. The hunt for Mirsal was accordingly 
intensified leading in about October to his arrest and subsequently removal to 
Khartoum. 
The circumstances of Mirsal's defection and arrest may never be known for 
certain, but his later testimony clarifies matters a little. What he said, the manner in 
which he said it, and the contacts he made while awaiting trial, indicate that Mirsal 
was indeed a threat to the cohesion of the Sudanese-British alliance which Wingate 
and his lieutenants had strenuously worked to achieve. 
In detention, Mirsal's attitude towards the Sudan Government hardened. He 
confided to a German prisoner that he was pro-Turkey in the War. To a government 
official (most probably in disguise) who conversed with him, Mirsal was forthright 
about his political views: 'My relatives, the Dinkas of Bahr al-Ghazal, are 
discontented', he declared, 'but unless some movement against the Government is 
started and is manoeuvred from Khartoum and Omdurman, it will not be of any use'; 
adding wistfully that the 'German and Turks are victorious, but are still far away'. 63 
Mirsal's thinking was an indication of his political sophistication. It had become 
clear to him that traditional Dinka war tactics had proved hopelessly ineffective 
against modern military technology and the organisational capability of their new 
masters. Urban dissidents in Khartoum and Omdurman could provide better ideas to 
make Dinka resistance more effective. The so-called detribalised blacks of Southern 
origin in urban Omdurman among whom the Dinka preponderated, had also acquired 
some material means of assistance: 
This class has shown itself readier in the past than most others to avail 
itself of the educational facilities offered since the British occupation, 
and is, consequently, strongly represented in the lower ranks of officials, 
military and civilian, and similar capacities in commercial life. 64 
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Unfortunately for himself and luckily for the Sudan Government, Mirsal did not get 
the chance to try his ideas in Omdurman or other urban centres for he was considered 
to be too dangerous to remain in the country in war time. If the numerous and 
warlike Dinka were to be introduced to the wider national - perhaps even 
international - politics that Mirsal intended to preach, Dinka resistance might easily 
have affected the Arabs and Muslims along their common border, for many of these 
were secretly sympathetic to their Turkish co-religionists. 65 Wingate had wanted 
Mirsal exiled as far away as Malta; but as its prisons were full, he was interned in 
Cairo and was not to be allowed back in the country until after the War. 66 
It is not known whether Mirsal had been embarked on his mission of Dinka 
liberation long enough to recruit adherents within the army, nor is there evidence to 
show that the alleged seven Dinka with whom he associated carried the message 
further. There is, however, a hint that his dissatisfaction was shared by other Dinka in 
the province. Fergusson of the Eastern district, (who faced his own Dinka opposition 
in 1921, narrowly escaping death twice: from being drowned by a rebel chief on one 
occasion and being clubbed on the head, on the other67) believed that the cause of the 
unrest had roots in the past. He could easily relate 'this infernal anti-Government 
feeling among the Dinkas' to 'serious trouble concerning one of the native officers' 
who had served in the province and was at the time in detention in Khartoum. 68 
If Fergusson was right to link his 1921 troubles to earlier discontent, then one 
of the two interpretations are possible. Either the anonymous native officer was 
Mirsal, which would suggest that he had managed before his arrest to spread his 
gospel to a few disciples who continued the political resistance. Or it was a different 
officer with the same objective as Mirsal, which would show that there was a more 
widespread Dinka movement seeking liaison between the urban and rural Dinka. In 
either case, Dinka resistance was a potential threat that had to be dealt with in its 
infancy, and Wingate and his provincial officials did not take risks. 
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Concurrently with the efforts to remove Mirsal from the scene, other plans were 
made to counter-act whatever he might have sown among his people. The problem 
was thought to be so potentially serious that the relevant decisions were taken at the 
highest level by: the Governor-General, Civil Secretary and Adjutant General. They 
appear to have suspected that the Mirsal incident was linked to a rumoured Dinka - 
Ali Dinar alliance: certainly both had directed attacks against a tribe friendly to the 
government, the Rizeigat. The Dinka attack had already sent the Rizeigat leader, 
Madibbo, to the government appealing for intervention to check the incursion69 at 
the same time as Ali Dinar threatened invasion of his lands. 70 It was decided that a 
patrol of about six companies should be sent against the Dinka of northern Bahr al- 
Ghazal, which would also act as'a veiled threat to Ali Dinar'. 71 But when it came to 
implementing the decision, the two governors of the relevant provinces had different 
views. Governor R. V. Savile of Kordofan - whose Arab subjects on the border with 
Bahr al-Ghazal were not all that dependable - supported military operations against 
the Dinka in the hope that it would help his rapproachment with Musa Maddibo. 72 
But, Governor R. M. Feilden of Bahr al-Ghazal - whose vast and remote province had 
been drained of officers by the war-advised against the patrol as it would be 'a most 
costly undertaking'. Wingate was convinced by Feilden's argument and the Dinka 
patrol was cancelled. 73 It was left to provincial authorities to handle the situation as 
best they could. 
After surveying the situation in his province, Feilden saw the need for frequent 
contact with, and closer supervision of, the hitherto unadministered Dinka. In this 
way discontent could be detected early enough to be contained. The likes of Mirsal 
could not then be concealed among the people, and proximity with the tribe would 
enable local officials to identify collaborators through whom they could channel 
policies. So Feilden initiated a policy of peaceful penetration by being the first 
governor of the province ever to visit the Nyamlel area in April 1916. His physical 
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presence among the local people and the talks they held with the governor pacified 
many leaders and their followers, who then expressed willingness to pay their taxes 
and render other services like cleaning the road. But Feilden did not employ 
diplomacy at the expense of authority, lest the Dinka took it as a sign of weakness on 
the part of the government. When one chief whose people refused to clear their 
portion of the road declined to meet the governor, he was fined twenty bulls. 74 After 
this high profile visit to northern Bahr al-Ghazal, local government officials 
maintained frequent contacts with the Dinka villages. But the creation of new 
administrative posts in the district was out of the question for the time being, as these 
would demand additional financial resources and manpower, at a time when 'not a 
single British solider' had been added to the garrison in the Sudan since the War 
began. 75 
As the government grip on the Dinka started to bite with tax collection and the 
gradual enforcement of labour on roads, resistance was stepped up by die-hards. 
Their ideal targets were collaborating government chiefs (who facilitated the loss of 
Dinka independence), rest houses (which resistors believed were used as staging posts 
for patrols against them), and obstruction of road work (as it brought government 
officials nearer to the people). Opposition continued to rise in both scale and 
quantity. It became more widespread through the work of individuals who spread 
anti-government propaganda from Nyamlel district in northern-western Bahr al- 
Ghazal through the central region to the Eastern district, Rumbek. Behind this tide of 
opposition was a minor Malual chief, Bol Yol. 
With Bol Yol, chief of Pariath clan, best known by his religious name of 
Arianhdit, Dinka resistance was carried further. In 1915 Arianhdit is said to have 
disappeared or - as it was believed by the Dinka - was carried away to a distant 
country by Nhialic (God). Returning to Nyamlel district as a prophet in 1917, 
Arianhdit announced his divine mission to the Dinka. It was clear and direct: God 
t 
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had directed him to tell the Dinka to abandon the government and to move from its 
reach to a land of peace and prosperity. 76 While sending out agents to spread his 
message among the Dinka and the neighbouring Jur tribe, and assuring the people of 
victory as he claimed to turn bullets into water and raise the dead, prophet Arianhdit 
went to work in earnest to set up a rudimentary alternative government. This he tried 
to achieve by emulating as best he could certain aspects of the Sudan Government. 
He chose a site for his headquarters in a region not easily accessible to government 
agents on the Lol river where he built a large house for meetings with a capacity of 
between 300 to 400 persons. 77 As a symbol of authority and test of the people's 
loyalty to him, Arianhdit introduced his own tax (paid in bulls). 78 He also made 
efforts to maintain law and order in the area by suppressing crime and reconciling 
feuding groups. On petty crime for example, Arianhdit ordered the release of stolen 
Sudan Government donkeys, and restored property robbed from a Northern Sudanese 
trader passing though his territory. 79 
Arianhdit's role as a peacemaker between the Twic of Bahr al-Ghazal and Ngok 
- who were administratively part of the Northern Sudan - deserves comment because 
it provides strong testimony of his acceptance as Dinka leader. As early as 1914, 
Chief Akonon, deputy of the Ngok's overall leader, Kuol Arop, combined forces with 
a Baggara party under Ali Gula and raided the Twic cattle of Chief Bol Chol. 80 For 
one reason or another, possibly evasion of the local authorities or resistance to orders, 
it was only early in 1920 that the provincial authorities of Kordofan compelled 
Akonon to release Twic cattle. To his great disappointment, the plaintiff discovered 
that some of the stolen cattle had remained with the defendant. Surprisingly enough, 
the appeal against this continuing injustice was made not to the Sudan Government 
but to Arianhdit. The prophet responded by visiting the Ngok country, and securing 
the release of the rest of the Twic cattle to their owner. While in Kordofan, Arianhdit 
also settled disputes among different Ngok sections, one of which was a chronic 
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blood feud which he brought to an end by imposing payment of compensation in 
cattle. 81 
In an ordinary condition of Dinka society, in which there were sharp inter- 
sectional and clan differences, it would have been unthinkable for a Twic to take his 
complaint against a Ngok to a Malual chief. Conversely, it would have been 
presumptuous of such a Malual chief to think that a Ngok would respect his 
arbitration. But with prophet Arianhdit on the way towards forming a united Dinka 
nation, some leaders felt obliged to operate above tribal differences. 
While Arianhdit campaigned for the unity of the Dinka and to woo away people 
from the Sudan Government, he was invited several times to visit Wau and Nyamlel 
for discussions with government officials. 82 But he declined, and then stopped further 
requests with the defiant statement: 'My father and my mother did not speak with the 
English. Why should I? '83 Reporting to Wau or Nyamlel would have implied 
recognition of the Sudan Government, which Arianhdit was not prepared to accept. 
As well as being unable to influence the leader, government officials were unable to 
win over the prophet's agents who visited government centres to argue their case with 
them. Arianhdit's agents would ask officials to produce convincing reasons why they 
should expect the Dinka to desert the prophet, who in addition to being a power in his 
own right, taxed the people less than the government. 
84 Arianhdit's influence 
continued to grow, to the alarm of Governor M. J. Wheatley: 
... 
his influence has been gradually extending until he now practically 
rules all the Dinka in the neighbourhood of Nyanlell and only those in 
the immediate proximity to the post make any pretence of obeying 
government orders or paying their taxes. The Mamur and police cannot 
without risk of attack venture very far from the Merkaz. 85 _" 
That situation now demanded a different treatment. To curb Arianhdit's anti- 
government activities, therefore, the governor decided in early 1922 to subdue him 
militarily, and a three-pronged patrol was despatched against him in February, 
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Outmanoeuvred and realising, it appears, that his effective weapons against the Sudan 
Government had been his tongue and boycott, not spears, Arianhdit surrendered in 
March, the troops having encountered only feeble resistance from pockets of 
Arianhdit's die-hards. 86 
Although his struggle to liberate the Dinka seemed to have ended in anti-climax, 
Arianhdit had organised the only tribal resistance in the South which made 
government officials feel serious apprehension. While he consolidated his position in 
northern and central Bahr al-Ghazal, other Dinka leaders, possibly inspired by him, 87 
organised resistance against the British in the eastern part of the province and in 
adjacent Mongalla Province. Although none came anywhere near Arianhdit's 
achievement, these outbreaks provide substantial evidence that a general Dinka 
uprising was contemplated. The different Dinka revolts from 1918 to 1921, reveal an 
unusual spirit of unity among all the Agar, Atwot, Aliab and the Twic leaders. The 
Agar and Atwot leaders, Malual Mathiang and Dhieu Alam, whose peoples the 
government had employed interchangeably as friendlies whenever it was at war with 
one or the other, were by 1918 willing to bury past differences in order to co-operate 
against the British outpost at Rumbek. 88 Even the traditional Dinka enemy, the 
Nuer, were approached by Malual to shelve their differences and join in the war of 
liberation against the British. 89 The Aliab co-ordinated plans with the Bor Dinka for 
a simultaneous attack on the government towns of Bor and Mingkaman. 
90 Farther 
north of the Bor, three Twic sections - Ayual, Dachwek and Awulian - contacted the 
Kongor section to join them in an uprising against the government post at Kongor. 
91 
Faced by hostile Dinka across a wide front, extending from the border of 
Southern Darfur to the east bank- of the Bahr al Jebel, and hopelessly outnumbered, 
there was some justification for the nervousness of government offcials. 92 In the 
event, the few government troops had practically a walk over. It goes without saying 
that the government's superior military technology and organisation almost alone 
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made its victory a foregone conclusion. However, the role of local allies cannot be 
ignored. Confrontation with troops was attempted on a number of occasions, but as 
in previous clashes, the Dinka were torn between group independence and local 
considerations. The conflict with the Twic and Aliab is a case in point. The appeal 
which Chief Bul Kuer of Ayual section made in March 1919 on behalf of the Twic 
war party, to their numerically strongest member, Kongor section, to join was 
rejected. Far from consolidating the Dinka front against the Anglo-Egyptian 
Government, the proposed Twic military strategy divided the people more than ever 
before. The Kongor rebuff accentuated existing tension created by section rivalries, 
precipitating in April an Ayual attack on Kongor for being government agents. In 
retaliation the Kongor joined a government patrol in May during which ten Ayual 
were killed, villages burnt and cattle confiscated. 93 
The Kongor were happy with the government, it appears, because the 
government station which was targeted for destruction was sited in their village and 
named after their section. As the host, they would have felt bound to protect their 
guests. Moreover, the presence of government in their midst gave their chief, Aguer 
Bior, an unofficial paramountcy over the other Twic chiefs: Bul Kuer (Ayual), Lual 
Deng (Dachwek), Akoi Atem (Adhiok) and Biar Abit (Awulian) . Above all, there 
was the general interest (which the Ayual seemed not to consider) that Kongor post 
was there in the first place to protect the Twic against Nuer raids. Given the two 
alternatives, the Kongor would rather cling to those privileges than to enter a war 
they knew would not be won for some time. 
The Aliab uprising of 1919-1920 offers another interplay of'national' and tribal 
interests in Dinka society. Administrative malpractices by the mamur in their country 
provided the Aliab with a direct cause to pursue their war of independence. In the 
planning stages, they were in consultation with the Bor Dinka on the opposite bank of 
the Bahr al-Jebel. The latter's immediate grievances were not apparent, as they had 
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been on good terms with the government since the early days of the reconquest. All 
the same they were involved in anti-government activity that was going on in the 
Aliab country. Chief Yuot Alier sent a three-man delegation to the Aliab leader, Chief 
Kon Anok suggesting that both the Aliab and the Bor should co-ordinate their attack. 
On the agreed date, the Aliab would start by overrunning the smaller Mingkaman 
station after which the latter would attach Bor town. 94 
As agreed the Aliab executed their part of the deal but the Bor uprising never 
materialised. Two factors seem to explain their inaction. Stigand's show of force as 
he passed by Bor in November 1919 on the 'Tamai' enroute to the Twic region might 
have intimidated them. But considering the close attachment of the for Dinka to the 
government, which the Beir (Murle) raids necessitated, one would be inclined to think 
that Yuot Alier was momentarily swept along by the liberation appeal before he knew 
what he was about to jump into. ý The Aliab could risk a break with the government 
because they did not have a strong indigenous enemy from whom they needed 
government protection. The Bor on the other hand could hardly afford to lose the 
only ally who had protected them against Beir attacks since 1908 in return for a 
nominal herd tax. Thus, the desertion at the last hour after they have given the other 
party false hope of support. 
Together with the difficulties faced by Arianhdit and other Dinka leaders in 
Bahr al-Ghazal, the Twic and Bor-Aliab micro-politics have further demonstrated that 
Dinka local issues were an asset to the Anglo-Egyptian Government. It was the same 
old plague that had devastated their forebears: 
So large are the numbers of the Dinka and so extensive their territory, 
that it must be expected that they will long perpetuate their existence 
among the ... 
inhabitants of Africa. So far as regards their race, their 
line of life, and their customs, they have the material of national unity; 
but where they fail is that their tribes not only make war upon each 
other, but submit to be enlisted as the instruments of treachery by 
intruders from outside. 95 
130 
Dinka unrest, and especially Arianhdit's initial success acted as an eye-opener to the 
government which, realising the futility of laisser-faire in the interior of the Southern 
Sudan, took immediate steps to bring the whole region under effective administration. 
In the region previously controlled by Arianhdit, two new administrative centres were 
established in 1922 at Gogkrial and Aweil with resident officials. Considered in this 
context, Dinka resistance accelerated rather than impeded the opening up of the 
region. 
(d) Integrating the Inheritance front Uganda 
What became the eastern districts of Mongalla Province from 1914 had been a 
turbulent, largely unadministered, region of Uganda Protectorate. Several proposals 
by British officials to extend government administration inland to the tribes lying 
between the Nile, Ethiopia, and British East Africa (Kenya) were rejected by London 
on account of the enormous cost without prospect of corresponding revenue. Those 
administrators like Frederick, Johnston and Sadler, who came after the expansionists 
MacDonald and Sir Harry Johnston, were cautioned by the Foreign Office against 
further expansion in that direction. For example, Commissioner Sadler was told in 
1902 'not ... to push too quickly amongst 
tribes in outlying districts who have little to 
offer at the present in the way of commerce, and who 
have not yet become 
accustomed to the sojourn of the white men in their midst-. 
96 In addition transport of 
any goods from this production area would be prohibitively high as not 'a single 
product that might be grown ... would pay 
for the cost of its carriage to the seaboard'. 
By 1906 even an already established station inland like Fatiko had to be abandoned 
because: 
... the 
further we push our active authority into those wild regions 
eastwards of the Nile, the more rapidly will our responsibilities grow and 
we would probably find ourselves, a few years hence, committed to the 
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proper government of a vast territory reaching to the very borders of 
Abyssinia, the commercial value of which would never pay for one tithe 
of the cost of its administration. 97 
Even more discouraging to the British was the task of administering the 'stateless 
societies' found in the area. The British had found it easy to control most of Uganda 
through the centralised tribal system existing among the Bantu tribes. These were 
administered by the officials controlling the local kings, who then passed down 
government directives to their submissive followers. In contrast, the tribes in 
Uganda's Nile Province, like many of the tribes across the border in Sudan, lived 
under many chiefs, and they would not be directed by these chiefs without their 
consent. In fact the chief was only the first among equals, and his degree of authority 
over his clan or tribe was largely dependent on his personality. Uganda officials thus 
found it especially exasperating to administer such peoples who had 'no powerful 
local authorities through which we might transmit our directions. '98 Nevertheless, 
the Uganda Protectorate authorities continued to penetrate the region slowly and 
grudgingly until the 1914 boundary adjustment with the Sudan Government offered 
an opportunity to transfer responsibility for the area to the Sudan Government. 
On taking over the new territory, the immediate task for the Sudan Government 
was to extend control over peoples who had been used to a colonial government 
that did not seem to have the ability to interfere with their independence. Petty 
crime, insubordination, inter-tribal conflict, and the presence of firearms brought 
about an early clash between the two sides. The small mountain tribes, the Latuka, 
Lokoyia, and Didinga, came within reach of the government for the first time with the 
establishment in April 1914 of the administrative centre at Torit in the Latuka country 
about eighty-four miles eastwards from Mongalla. Initial contacts with the Latuka 
were impressive. Governor Owen during the opening of Torit received their chiefs, of 
whom Sultan Lokitei (Lohide) arrived in 'a royal procession' with his police in 
uniform. 99 Lohide was apparently trying to let the Sudan Government know that he 
rather than other chiefs was the man to work with in the district. He succeeded to the 
132 
extent that a government patrol which he had requested was sent against a rival chief 
of Calamini village in June 1914. But the co-operation did not last. Lohide insisted 
on maintaining effective authority over his tribe with the help of the government, and 
resented being reduced to a government agent. He was apparently opposed to the 
recruitment of Latuka youth into the Equatorial Battalion of the Sudan army, and 
eventually was accussed of being an accomplice in the desertion of some recruits. His 
change of attitude was confirmed by his refusal to co-operate in the collection of 
firearms which the Latuka were getting from Ethiopian traders. Not only did he 
refuse to disarm the Latuka but Lohide himself withdrew in 1917 to his village of 
Tirangore, acquired more firearms from Ethiopian traders and openly defied 
government orders. The government responded by sending a punitive expedition on I 
June 1917 which the Sultan resisted till he died fighting. His death ended active 
Latuka resistance and his successor, Onyong, co-operated with the government. 100 
The Lokoyia through whose country the telegraph line from Mongalla to Torit 
passed refused to recognise the government and even provoked it by destroying the 
telegraph line and using the wire for bracelets. Although they are a small population, 
the Lokoyia presented an obstacle by preventing government mail passing through 
their mountainous region. After attempts for a year to negotiate a peaceful settlement 
with the tribe proved a failure, it was decided to subdue them by force of arms. From 
January 1915 to July 1918 all the difference Loyoyia villages were brought under firm 
Sudan Government control. 101 
Further east of the Latuka were the formidable Didinga and Toposa tribes who 
with the help of firearms from Ethiopia continued to devastate their neighbours. 
Owen had decided as early as 1915 not to occupy the Didinga country until the 
government was in a position to administer it effectively. 102 Didinga raids against 
tribes in both the Sudan and Uganda continued unhampered until 1921 when the 
powerful Didinga chief Enamoi challenged the Torit District Commissioner, R. B. 
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Black, to subdue him by force if he could. The Sudan Government was still 
unprepared to take on the Didinga, but since the tribe was also a threat to Uganda 
security, the latter was accordingly informed in July 1921 of the difficulty. 
Fortunately for the Sudan Government, the Uganda Government was now ready to 
conquer the Didinga, and asked only for assistance in its own operations. This Sir 
Lee Stack could afford, and accordingly one company of the Equatorial Battalion 
was despatched to help troops of the King's African Rifles (KAR). By January 1922, 
the tribe had been subdued. , An administrative post was established in February at 
Nagichot under the Uganda administration until it was handed to the Sudan in 
1923.103 
This survey of tribal resistance has revealed an extremely complex situation, 
which controverts any general argument that the behaviour of Southern Sudanese 
tribes created a major obstacle to progressive British administration. While some 
tribes resisted on their own initiative, others were provoked by actions of British 
officials. Some of the resistance arose from only minor differences between officials 
and tribes, but was magnified to justify proposed lines of government policy. In other 
situations, officials simply assumed that tribes were unfriendly, and harsh decisions 
were reached upon little, if any, tangible evidence. Where armed confrontation 
occurred, none of the incidents lasted long enough to hold up government 
programmes, whenever such existed. 
Moreover when we discuss resistance in the Southern Sudan it should not be 
forgotten that similar conditions faced the British in Northern Sudan. Both resistance 
against the government and inter-tribal conflicts in which the government became 
involved dotted the history of the North from 1903 to 1921. There were religious 
revolts in Kordofan in 1903 of Mohammed el Amin; at Singa in 1904 by Mohammed 
Wad Adam; and in the Gezira in 1908 by Wad Habouba, while the many Nuba revolts 
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persisted till 1930.104 In Kassaa Province Major J. L. J. Conry and three of his men 
were killed in 1914 by Arab tribesmen. 105 Two British officers were killed at Nyala 
in 1921 by Arab. 106 Since resistance was not unique to the Southern Sudan, the 
effects of Sudanese opposition to the British cannot convincingly be used to explain 
the disparity in the development of Southern and Northern Sudan. 
Having considered the constraints upon British rule, certain problems remain. 
Before such constraints were even experienced, government officials were already 
making disparaging statements about the Southern Sudan and its people - statements 
which could not have been based upon what they had learnt in the short time since 
they had entered the country. Upper Nile region was described in 1899 as an area 
'only fit for hippos, mosquitoes and the Nuers to live ire. 107 Why did Wingate think 
in 1904 that it was not necessary 'to strive at a higher. standard for the actual 
inhabitants of the Bahr al-Ghazal'? 108 On what was the conclusion based in 1902 
that it would take a long time before the Dinka 'can be improved'? The ideas or 
preconceptions which produced these and many similar statements will be the subject 
of the next two chapters. 
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Chanter Vl. - Securing Southern . Sudan Against Local Competitors 
The contrasts between Southern and Northern Sudan which the historical 
debate about constraints have highlighted seem to have been based on incorrect 
assumptions. They appear to emanate from a premise that the Sudan Government 
had one policy for the entire country; it is then assumed that the quality of 
administration, the level and extent of education, and socio-economic development of 
the two regions could be fruitfully compared. Implicit in all this is the presupposition 
that if certain constraints had not intervened, the administration, education and 
development of the South would have been. similar to that of the North. The truth is 
that while the Sudan remained nominally one entity, the Anglo-Egyptian Government 
in practice treated Northern and Southern Sudan as separate colonies. The different 
regions attracted different responses from the British, depending on how each related 
to their specific objectives. As shown in Chapter II, the British had particular 
interests in the Southern Sudan which would necessitate different approaches from 
those applied in Northern Sudan. It would not be convincing, therefore, to conclude 
that the policy of the Sudan Government in the Southern Sudan for the first two 
decades was a failurel if the criterion was simply comparison with what emerged in 
the North. The success or failure of British administration in the region would only 
be meaningfully assessed in relation to those regional concerns. 
The British in fact followed a two-level programme in the South. This can be 
considered from two perspectives: what the colonial administration wanted from the 
area, and their obligation towards the indigenous peoples whose role was important 
to the British attainment of their own objectives. The first part will be considered in 
the present chapter, while the second will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
It has been shown in an earlier chapter how worried Christian Britain was by the 
steady Islamic penetration into central Africa through the Southern Sudan. Tentative 
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suggestions had been made for counteracting this development, requiring the 
establishment of a defensive front-line position in the region. This responsibility fell 
on the shoulders of the Christian rulers of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Wingate and 
some of his lieutenants did not need to be persuaded, for they also entertained similar 
religious sentiments in addition to their political and economic ideas about the South. 
It must be pointed out from the outset, however, that this did not constitute an 
explicit and coherent government policy, set out systematically on paper and 
sanctioned by the various organs of the state at both the Central and provincial levels. 
Rather, it will be found in seemingly unrelated pronouncements and actions by 
individual British officials, which on first glance would appear to have arisen only 
from adjustment to local conditions. Despite their spontaneous appearance, these 
pronouncements and actions had two things in common which together qualify them 
to be called a general policy. One consists of Kitchener's policy guidelines, already 
quoted, which gave each British official the right to initiate particular policies in their 
respective localities, provided that these should operate towards the ultimate 
realisation of British objectives in the Sudan. The second factor is the inherited or 
acquired attitudes of officials towards the 'natives', which influenced the choice of 
policy priorities and the timetable for their implementation. Two matters require 
examination: the Islamic factor in the South, and the problem of military manpower. 
(a) Winjate'c Islamic Policy 
The wish to secure the Southern Sudan for Christianity and Western civilisation 
was ever alive to the Governor-General, but he had some difficulties in achieving his 
objective. Wingate knew too well that the 1899 Condominium agreement limited 
British freedom of action in the Sudan: they had to take account of their Egyptian 
partner's concerns. The British had virtually become hostage to their own imperial 
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tactic for acquiring the whole Sudan at a cheap price. Doing anything exclusively to 
advance British interests in the Sudan was a problem which Wingate had to tackle 
with care. The Governor-General faced difficulties in four areas. First, the Anglo- 
Egyptian Government had adopted a policy of appeasement in Northern Sudan to 
pacify Muslims and deprive potential Islamic 'fanatics' of a cause for inciting the 
population against foreign Christian rulers. The Mahdist revolution was a warning to 
the new Sudan administration, and unnecessary provocation had to be avoided. In 
1896 Kitchener had announced his future religious policy for the Sudan once the 
Khalifa had been removed. He had pledged 'to establish an Islamic state based on 
justice and righteousness, to build mosques and to help in spreading the true faith'. 2 
Kitchener in 1899 emphasised this to his officials, telling them to see to it that 
'religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, and that the Mohamedan religion 
is respected'. Officials were also instructed to build mosques in the principal towns, 3 
and by 1901 the government had built a mosque in Khartoum. A sum of money was 
released in 1902 towards the building of another mosque in the town of Kassala, 
which had not had one previously. 4 
In the government's endeavour to placate Muslims in the North, the activities of 
Christian missionaries, some of whom entered the Sudan determined to immortalise 
Gordon by converting Muslims, were prohibited. This provoked angry exchanges of 
letters between the two sides. 5 Wingate's reply to a complaint by an Anglican Bishop 
on the non-observance of Sunday as a day of rest in the Sudan was: 'You must 
remember that the country is a Mohammedan country and that we arc governing it in 
the first instance in the interests of the Mohammedan population'. 6 
Secondly although it was intended to exclude Islam from the South, the area 
had been reconquered using a predominantly Muslim army, units of which remained 
there on garrison duty to maintain law and order. While present in the South each of 
these 'hundreds of Moslems', was, 'by the very nature of his religion, an embryonic 
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missionary', 7 who competed with Christian missionaries over 'God's inheritance' - the 
'pagan' peoples of the region - whom General Gordon had earmarked since the 1870s 
'for gathering in' to Christianity at the appropriate time. 8 
Thirdly, as Wingate was a servant of two sovereigns - British and Egyptian - 
with different religious convictions, this made his relations with his own co- 
religionists rather complicated. Some of the Christian leaders like Bishop Gwynnc did 
not fully appreciate Wingate's predicament, and he had to bring them round by 
persuasion. When Gwynne pressed the Sudan Government to remove restrictions on 
missionary activities, Wingate sympathised with the Bishop's zeal and assured him of 
his support for the Christian programme. But the Governor-General also appealed to 
the Bishop to be realistic and not to push too hard. He told Gwynne to bear in mind 
that, 'although I am a Christian myself, I am in this country the representative of the 
King and the Khedive, and am responsible for maintaining an even balance over all 
subjects in the Sudan, whether Christians or Moslems'. 9 
Fourthly, education also presented Wingate with a problem. At the inception of 
the Condominium administration, primary education was given top priority in the 
Sudan to supply the government with local staff for the very junior jobs. James 
Currie as Director of Education commenced his work in 1900 with the opening of a 
training school at Omdurman for village school teachers. Three more schools were 
opened in 1901, a primary school each for Khartoum and Omdurman and a small 
industrial school at Khartoum dockyard. 10 By 1902 Currie was considering 
immediate introduction of higher primary schools whose graduates would gradually 
replace the rather expensive Egyptian and Syrian clerks. 
11 The Gordon College was 
opened that year. And as if Wingate and his officials were not going fast enough in 
the field of education, Cromer exhorted the Governor-General to 'do all in his power 
to create a class of Sudanese, who will before long be capable of filling ... the 
subordinate posts under the Government'. 12 
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In theory, the educational policy was for the whole Sudan, but in practice it 
became a Northern Sudan programme. Although there were other factors (as will be 
seen in Chapter VII) only the Islamic factor will be considered here. The medium of 
instruction in elementary (kuttab) schools was Arabic. If such schools were allowed 
to operate in the Southern Sudan, there was the likelihood of Islam being gradually 
exported to the region, a development which a political Christian like Wingate would 
not encourage. The challenge came soon enough. The governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 
Province, Boulnois, acting innocently on the assumption that the government 
education system was for the whole Sudan, opened an elementary school in 1904 at 
Wau and asked the Central Government to assist financially. Currie's response to the 
governor's requests reveals the influence of the Islamic factor. As he explained to the 
Civil Secretary: 
The Sudan Government as a whole has not yet made up its mind what it is 
to do in the matter of education of these Blacks. Till they do I don't want 
to be committed to any line of policy. I rather doubt if all the 
considerations have occurred to the Mudir in this case. If the teacher he 
is employing is a Mohammedan the net result of this teaching must tend 
towards Mohammedanism. 13 
Wingate agreed with Currie: 
The question of education in the Southern Provinces which are not really 
Mohammedan, presents certain difficulties, for instance all preliminary 
class books in Arabic contain plentiful references to the Prophet ... and I 
am not at all keen to propagate Mohammedanism in countries in which 
that religion is not the religion of the inhabitants. 14 
The Governor-General was particularly anxious about the possibility that 'every boy 
would eventually become an Arab speaking Moslem' if the type of education which 
existed in Northern Sudan were allowed in Bahr al-Glhazal. 
15 But while he exerted 
every effort to exclude Arabic and Islam from the region, Wingate was conscious of 
the outcry that a leak of the government's anti-Islamic regional policy would provoke 
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in Northern Sudan and in Egypt. He therefore dealt with the problem in confidence 
with his subordinates. Wingate cautioned the two governors of Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Boulnois and H. Hill, to keep his views confidential 16 because the time was 'not ripe 
yet for a formal disclosure of the policy' the government intended to pursue. 17 
Arguing ostensibly that Arabic was more difficult than English, Wingate defined 
'the present object' of education in the province to be 'to provide a certain member of 
trained artisans, carpenters, blacksmiths ... '. 
18 He accordingly ordered the creation of 
two separate school systems. Boulnois's school was replaced with an Arabic-free, 
low-standard, non-sectarian, school run jointly by the government and the Catholic 
mission for the children of non-Muslims. 19 The children of the Muslim soldiers, 
provincial employees and Northern Sudanese settlers were to be offered a sectarian 
education in Arabic in a proposed regimental school to be transferred to Wau from 
Khartoum. 20 But although this school was promised in 1904. Muslim children were 
to wait for six years before the transfer could be effected. 21 
In spite of the Sudan Government's preventive measures in Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Islam continued to infiltrate into the area (if it was not there already). It was simply 
too ambitious to combat Islam in a province which, besides the urban settlers and the 
army, had common borders with the Muslim province of Darfur and Kordofan. The 
local people continued to mingle in border areas and the government could not 
control such interaction. Wingate's attempts to insulate the province against a rival 
culture only succeeded in depriving native inhabitants of Bahr al-Ghazal of quality 
education. 
The sensitivity of the religious problem is borne out by how the Adjutant 
General Asser, reacted to an insignificant incident. On an inspection tour of the 
military hospital in Wau in 1911, he found a small civilian boy circumcised, upon 
which he wrote to the Governor-General expressing his displeasure. 'This is a small 
fact in itself, he admitted, 'but it makes me think a lot'. Asser saw the incident in the 
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wider context of Islamic expansion in the town which the erection of a mosque22 and 
the presence of the army- had accelerated, resulting in the reduction in the pupils' 
attendance at the mission school. 
s 
The Army undoubtedly has the effect of turning pagans into 
Mohammedans simply by its example, but should not go still further and 
assist by circumcision. It seems to me most undesirable if, as I 
understand, the idea is that the tribes in at least the Southern portion of 
the Bahr al-Ghazal, should not adopt the Mohammedan religion. What is 
done at Wau is I expect done South. A tribe such as the Nyam Nyam 
seems to me goad enough as it is and does not require Ramadan and 
Beirans ... 
but I don't see what is going to stop it ... 
23 
The situation in the Upper Nile Province was handled quietly. Through 
contacts with their northern neighbours, the Arabs of the Blue Nile and Kordofan, 
settlers and traders, the northern Dinka - Abialang, Ageer and Nyiel - had acquired 
some Arab habits like donning the long white dress known locally as jallabiaand its 
associated head gear, the turban. This was not acceptable to a government that 
favoured the maintaining of exclusive cultural zones in the country. The Dinka had to 
be prevented from inhaling more of the Islamic-Arab culture. Thus when a small 
number of Islamised Dinka petitioned the Administrator of Fashoda Province in 1902 
for a school of the Northern Sudan 'kuttab' type to be opened in their area, they were 
ignored. 24 Repeated requests by different groups in Northern Upper Nile for schools 
in their respective localities between 1905 and 1911 were equally unsuccessful. 25 
Meanwhile, plans were initiated to reinforce Dinka cultural resistance to Islamic 
influences by undertaking the study of their customary law for application in the 
district. By 1908, Captain O'Sullivan had successfully completed the research. 
However, the concern about Dinka culture was not prompted by admiration of this 
Niolitic way of life per se, but was also dictated by strategic considerations in other 
parts of the South. Willis, as an official of the Intelligence Department between 1915 
and 1926, was privy to government thinking. In his retrospective explanation of the 
148 
policy in Renk district from early days he explained that the government wanted to 
preserve Dinka culture because these people were 'the nearest of the negroids to the 
Arabs', and the maintenance of their customs was 'therefore a bulwark to those further 
South'. 26 
The attempt was an utter failure. Islamic influence in the main towns such as 
Malakal, the provincial capital since 1914, which has been described as a Northern 
colony in the Southern Sudan, 27 was well entrenched. The Civil Secretary, 
-MacMichael, had virtually abandoned the town to Islam by 1927, objecting to the 
stationing of units of the Equatorial Battalion at Malakal for fear of these 'Pagan 
Troops' becoming Islamised. 28 
Further south in the Mongalla Province, similar efforts were made to restrict the 
spread of Islamic influences. Christian missionaries, who had been barred from 
proselytising in the North, naturally resented the idea of sharing the 'pagan' Southern 
Sudan with Islam. The annexation of the Lado Enclave to Mongalla Province in 1910 
spurred vocal Christian leaders like Bishop Gwynne into action, urging the 
government to adopt their proposal for ridding the province of Islam. They had 
expected the government to keep Sunday as a day of rest in the Lado Enclave, as it 
had always been when the area was under the Congo Free State. But this wish was 
not granted. Although Wingate was sympathetic to the missionaries' views, again he 
could not do exactly as demanded because of the delicate balance he had to maintain. 
Such a measured approach to so sensitive a question was misinterpreted by Christian 
zealots like Shaw as being pro-Islamic, indeed he described the government as 'a 
machinery for spreading Mohammedanism'. 29 Yet Wingate only wanted time and 
patience to realise some of the missionaries' goals. fie even entertained at one stage a 
faint hope of a new order emerging in the future, which would release the Sudan from 
the cumbersome arrangement imposed by the Condominium agreement. On such 
assumptions, Wingate advised the Bishop not to embarrass the government with 
149 
requests which could only be realised later 'when some huge political upheaval takes 
place which has the effect of altering the status of the Sudan in such a manner as to 
bring [Gwynne's] scheme within the range of practical politics'. 30 But in the existing 
circumstances Wingate found it necessary, outwardly, to keep the Sudan Government 
'rather Moslem than Christian', 31 in order to control the situation. 
The Governor-General was particularly apprehensive of the newly-arrived 
'wrong-headed and fanatical Missionaries' who would 'dash about in the Southern 
Sudan' like bulls in a china shop', ' thereby jeopardising 'the good and steady work 
which has hitherto characterised the efforts of the Missionary Bodies in these 
districts'. 32 This steady approach Wingate continued to pursue. Unknown to the 
average missionary, the Governor-General was operating in the same direction as 
them. As he confided to Gwynne: 'I am doing all I can to bring about a change in the 
Military system South of Fashoda which will have the effect to some extent of 
eliminating the factors which go towards increasing Moslem propaganda ... 
33 
At the provincial level, Governor Owen tried whenever he could to give his 
domain a Western cultural outlook by projecting British symbols to the exclusion of 
Egyptian considerations. Owen had administered parts of this Anglo-Egyptian 
territory as a district of the wholly British Uganda Protectorate in 1902, and in the 
split of allegiance between the British Crown and the Khedive, was inclined to lean 
towards his own country. For example, on a visit to the Uganda territory about to be 
handed to the Sudan in 1914, Owen spelt out the policy he would pursue once the 
territory had been incorporated. 'Having served in that country under one flag', he 
told Wingate, 'it will seem very odd to take it over and fly two, Ile preferred to fly 
the British flag only. 34 The policy was carried a step further in the take-over 
ceremony in January 1914, when he assured an assembly of chiefs that they were 
practically under the same government - that is to say - thorough English. 35 Early in 
1915, Owen, on a visit to the countryside, quietly removed the Egyptian flags which 
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he found flying over two or three villages, claiming that such flags could only be 
flown in government stations. 36 This was not a convincing argument unless a new 
policy restricting the flying of flags in the villages had been passed, for they used to be 
distributed to loyal chiefs to extend government influence. More significantly, Owen 
also moved against 'the more fanatical, super-religious Moslems'37 like Sub Mamur 
Ahmed Khalil, who was 'very energetically' teaching Islam in the Moru district in 
1914. Khalil was replaced by a Coptic official. 38 Meanwhile, the Governor acted 
'very quietly and inostentatiously to Anglicise Mongalla as much as possible' by 
introducing English in the police force, with similar plans for the army. 39 
(b) The Equatorial Battalion: Its Origins and Objectives 
Since the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan mainly to secure cheap 
manpower for military and domestic service, the acquisition of blacks had remained 
the main foreign interest in the Southern Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian Government 
was similarly attracted by the region's human resources, though not for slaves but for 
military service. Thus shortly after the reconquest, the search for men for the army 
brought the Southern Sudan to the fore of government priorities. Drawing on their 
previous knowledge about Southern Sudanese military talents, British officials 
embarked immediately on recruitment in the South. 
An annual recruitment of between 400 and 500 men was obtained from the 
region between 1904 and 1912, partly through a Recruiting Scheme set up in 1904 
specifically for the populous Bahr al-Ghazal area. Some men were secured through 
the individual efforts of old soldiers who received financial awards for every youth 
they presented for recruitment. 40 The resort to this arrangement is an indication that 
the expected enthusiastic enlistment by tribesmen did not occur. Past experience had 
shown that those red or brown foreigners could not be trusted much. Young men had 
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been abducted or negotiated from their chiefs for such service, but many had ended 
up being enslaved in homes and agricultural fields and were never seen again by their 
beloved ones. There was therefore little incentive for the people of Bahr al-Ghazal, 
and the whole South, willingly to entrust their lives to seasonal caravans to the North. 
Faced with this difficulty, the government had to use every available device to 
maintain the strength of the Sudanese Battalions. Thus, presentable casual labourers 
in the towns, prisoners captured in patrols or convicted of petty crime like stealing 
telegraph wire, 'hnd contributions of men coaxed from loyal chiefs, were drafted into 
the army. 41 The difficulty of finding recruits, and the government determination to 
get reliable troops from the South made the Director of Intelligence, L. O. F. Stack 
even suggest the purchase of young men with cattle. 42 
By 1911, Southern Sudanese military recruitment had become so important for 
the British administration that a special Southern policy in this regard had to be 
pursued. Almost simultaneously three leading men of the Sudan administration: - the 
Governor-General, Adjutant General, and the governor of the southernmost Mongalla 
Province - converged on the need to have a separate military arrangement for the 
Southern Sudan. Professor Collins has credited the latter, Owen, with originating the 
idea of this Southern Sudan army, known as the Equatorial Battalion. In a 
memorandum dated 29 March 1911, Owen did indeed propose to the Sudan 
Government that a battalion composed entirely of Southern Sudanese should be 
formed for garrison duties in the South. This army unit would be English-speaking 
and Christian. The military proposal was part of a grand plan to create in the region'a 
large Christian population which would eventually link up with Uganda and from a 
substantial buffer or check to the spread of a faith, such as the Muslim, which may at 
any time break out into a wave of fanaticism'. 
43 Collins limits Wingate's role to only 
approving the request. 
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However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Owen only articulated his 
part of an opinion generally held by the Sudan Government. Wingate had in fact 
proposed a similar scheme to the British Consul-General four weeks earlier. While on 
the Bahr al-Jebel on a return journey to Khartoum after a tour of Mongalla Province 
in February 1911, Wingate had dispatched an eleven-page report to Gorst. Wingate 
was baffled by the way the tribes of the Lado Enclave reacted to recruitment into the 
Sudanese Battalion, an experience he used as the direct justification for his 
submission. When the Enclave had been taken over by the Sudan in 1910, there was 
an initial influx of recruits; but by the end of the year the people were not willing to 
enlist. Wingate suspected the Islamic factor: 
Personally, I am rather inclined to think that the system which prevails in 
Sudanese Battalions, of turning all recruits into Moslems and circumcising 
them, has something to do with it, and this leads me to the consideration 
of the desirability ... 
in the Mongalla Province ... 
(of] replacing our 
Regular Troops by some Territorial system which would have the 
advantage of enabling us to tell all volunteers who joined such a force that 
there was no chance of their being transferred out of the Province ... 
Further reforms would be effected under a proposed reorganisation of the army which 
would be exploited for 'getting rid of Moslemising influence in the shape of Egyptian 
Officers and fanatical Sudanese N. C. O. 's, and very gradually dropping the Moslem 
conditions which prevail in all Sudanese Battalions of the Egyptian Army. But 
mindful of the religious repercussions of such changes, Wingate proposed to deal with 
this sensitive issue under a camouflage: 
Of course you will understand that these arc ... submitted in strict 
confidence as it would never do to allow the religious question to appear 
prominently in any scheme of reorganisation, but I am personally 
convinced that the religious question has a great deal to do with our 
successful administration in these Southern districts ... If, therefore, a 
scheme is eventually matured somewhat on the lines I suggest, I should 
present it entirely from a Territorial point of view and should altogether 
avoid any reference to the religious aspect. It will take me some time to 
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think out a suitable project as there are many points which require very 
careful consideration, but I am practically convinced in my own mind that 
some such scheme will eventually become necessary and will give us a 
considerably larger amount of reliable fighting material at a possibly 
reduced cost. 44 
What appeared to be Wingate's scheme or, as Asscr maintained, an independent but 
similar proposal, materialised seven months later. In his submission to the Governor- 
General and Sirdar of the Egyptian army under the title 'Rough Scheme for Irregular 
Troops', Asser said that he had been actuated solely by economy as the regionally- 
based soldiers would be 'the best solution' to the transport difficulty. Ile even 
asserted that he had entertained the idea for years before putting it down on paper, 
and had not sought the views of others. 'You will see by the comparative table 
shewing what men in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Mongalla ... 
Regulars receive, he 
pointed out to Wingate, 'that what we are offering is a minimum'. 45 
Asser's presentation successfully concealed the religious motivation as Wingate 
had suggested, but whoever initiated the idea, it was in line with the religious 
inclination of the three men shown above. The approval of the scheme was a 
foregone conclusion. Units of the new Equatorial Battalion were formed by 1913, 
and between 1914 and 1917 the Equatorials completely replaced the Muslim troops 
of the Sudanese Battalion in Mongalla Province, paving the way for the declaration of 
Sunday as a public holiday throughout the province in January 1918. The system was 
extended to Bahr al-Ghazal in the 1920s after the last of the Sudanese Battalions had 
left the province in 1926. The Equatorials were briefly stationed in Malakal, Upper 
Nile Province, between 1927 and 1931, when they were withdrawn for fear of being 
converted to Islam in the Northern-Sudanese dominated town. 
46 
Three main objectives appear to have dictated the creation of the Equatorial 
Battalion: religious, political and security. The first two motives actually overlapped 
because their ultimate aim was a Southern Sudan under British rule and British 
religion - Christianity. The concern here is with the ohject es; whether these were 
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realised or not lies beyond the scope of the present thesis. The creation of a 
Christianised population in the region was to be the fulfilment of the century-old 
British strategy of a buffer zone against the penetration of Islam into central Africa. 
The politico-religious motive behind the birth of the Equatorial Battalion was 
summarised by Wingate himself when he said: 'Quite apart from religious question per 
se, it would ... 
be politically undesirable for the Equatorial, who arc presumably for 
the most part Pagan, to become Moslems'. 47 
British security was another major consideration in the formation of a loyal 
army in the Southern Sudan. Owen's statement quoted above was not a false alarm. 
Fear of a resurgence of militant Islam had haunted the British since shortly after the 
reconquest. Gwynne's diary frequently recorded rumours of Arab uprisings between 
1898 and 1910, and Wingate feared a jihad or Muslim holy war against the Christian 
rulers. 48 Another manifestation of this fear was that steps were taken to supplement 
the British garrison in Khartoum with European auxiliaries. Wingate in 1907 formed 
three Rifle Clubs in Khartoum - British, Greek and Italian - with a total membership 
of about 800 for self defence: 
In the event of trouble in the Sudan which might lead to the Europeans in 
Khartoum being entirely isolated, I have formed three Rifle Clubs ... 
These various clubs are under the impression that they are Rifle Clubs 
pure and simple; my object goes considerably further. I am really training 
all the members of the clubs to handle our reserve rifles, and to shoot 
straight with them. In this way I am providing a very valuable 
supplementary European force which, under certain circumstances, might 
render enormous service. 49 
At the national level, European security would be met by Southern Sudanese 
auxiliaries. If it were not because of the Islamic element in the Sudanese Battalions, 
Southern Sudanese would have continued to be relied upon by the British in the 
whole country. But as things stood, it became necessary to look for another brand of 
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the same 'reliable fighting material' - blacks minus Islam - which the Equatorial 
Battalion fulfilled. 
In the formation of this Battalion, security considerations were obviously in the 
fore. There was a significant shift from recruiting the warlike Dinka to the smaller 
tribes of the former Lado Enclave and areas transferred to the Sudan from Uganda. 
The change of policy is understandable; the government wanted more reliable troops 
for the next stage of its intended development of the South. The tribes of the old 
Southern Sudan had been exposed rather more to what the British " called the 
Northern outlook'. Their warlike qualities, particularly of the tribes further north, 
might be turned against the British if for one reason or another they fell foul of the 
government. Throughout the early history of the Equatorial Battalion, from its 
inception to about 1930, recruitment into the force was mostly confined to Mongalla 
Province, forcing the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal to request extending it to his 
province in 1929. The governor's concern was the enormous cost of transporting 
troops from Mongalla and back, which could be cut by recruiting resident troops from 
among the tribes of Bahr al-Ghazal. To this request, the Civil Secretary told the 
governor that the Army held strong views that cattle-owning tribes like the Dinka 
were not of'any use as soldiers'. 50 
In contrast, the peoples of the Lado Enclave, who, through contacts with the 
Belgians, were considered 'more advanced'51 than such tribes like the Bari, Dinka and 
Shilluk would be more suited to the new security needs. With the Nilotic butler to 
screen them from direct Islamic influences, a reliable force with a Southern outlook 
would emerge. These local troops soon proved their worth in operations against 
recalcitrant tribes like the Lokoyia, which raised Wingate's hopes of ultimately 
creating a'Sudan Army'. 52 
The British may not have achieved all they intended in the creation of the 
Equatorial Battalion, but for the Southern Sudan, if there is only one act of the British 
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in the Sudan to enshrine, it is the birth of the Equatorial Corps. Its existence enabled 
the disrupted Southern society of the 19th century to salvage something of its own 
ethnic and cultural identity. In the long struggle between the South and the North, 
Southern Sudanese peoples remember 1955 and Torit, the headquarters of the 
Equatorial Corps. 
This chapter is yet another example of British early concern about some of their 
original objectives in the South. It was realised that for the region's economic and 
human resources to be fully exploited,, the area had to be fenced off first against 
possible external contenders., Three imperial powers had earlier been excluded from 
the area through treaties; the fourth - Islam/Arab - had to be tackled by sealing 
channels of possible physical infiltration and cultural flow southwards. 
As far as Southern Sudanese were concerned. Islam and Arabism were as 
foreign as were the Ethiopians, French, Belgians, British and Christianity. There is 
therefore no basis whatsoever for the existence of a Sudanese 'national' grievance 
against a 'divisive' colonial power - British for only trying to keep out another colonial 
rival from a contested colony - the Southern Sudan. Although British anxiety about 
Islam in some respects might be seen to have retarded Southern development, 
especially in education, for British officials, as will be seen in the next chapter, it was 
a question of what had to be addressed at first. 
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Chapter VII: Hiahli2ht. s on Administration, Education and Economic 
Development 
As the anti-Khalifa propaganda had made the planned reconquest of the Sudan 
appear is a rescue operation, the British public expected much from the Anglo- 
Egyptian Government. The Sun for example, was by 1902 lavishly crediting the 
victor of Omdurman with having 
made a race of men out of a conglomeration of serfs and chattels [. An] 
oppressed and broken-spirited people he raised to a sense of dignity and 
independence, while at the same time he restored manhood, courage and 
ambition to human beings in whom these qualities had hitherto seemed 
irretrievably crushed out. I 
The paper expressed public sentiment correctly, though much of what it claimed was 
in fact still to be realised. The road to progress was actually chosen by Cromer more 
than Kitchener. Mindful of the dire consequences of centralised Turco-Egyptian 
administration of the Sudan from Cairo, Cromer proposed a system of government 
that would give the man on the spot a chance to recommend or make decisions in the 
light of the situation before him. He therefore announced soon after the reconquest 
that the Sudan Government would best administer the country through a policy of 
decentralisation in order to avoid 'the evils which are likely to ensue from the system 
of over-centralisation'. As he favoured less interference by Cairo in the administration 
of the Sudan, Cromer similarly deprecated 'any excessive amount of interference' by 
the central government in Khartoum in provincial administration. 2 Kitchener adopted 
this approach in his 'Memorandum', and Wingate inherited the same policy, for 
Cromer reported to the Foreign Office shortly afterwards that the Governor-General 
had 'most wisely left a wide latitude of action' to the governors. 3 
As stated in the last chapter, educational development was originally conceived 
for the Sudan in general. To involve the local people productively in the government 
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campaign for their socio-economic betterment, a certain amount of training was a 
prerequisite. It is not surprising therefore that the opening of schools which should 
have come secondary to the restoration of law and order was in the fore of 
government priorities. 
General though the Sudan Government policies were in principle, in practice 
there were two levels of policy, indeed two separate policies, for each of the main 
cultural regions of the Sudan - the North and South. These differences will be 
analysed under ý three sub-headings: Administration, Education and Economic 
Development. 
(a) Administration 
The policy of creating an administrative apprenticeship for Sudanese was easier to 
apply in Northern Sudan than in the South. The government could delegate powers 
to local Northern leaders who were considered more civilised4 and 'knew what 
administration was'. 5 The need to neutralise the 'fanatical' ill-educated Muslim leaders 
with better educated Islamic graduates of the government schools allowed for the 
emergence of autonomous urban Northern judges of Sharia law courts. They were 
supervised from a distance by the Legal Secretary, and as these native officials were 
mostly selected from 'good families' (meaning loyal Northern Sudanese), this indirect 
rule functioned well. 
In line with the same policy of minimising conflict with Muslims, the 
government allowed the Arab nomads to continue to enjoy their own independence 
for the time being, stepping in only in extreme cases of disorder or insecurity to 
remove and appoint a chief. 6 It was only in 1922 that the government ended the 
autonomy of the nomads.? Strangely enough, this was at the time when the 
government applied the policy of further decentralisation as recommended by Lord 
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Milner in 1920. The purpose seems to have been to demonstrate clearly and finally to 
the nomads that the government was their paramount chief. The move was made 
safely in a period when there was no fear of again provoking Muslims, since many 
people had been won over by well calculated confidence-building actions during the 
first two decades. The most important thing to note, however, is the early association 
of Northern Sudanese with their own administration. The government came to be 
seen more as a means by which local leaders could achieve higher objectives than as 
an obstacle to attaining them, and a working relationship was therefore forged and 
maintained. Of the long-term result of this Northern Sudanese colonial experience, an 
official of the Sudan Political Service wrote: 
These are the people who are the backbone of the Sudan and on whom 
the administration has been largely built with such success. And why? 
The clue lies in all aspects of their character ... These were people who had learnt in the hard school of a land where famine, locusts, pestilence, 
pillage and the climate itself had combined to make them appreciative of 
anything which had obvious practical usefulness. This and certain 
similarities of character ... made them very ready to follow the lead of the British in the spectacular improvement of their country; ... made them 
progressive tribal leaders; and above all made the first of them who got 
modern education, excellent civil servants, imbued with loyalty. 8 
In the South, however, the British had instant difficulties finding the right systems and 
individuals to work with. In contrast to the 'more civilised' Arab North, the Southern 
Sudan was inhabited by peoples commonly described as pagan and savages, with 
hardly developed indigenous systems through which collaborators could be recruited 
and improvement introduced. Multiplicity of tribes and the nominal nature of tribal 
authority are commonly cited as obstacles to successful British interaction with many 
Southern Sudanese. Officials are said to have looked for but could not find centres of 
local authority through which the region could be ruled. In fact, such leaders did 
exist; the real problem was that their people were considered to be in a low state of 
human development. They were associated with 'practices repugnant to civilised 
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standards of justice and morality'. It is argued that 'the attributes which caused the 
chiefs in many primitive tribes to command the acceptance and respect, or at least the 
fear, of their people had more to do with witchcraft than administrative talent'. The 
officials came to realise that it would be retrograde to entrust such leaders with 
government authority. So although the aim was to decentralise, government 'came 
more and more to mean direct rule'. 9 
There were several other factors which militated against an early devolution of 
power to native leaders in the Southern Sudan. Using as their basis for assessing 
tribal leadership what has always been considered as unprecedented state of anarchy 
in the region during the late 19th century, British officials were not attracted to the 
chiefs they found still in power. They believed that the good chiefs had either been 
removed or killed by the existing ones who 'owed their survival to qualities of 
toughness, ruthlessness and cunning which hardly commended them to the new 
administration'. 10 
The Sudan Government policy of confining Islam to the North also necessitated 
the imposition of direct rule in the South. Tribal leaders of some Nilotic people, the 
Dinka and Shilluk, for example, were (falsely) suspected of Islamic or Arab 
connections) I and had to be watched closely, or to be removed if a chief failed to 
adjust to the standards of the new government. That was the case with Meth Kur 
Abdel Fadil of the Shilluk. 12 
There was some truth in the British complaint that they could not find suitable 
chiefs with whom to work. What government officials wanted was an ideal system to 
be operated at minimum cost to the government. 'An essential feature of tribalism', 
explained the British official quoted earlier, 'is the collective responsibility of a tribe 
for the acts of its individuals'. A strong tribal authority could be utilised in the 
detection and handing over of criminals and for obtaining compensation for any 
damage done by tribesmen, by the simple process of taking a chief as hostage. If such 
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a system existed, 'a considerable part of the policing of a country can be done without 
the use of government forces'. 13 Yet this attitude towards local leaders was the very 
reason why those ideal leaders were difficult to identify. Because of the victimisation 
of chiefs in the 19th century through administration by hostage, some Southern Sudan 
peoples devised a two-stage system of leadership. According to one British official, 
in the selection of formal chiefs certain groups would 'put forward some complete 
nonentity as a scapegoat to bear government wrath, the real holder of the office who 
is recognised as such by everyone remaining in discreet obscurity in the 
background'. 14 Under such conditions the wisest thing for officials to do was to 
prevent a relapse into the disorderly past by themselves virtually standing in for the 
tribal leaders, using the nominal chiefs as agents among their own people. In short, it 
was direct rule. Administrators like Governor Matthews of Upper Nile Province 
exerted every effort to enlighten appointed chiefs in order to cope with the modern 
way of doing things under the Anglo-Egyptian Government. Wingate in 1903 praised 
Matthews for 'endeavouring by every means in his power to inculcate in this 
somewhat civilised potentate [a Shilluk king] the elements of justice and honesty'. 15 
Two years later, the governor was still trying to raise the king to the desired standard, 
and although he believed that the Shilluk monarch was 'only a savage', Matthews was 
still prepared to support him 'up to the hilt'. 16 
If even the most developed system in the Southern Sudan, that of the Kingdom 
of Fashoda, was so poorly appreciated by British officials, their assessment of 
leadership in the stateless societies would be very harsh indeed. The Shilluk have a 
national capital, government with the reih on the top below whom are provincial 
chiefs of Luak (Southern Shilluk) and Ger (Northern Shilluk), and an electoral 
college. In the case of the other Southern peoples, it would mean in administrative 
terms delegating even lesser authority to the chiefs. This is precisely what happened 
in 1920 in the wake of the Milner report. When the Central Government asked the 
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three governors of the Southern provinces to respond to its suggestion that some 
government authority should be delegated to tribal chiefs, all of them objected to the 
proposal. Writing to the Civil Secretary, the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal stated: 
'Owing to ignorance of the population on matters concerning law ... I do not consider 
any ... advanced form of Administration should be placed in the hands of the 
Chiefs'. 17 The governor of Mongalla Province did not believe that there were 'any 
chiefs ... capable of 
being entrusted with individual magisterial powers'. 18 The 
governor of Upper Nile Province objected to the suggestion on the ground that 
besides the Shilluk, no other tribe was capable of exercising powers on the behalf of 
the government. 19 
The greatly condemned primitiveness of Southern Sudanese does not appear to 
have been a unique experience for the British. Similar heterogeneous tribes with 
repugnant practices and systems of beliefs were found in other parts of the Empire, 
yet British reaction to such characteristics differed in different territories. In Uganda 
and Kenya, for example, African superstition was not condemned but brought into 
alliance with the cause of the Empire. Diviners among the Ankole and the Luo used 
their spiritual influence to win support for British rule, and in the case of the Kenyan 
tribe, the spiritual leaders established lasting collaboration with the government. 20 
While the British in the Southern Sudan blamed weak tribal leadership for their 
administrative difficulties, in South Africa they considered the very existence of the 
institution of chiefdom as an obstacle to progress. One administrator maintained that 
if chiefs were removed from the Basuto nation, it would 'be an easy one to rule, and 
capable of attaining the highest degree of civilisation and prosperity which any native 
race can achieve'. Another official believed that those societies which had no chiefs 
made'the best and most progressive subjects'. 21 
These examples clearly show that circumstances largely determined British 
attitudes towards the usefulness or otherwise of African tribal structures and 
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practices. Thus, the standards of bad and good, for indigenous characteristics were 
only relative to the restricted region or colony in which the comparison was made. In 
the case of Southern Sudanese, the negatives became more pronounced because the 
comparison was not within the same African cultural context, but with a different 
society which the colonial master believed to have attained a higher level of 
civilisation. The practice of subjecting African standards to Arab and Islamic norms 
in the end became detrimental to Southern Sudanese in their different walks of life. 
This will be illustrated in the administration of justice and maintenance of law and 
order. 
The Sudan Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Sudan Civil Justice 
Ordinance, issued in 1900 were in operation in the various provinces from 1903. 
Exception was however made of the Southern Sudan, where governors were 
empowered to opt out of certain rules whenever they deemed it expedient. 
Proceedings were to be taken under the Codes 'in such cases only as shall be ordered 
in any general or special instructions from time to time issued by the respective 
governors of these Provinces'. It was further stated : 
Any such instructions may provide for omission of all or any part of 
procedure which under the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
ought to take place before the trial of any accused person. 
The Governors of these Provinces shall have power by any general Vf 
special instructions from time to time issued by them to order that any 
particular case or cases or any class of cases shall not be dealt with under 
the Civil Justice Ordinance ... 
Y2 
These special legal arrangements were necessitated by the existence of different levels 
of civilisation among the Sudanese, broadly assumed on a North-South basis. 
Defending the decision taken by his Department, Carter argued: 
One has to deal with several races of different grades of civilisation and 
with different ideas and habits. The same crime if committed by a 
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Sudanese black, a Jaalin Arab, or a Kabbabish nomad would probably not be fairly met by the same punishment. 23 
He cited a case of murder among the Shilluk on charges of witchcraft as an example 
of those conditions under which the normal legal standards would not apply. But 
Carter was quick to state that such laws could be safely operated in Northern Sudan 
where the Arabs 'as a rule have no difficulty in understanding the principles of criminal 
responsibilities administered by the Courts'. 24 For Cromer the Shilluk incident 
showed 'that the principles of European criminal justice will have to be applied with 
some caution in the districts inhabited by Negroid tribes in a low state of 
civilisation'. 25 
The discretionary application of criminal laws is demonstrated by two 
contrasting incidents. In response to reports of lawlessness caused by raiding among 
the Arabs, Carter stated that 'even if murder results', such acts 'are, as once were 
cattle lifting on the Scottish Border, but manly exercises'. 26 Yet in 1908, two Shilluk 
who had robbed and killed an Arab trader were caught and executed on the scene of 
the murder, 27 a typical instance of the rough and ready justice Jackson admired. 
Disparity was also experienced in customary laws. While the Arabs/Muslims 
and Southern Sudanese were administered respectively through the Sharia and 
Customary Law, only the former had training opportunities for self-regulation. 
Arabs/Muslims performance was improved by the service of 'broad-minded' Muslim 
scholars trained in government schools under the direct supervision of a grand judge. 
The Southerners on the other hand stagnated because their Customary Law was 
defined and directly supervised by government officials, since the natives were 
believed to be incapable of handling such a responsibility. As a result, local leaders 
could not get sufficient experience in managing local affairs. This situation continued 
until 1922 when adoption of the policy of Indirect Rule at last gave them access to 
limited powers. But even then it was less a real devolution of authority than a change 
of one foreign system for another. What in fact happened only confirmed that the 
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government was convinced that Southerners remained incapable of evolving a 
creditable system of rule. The British imported from the Buganda the Lukiko or 
Chiefs' Council, extending into the Southern Sudan what had come to be known as 
Buganda sub-imperialism by which the British ruled other tribes of Uganda using their 
institutions. 28 
The paternalistic way the British handled Southern Sudanese in the area of 
administration echoes earlier advice from General Gordon to future rulers of the 
South: 
I think with respect to the natives; truths simple might and may be 
inculcated, and by degrees, as their understanding progresses, deeper 
truths may be explained; but, as a child must grow in age and knowledge 
before he attains the fullness of the truth, so must the Negro nations pass 
the period of their youth before they can do the same. 29 
Gordon had warned that unless his successors adopted this process of gradualism in 
the South, they could hardly succeed in administering so primitive a people - because 
as the indigenous languages did not contain a vocabulary of 'more than 300 words ... 
any explanation, even of secular affairs, must be difficult'. 30 The similarity of views 
between Gordon and Sudan government officials suggests common cultural 
assumptions rather than knowledge gained by experience in the field. 
Since the British recognised the existence of a social and cultural gap between 
the Southern and Northern Sudanese, they were bound to apply different paces in 
guiding the two charges towards mutual objectives. This meant that the distance 
between them would always be maintained, and the logical outcome was their arrival 
at the goals at different times. The training of Sudanese for the auxiliary role that the 
colonial administration intended for them might have narrowed the gap, if only the 
segregated training classes like the one which Stigand later proposed had been 
adopted. Those other constraints had their negative role in this area but their impact 
was exaggerated by colonial attitude towards the different Sudanese peoples. 
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(b) Education 
In this area, gradualism became more evident. Cromer had before 1900 
opposed Christian missionary entry into the Southern Sudan on the ground that the 
would-be converts were still too backward to understand the Gospel. Since the 
missionaries' mere presence in such a barren land would create suspicion among 
Muslims in the. North, Cromer preferred to exclude them from the Sudan 
altogether. 31 But when mounting pressure from the C. M. S. forced him to relent, 
Cromer and the Sudan Government decided to control the missions by designating 
each a specific territory and directing their operations. They were, for example, 
encouraged to engage in practical things which the 'pagans' would easily absorb like 
welfare work in the medical field and the teaching of simple crafts. Abstract 
conceptions like the Christian doctrine and literary education were to be delayed until 
the natives were advanced enough to cope. Cromer accordingly advised the Catholic 
mission in 1902 to instruct Southerners in 'some useful technical trade or craft', and 
appealed to the C. M. S. in 1904 to pay special attention 'to some simple forms of 
industrial and agricultural instruction'. 32 Cromer hoped that thus employed, the 
missions'might ... 
be of some slight assistance in gaining the confidence of his ... 'half 
devil and half child' and possibly even in transforming them into industrious labourers 
and artisans'. 33 
In the view of Jackson, first administrator of the Southern Sudan (only Fashoda 
military district), early introduction of alien cultural influences would be totally 
disruptive on the natives' natural growth. 'From the time missionaries enter their 
countries, these tribes will disappear'. Jackson did not of course fear their physical 
disappearance but their moral decay, as the people would have been suddenly 
removed from their traditional way of life yet be still too low in human development 
to benefit from the sophisticated Christian ideas. Thus suspended in a cultural 
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vacuum, the 'pagan' would become 'a scamp, loafer, scoundrel and liar' instead of as 
he then was: 'happy, contented, and honest and vice unknown'. 34 
The missionaries, who came from a similar cultural background to the 
administrators, did not differ significantly in their approach to the peoples of the 
South. The three missions - C. M. S., Presbyterian and Catholic - did concentrate in 
the early stages on practical work rather than spiritual teaching. The would-be 
converts were attracted to their stations by such free services as treatment of the sick, 
after which a few young men were introduced to practical skills, for example, 
carpentry, brick making and modern crop production. On his Presbyterian mission's 
relations with the Shilluk among whom they settled, Giffen wrote: 
Our principle was that without labor, - productive, useful labor, - there 
could be no development of character. We must teach the people to do 
something, before we can expect them to be anything. We took 
advantage of every opportunity to get them to labour ... 
Thus, little by little, some of them ... 
learned something of a day's labour 
... and something of the meaning of responsibility in labour, of which they had been entirely ignorant. 35 
Similarly Gwynne, accompanying the C. M. S. team that visited Mongalla Province in 
1906 spared some time to talk to the Dinka at Malek about labour, as they 'hadn't the 
slightest idea of what work meant'. 36 
Although the missionaries did not strictly adhere to the government guidelines 
(for they also preached and taught some reading and writing alongside practical 
training), they were still seen by government officials as generally conforming to 
them. Slatin saw their work as having 'an improving effect on the character of the 
people among whom they have settled'. 37 For Governor Matthews of Upper Nile 
Province, the priests were 'setting a noble example', for they avoided doctrine, 'which 
they knew the native cannot grasp'. 38 
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Yet despite this modest start and slow progress, some people outside and within 
the government feared that the missionaries were going too fast. Comments made by 
two British visitors to the Sudan provide yet further evidence for the argument that 
much of the British relationship with Southern Sudanese was governed by stereotype. 
Edward Fothergill, while on hunting trips from 1901 to 1905, felt both tremendously 
impressed and greatly dismayed by what he saw of the Catholic and Presbyterian 
missions in the South. He took the first as a model of the Western agents of 
civilisation among the 'savages': 
The Catholics 
... 
devote their labours almost entirely to lay teaching; ' they 
teach the native to till and work the land, to build, and they instruct them 
generally in the methods of organised labour. The question of actual 
religion is left to a future generation, when the minds of the people will be 
more receptive; when they will have at least attained that balance of 
thought which it is necessary to give to the subject, if their religious 
professions are to be anything more than a mockery ... 
They are 
accomplishing slowly and surely, the very work which is the most 
essential to the extended civilisation of the savages with whom they have 
to deal ... 
The appalling conservatism which stands as a barrier to 
universal labour has yet to be broken down, and that will be the work of 
many years. 
In contrast, Fothergill was bitter in his condemnation of the American mission. They 
had introduced literary education too early, with the possibility of negative results for 
all. 'In my opinion they go to work in the wrong way; in a way which is ... only 
calculated to be useless for the attainment of the very ends that they are in the Sudan 
to secure'. He was not opposed to the mission serving the natives in other ways, 
Fothergill was only worried about the people being dislocated by accelerated 
development. 'What do they expect to make out of a savage race like this, if they 
deliberately spoil them at the very beginning? ' His conclusion was that: 
... to place a school 
in the heart of savagery, and expect a lasting good to 
come out of any efforts in the way of book learning, when the people who 
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are being taught are ignorant of the first rudiments of civilisation, is to 
expect too much. 39 
The other visitor, E. S. Steven, during only one year's stay, claimed special knowledge 
about the blacks in relation to education. Like Fothergill, Steven stood against early 
introduction of literary education for its harmful side effects. 'In education ... it is 
necessary to go slowly - above all, with the tribes known as the "Pagans" in the 
South'. Driving the point further, Steven argued that 'literary education, as a matter 
of fact, has never brought the black happiness, and never will' and 'should we now 
attempt' to extend it to them 'we should be giving them a curse instead of a 
blessing'. 40 
The Director of Education, Currie was also opposed to a forward policy in the 
education of the blacks. Currie feared that prescribing an advanced type of learning 
so early would have negative results, since the recipients would not know how to turn 
it to the good of themselves and the government. To guard against such adverse 
developments emerging from schools which did not fall directly under his authority, 
Currie sought government approval for the inspection of mission schools. His 
worries were confirmed soon afterwards by an incident beyond the Sudan. In far 
away Natal, where African armed resistance against the British occurred in 1906, 
there was a significant shift from earlier clashes. Whereas previous opposition was 
characterised by unconcerted tribal revolts, the later one became a broad-based 
organisation which transcended local allegiance. The 'native' or 'Ethiopian' Church 
had played a leading role in unifying the African ranks in a confrontation that left over 
three thousand people dead on both sides. 41 And believing like many others that 
African resistance to colonial rule was reactionary, 42 Currie looked at the Christian 
input into the Natal affair as abetting retrogression. He suspected the American 
mission in the Sudan of having similar potential and thought it should be preempted. 
Thus, with another official of the government, Ernest Bonus, Currie submitted a 
memorandum to the Governor-General: 
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We consider, in view of what has taken placed and is taking place in 
South Africa, that the effects on Blacks of American Missionary school 
teaching ... ought to be very carefully watched, and, if necessary, firmly 
controlled. "Ethiopianism" in South Africa derives from an American 
Presbyterian Missionary body. There is no doubt whatever that this 
movement has been the driving force behind the late rebellion in Natal, 
and American Commercial enterprise, influence and teaching are certain in 
the near future, to be present in force in the Sudan. 43 
With that justification, they then requested Wingate to procure a copy of a special 
report on native education by the South African Government to the Colonial Office. 
Currie got the document whose gist was the devising of a special system of education 
for the blacks which would 'result ultimately in greater abundance of native labour for 
European industries and in the greater steadiness and intelligence of the labourer 
himself. 44 It greatly impressed the Director because he believed that not a single 
sentence of the recommendations did not apply to Southern Sudanese. 45 
The central theme in all these educational suggestions was that labour-oriented 
training for the blacks was the necessary prelude to then adaptation to a variety of 
future opportunities. All that they wished to see adopted was the development of the 
native in stages, taking care that no phase should be advanced or skipped. Academic 
education of the Northern-Sudanese type was to come later in the South; if any 
attempt was made to reverse the order, it would meet objection from such education 
experts as Currie. It was partly due to his determination to maintain these principles 
that Currie refused to subsidise the Wau academic school in 1904. Apart from those 
in connection with the spread of Islam he declared: 'I have £1000 per annum for the 
vernacular education of the whole Sudan. Ought any portion of this for the present 
[my italics] to be spent in Bahr al-Ghazal'. 46 It was not a problem of money; it was a 
question of timing. Bahr al-Ghazal would be catered for ultimately by the Education 
Department, but only when the people would be enlightened enough to utilise the 
opportunity profitably. 
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Wingate and some officials in the South shared Currie's views. On the Wau 
school, the Governor-General argued 'from an educational point of view' that it was 
not 'necessary to strive at a higher standard for the actual inhabitants of the Bahr al- 
Ghazal'. 47 Considering the keen interest the Sudan Government showed in the 
question of education in the country generally, Wingate's statement can only be 
understood in terms of the proposed sequence of education for the region. He made 
things clearer three years later when he justified the minimal attention the government 
paid to Bahr al-Ghazal: 'The country is yet too uncivilised for education to be 
seriously considered'. 48 For Mongalla Province, where he considered the natives 
indifferent and distrustful of government intentions by reason of their backward 
mental condition', Wingate recommended the introduction of only technical 
education, which would be useful to them 'especially for the making of spearhead'. 49 
The governor of the Province, Cameron, had earlier made a similar judgement on his 
subjects' prospects in education. He maintained that the need for it would not become 
pressing 'until the immigrant population increases or the intelligence of the native 
develops somewhat by contact with better educated people than himself. 
50 General 
Gordon had earlier suggested that for Southern Sudanese to be receptive and benefit 
from new ideas, it would be necessary for them first to mix freely with 'more civilised 
races' over a period of time in order to widen their perspective. 
S 1 We need not 
assume that Cameron was influenced by Gordon's ideas; the point is that both 
comments suggest a common cultural attitude about the natives. 
While other officials monitored the social conditions of the natives, Currie 
continued his search for an appropriate system of education for them. On his 
suggestion in 1909, the government engaged an anthropologist, Dr. Seligman, to 
undertake studies of the Southern peoples. His preliminary report of 1911 only 
entrenched what the layman had assumed about the natives. The anthropologist 
congratulated the government for deciding not 'to rush into action until some 
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extremely obscure points, dealing with the psychology of these primitive people, have 
been to a certain extent cleared up'. 52 
The government continued to study the situation while education for 
Southerners waited. It was not until 1922 that the issue came up again. A senior 
official of the Education Department, Hillelson, went to the South in late 1921 to 
prepare a report on missionary education. He subsequently compiled one in which he 
raised several questions for consideration. While he realised that there was an urgent 
need for literate Southerners to solve 'the practical problem of providing a class of 
native chiefs, clerks, artisans ... who will 
be of use to the administration', education of 
the people had by necessity to be selective. Introduction on a wide scale of a literary 
type of education was to be discouraged because its provision at that early stage 
'would result in the breakdown of tribal standards and the loss of primitive virtues 
before they have ceased to play a useful part in the life of the native'. 53 Moreover, it 
had to consider the psychology and aptitude of the different tribes. Peoples like 'the 
versatile Acholi always eager for new things' could be given the opportunity to read 
and write in the recommended vernacular district schools, while others like 'the 
intensely conservative' Dinka and Azande 'whose aptitude seems to lie in the direction 
of arts and crafts', required separate arrangements. 
I cannot help feeling that in other areas - the Dinka country for example - 
the teaching of reading and writing might be of no real value either 
educationally or practically and it is worth considering whether in such 
districts the most suitable type of school would not be an institution of the 
Boy Scout type designed for the inculcation of honesty, discipline and 
regular habits of work without the addition of literary subjects. 54 
The target had once more proved elusive and the search for the ideal type of 
education continued beyond our period. 
Inconclusive though it was, this government intervention in Southern education 
made one significant step forward. The largely understaffed, financially-limited 
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mission schools were for the first time to receive a government subsidy. 55 Some 
more money was put aside for the 'Boy Scout school' experiment. These schools 
were opened in the early 1920s in Malakal, and at Renk among the northern Dinka 
who had made repeated requests for a school since 1902. But because the training 
which those 'Boy Scout schools' offered did not prepare their graduates for a career, 
they were a failure and had been abandoned by the early 1930s. 56 
Considering the Sudan Government educational policy from the very beginning, 
it is clear that its handling of Southern education was in line with its overall objective. 
Education was geared towards economic development, and as such it had to be given 
only when the government had a specific need to be met and the right tools to use in 
achieving it. Thus in the early years Southerners, who could not be considered for the 
more sophisticated role as junior partners in government because of their relative 
backwardness, were found useful assignment in the labour sector. By the 1920s some 
of the tribes were seen to be enlightened enough to be admitted into the role which 
Northern Sudanese had enjoyed for over twenty years. With the introduction of 
Native Administration, the next stage of British rule was in need of local literate 
administrative staff, and training for them had therefore to be provided. Currie had 
earlier advocated exactly this approach. 
... 
if the man responsible for the educational development does not submit 
every phase of his policy to the test of what the economic needs of the 
country really are, it is inevitable that in the treatment of his own subject 
he will merely walk in the old educational rut, and repeat the old mistakes. 
His educational policy was based 'on what the actual economic necessities of a 
tropical country demand', but not 'on what English public opinion of somewhat 
obsolete type laid down as educational desiderata'. 57 Currie's successors did not 
appear to have departed from his course. They continued to assess Southerners' 
capability and employed it when and where it was in demand. 
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(c) Economic Development 
Previous academic works have emphasised the absence of any Southern 
Sudanese economic development worth mentioning. On the outcome, there is no 
disagreement. One is not fully satisfied, however, with what has been advanced as the 
causes of government's relative impotence. It is suggested here that more of the 
obstacles against progress in the region can be found in a cautious and paternalistic 
British treatment of the natives, largely influenced by inherited cultural attitudes. 
Generally, as a matter of policy the Sudan Government took their time in the 
selection of development priorities in the whole country. From London, Cairo, and 
Khartoum and in the South, the message had always been not to rush into action as 
there was time to sort out things. After the defeat of the Khalifa and successful 
exclusion of France, the most formidable foreign competitor, Salisbury relaxed. Since 
there was 'no foreign nation.. likely to interfere with us ... there 
is no danger in taking 
a great deal of time over the job', he told Cromer. 58 Not only did Wingate 
acknowledge that progress would be slow but it was his policy that the government 
should not hurry if they were 'to succeed'. 59 'For at least a generation to come, no 
complex question of how Western methods may best be adopted to Eastern minds 
will probably arise', Cromer assured the Foreign Office. 
60 The Acting Governor of 
Bahr al-Ghazal, Carter had this to say: 
The inhabitants, generally speaking, [are] savages ... 
They may not want 
the benefits of civilisation, but they have got to have them. Only we must 
do our spiriting gently, and 'Festiva Lente' must be the order of our 
going. 61 
It is in the context of this measured approach that Southern Sudan economic 
regeneration will be discussed. 
In the case of the North regional considerations encouraged early government 
concern with improving the socio-economic conditions of the local population. 
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Wingate, for example, planned for speedy railway building as the better means to 
'control and civilise these wild Arabs ... than by a series of expeditions' which was the 
other alternative. 62 Work had actually began on this economic lifeline by extending 
the original military railway built by the army of the reconquest. An eastern line 
reached the Red Sea Coast in 1906 to handle exports and imports, while another 
branch which left Khartoum, passing through the Gezira in central Sudan, reached El 
Obeid, Kordofan Province in 1911 to promote trade by transporting the region's 
leading cash earner - gum Arabic - to Port Sudan. In short, progress was in opening 
up the country to trade and contact. 
As for the South, the reverse was the case. Throwing the door open to an 
influx of outsiders in the 19th century had brought untold miseries on the natives. 
This had to be prevented from happening again by screening those who entered the 
region. The known economic potential of the South was in agriculture, and it was 
there that a rush was originally expected. Rubber, ivory and cotton particularly 
attracted the private sector. A casual collection of rubber in Bahr al-Ghazal in 1902 
by the government raised expectations so high that traders soon flocked into the area, 
destroying large vine fields through sheer ignorance in the methods of tapping, and 
Wingate had to issue an order banning trade in this commodity until further notice. 63 
This was a sufficient reminder that the people of the South could be descended upon 
by the likes of those who exploited them in the past under the guise of ivory traders. 
Partly for this reason and possibly also in pursuance of the policy to restrict Islamic 
influences in the South, in 1903 the whole of Bahr al-Ghazal Province and most of the 
Upper Nile areas were declared closed districts to European and other foreigners. 
Such persons could only enter by special permission of the Governor-General. The 
ban was due'to the local conditions of those districts'. 
64 
Apart from the determined effort to protect the tribes from unwanted foreign 
contact, and using the whip liberally to maintain law and order among them, 
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government officials waited patiently for any signs of social progress in the natives 
before definite development programme would be initiated. Progress was however 
bound to be slower since the native peoples had been made to believe that for the time 
being they were better as they were. The paternalistic treatment of Southern 
Sudanese by officials even seemed to increase with time, 65 with the possibility of an 
early introduction of innovations being postponed indefinitely. 
Three important but unsuccessful attempts were made in this period to adopt a 
general economic policy for the region. Governor Stigand whose presentation has 
been cited in the Introducton was particularly unhappy with the Central Government. 
He had seen enough of the apparent unconcern about its future, both as a junior 
district official and governor in two of the three provinces. While governor of Upper 
Nile, Stigand made a complaint to the Central Government: 
It appears to us in the South that we are neglected. Of the various 
Departments of the Sudan Government, such as Agricultural, Veterinary, 
Forestry and Education, which are presumably for the benefit of the whole 
country, we see little or nothing. This province (Upper Nile) with its 
principal revenue derived from cattle has never had a resident Veterinary 
officer ... The Forest Department cuts down forests but does no 
regeneration work. 66 
His complaint was simply ignored, but around this time officials in Khartoum began to 
realise that something should be done about the Southern Sudan. Thus, in the first 
serious attempt to address the issue, an agricultural expert, E. R. Sawcr, was 
commissioned in 1918 to carry out a survey of the needs of the South and to suggest 
ways and means of introducing development. Sawer conducted his research until 
early 1920, and submitted three separate reports. The 1919 report recommended that 
immediate action should be taken: 
If progress halt [sic] with the establishment of law and order the financial 
situation becomes seriously compromised and capital increasingly difficult 
to obtain. 
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A clearly defined agricultural policy to which all immediate and future 
administrative measures may be assimilated, is consequently a first and 
pressing Financial need ... 
67 
Yet no immediate steps appear to have been taken to make use of such 
recommendations, for four years later a similar survey was again proposed by 
Khartoum. The difficulty was neither the lack of funds nor the government's 
ignorance of what the South lacked, but rather that there were persons who claimed 
to know the problems of the South better. 
It was the Governor-General, Sir Lee Stack who again raised the issue of 
Southern development in 1924. On a tour of the region early in 1921, Stack had 
ample opportunity to see for himself its near stagnant condition. Something more 
positive had to be done and the Governor-General chose one of his senior governors 
M. J. Wheatley of Bahr al-Ghazal to take charge of the South. 
I have come to the conclusion that the time has come to fix on a definite 
policy of development, economic and administrative, for the Southern 
Provinces. 
In order to make this possible it is necessary to appoint somebody 
with the title, say, of Commissioner General of the Southern Sudan to 
visit the provinces concerned, ... and at the end of a prolonged and 
exhaustive tour of inspection of perhaps a year to put up 
recommendations to the Central Government ... I should be very glad to 
offer it you. 
Your duties would be to examine at first hand the various methods, 
administrative and economic, employed in the three provinces and after 
collecting all the information available to formulate definite 
recommendations for us to consider in Khartoum in order to formulate a 
fixed general policy for the immediate future. 68 
But the proposal was opposed by the Central Government who suggested that the 
idea should first be discussed in a preliminary meeting of the three Southern 
governors, and Stack had to withdraw it. 69 His death later in the year left his 
Southern project unaccomplished, and his successor Archer dismissed the proposal on 
15 January 1925.70 But, even if Stack's suggestion had been upheld, it is doubtful 
181 
whether his nominee would have seen things from the same perspective, as can be 
seen from Wheatley's statements to the Financial Secretary, Sir George Schuster, two 
years later when the idea of Southern development was once more mooted. 
In January 1926, Schuster asked Wheatley to present a programme for 
development to the Central Government for discussion, with an assurance of 
'generous support for any reasonable proposition'. 71 The governor, unfortunately, 
did not capitalise on this rare generosity of Khartoum. His plans for the province 
were different: 
As you know I am opposed to any rapid development. I consider we 
should develope [sic] the people only as fast as they can assimilate the 
new ideas. To rush ahead in order to gain a spectacular advance would 
only give them what might be called "mental indigestion" with all its 
attendant evil results, and no permanent good would be gained either by 
the people or the country. In fact it would be a case of more haste and 
less speed. The Nuers and Dinkas who constitute about half the 
population are still wild and undisciplined savages and cannot yet be 
depended on for solid work on crops year by year. They have to be 
weaned from their love of fighting and taught to work as a normal 
proceeding of life. A desire for and need of the various articles of 
civilisation must be cultivated so as to become an inducement for them to 
work and earn the money with which to satisfy their desires ... This Province is a vast area with a comparatively big population and 
large sums of money will be required for its development. I do not think 
that much can really be done from the ordinary revenue of the Sudan. I 
do not advise that the time has yet arrived for the Government to launch 
out in this way. 72 
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals the existence of a policy of gradualism, 
which was based more on British preconceptions about the natives than imposed by 
practical constraints. The introduction of certain essentials of modern life were made 
contingent upon the achievement of recognised levels of social sophistication, and 
these - it was thought - had not been attained by 1924. This policy was pursued 
because the officials believed they were doing the right thing for the natives, and the 
people had no quarrel with those who allowed them to follow their traditional way of 
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life. It is the retrospect shaped by later political developments in the independent 
Sudan that sometimes subject this early period of British administration to blame. If 
only the custodians had taken one more step - to respect and maintain for all times the 
dualistic character of the Sudan which they inherited at reconquest, if only they had 
not amalgamated Southern Sudanese with people they had 'no ties of race, language, 
culture, religion - or sympathy', - the delayed development of the Southern Sudan 
would be a thing of the past. Similar uneven development of different regions of the 
same colony existed in other areas. It is known, for example, that in Uganda, the 
Buganda received different attention from the British than the tribes of the Northern 
regions, eg Acholi, but in their case, post-colonial history of Uganda has shown that 
disparity within one cultural group is bridgeable. In the colonial period road 
construction was centred in the Kingdom of Buganda; first schools were opened there 
and so were hospitals; it was also the area of cash crop production such as cotton and 
coffee. 73 But after independence the tribes of Northern and Eastern Uganda who had 
been marginalised, so to speak, like the Madi, Lango and Acholi, played an active part 
in the political and economic life of their country. These regions have so far provided 
three of the seven presidents of Uganda: Obote, Amin and. Okello. Here, when 
groups could not get what they believed was their right, the complaint was directed 
against compatriots who withhold such rights, rather than valuable time being wasted 
castigating a former colonial ruler who had his own objectives to achieve. 
The use of Christian missionaries in the Southern Sudan for education and 
civilisation was a common practice in many, if not all the British colonies in Africa. It 
was an essential preliminary stage of colonial rule to prepare the ground for later 
government entry into the field of development. Nearer home is the case of the Nuba 
peoples in Northern Sudan. The Nuba belong to the African cultural complex found 
in the Southern Sudan. They were for the most part what Christians and Muslims call 
pagan. Although they were closer to Southern peoples in that respect, the Nuba fell 
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administratively within Northern Sudan. This location put them at a special 
disadvantage as far as education was concerned. They were left without a 
government or missionary school for the first two decades of the Condominium 
administration. This was because of the self-imposed decision by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Government that Christian missionary proselytism should not be allowed in the 
predominantly Muslim North. A few Nuba who had been exposed to Islamic culture 
through service in the Egyptian army, and those in proximity to the Baggara Arabs in 
Northern Kordofan, acquired the externals of the religion. But those deep in the hills 
and bordering the South remained unaffected and continued to practise their 
traditional culture. This dichotomy presented the government with a dilemma. To 
allow the Northern Sudan type of schools in the Nuba country would, according to 
government officials, be detrimental, for their exposure to Islam in the schools would 
destroy Nuba tribal morality. 74 On the other hand leaving them without education 
would, it is assumed, be seen as government failure to extend their mission of 
civilisation to people who deserved it. If no steps were taken sooner than later, the 
Nuba were going to be the dregs of the Northern Sudanese society. 
At last in 1920 a middle solution was found in the introduction of separate 
school systems to correspond to the cultural regions identified in the Nuba country. 
The Islamised areas were allocated government schools while the districts of non- 
Muslim Nuba became the 'sphere of influence' of an Australian-New Zealand 
Protestant missions known as the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM). 
The places assigned to the SIM were considered as very backward, and the 
government expected them to civilise the natives. 
75 By 1923 two elementary schools 
had been opened, teaching in the vernacular and in English. In an effort to give 
additional protection to the Nuba way of life, the Director of Education, J. W. 
Crowfoot, even suggested yet another system; for areas where the separation of Nuba 
and Arab pupils could not be successfully accomplished, the Nuba children were to be 
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taught the religion and customs of their own peoples with Islam totally excluded. 76 
Whether that Nuba policy succeeded or not is immaterial; it is the intention 
which matters. Here as in the South, the government's main concern was the 
preservation of indigenous cultures for a time until better conditions should prevail 
under which gradual reforms could be embarked upon for the benefit of both the 
government and the subjects. 
Farther afield in Southern Nigeria and Kenya the intention was the same as in 
the Southern Sudan. In those districts of Southern Nigeria where the 'mentally 
undeveloped' people afforded 'an enormous field for the pioneers of civilisation', 
missions schools were the first to be opened. 77 A similar practice was observed in 
Kenya. There the colonial administration encouraged Christianity 'because of its 
moral influence' upon the natives. 78 
The system of regular government grants to mission schools in the Southern 
Sudan from 1926 was in line with a general British policy towards missions schools in 
the rest of Africa. In 1925, for example, the Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies invited to London the governors of West and East Africa and instructed 
them to work in partnership with the missionaries by subsidising their schools. 79 
London most probably reckoned that the natives had then advanced enough to be 
introduced to the next stage of their development which required government 
participation. This was certainly the application of the policy of gradualism 
continental-wide. Further evidence of the role of the missionaries as an important 
appendage of colonial rule can be gleaned from Appendix VI. 
In addition, even the type of secular education prescribed for Southern 
Sudanese pupils was an integral part of an African education suggested in Britain as 
early as 1901. The African Society, which was formed to act as an information 
bureau for Africa, stressed the need for a labour-oriented education; to discover the 
talents of the different peoples in such skills as arts and handicrafts for appropriate 
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training. The two leading authorities on the affairs of the Sudan, Cromer and 
Wingate, were closely associated with the Society from its early days, and so was the 
Director of Education, Currie. Cromer had by May 1901 joined it as a life member 
and Wingate received a membership form with attached objectives of the organisation 
the same month. 80 
Both Cromer and Wingate were known advocates of native development along 
the lines of his own institutions, customs and regulations, as opposed to the 'hasty 
insertion of the iron ramrod of modern commercialism among half-developed 
peoples'. 81 Such persons would not, and in fact did not, hesitate to adopt some of 
the Society's proposals. The later actions and utterances of Wingate and some of the 
Condominium officials about Southern Sudanese show that the African education 
project was the basis for early educational planning for the region. Curve's search for 
an appropriate policy, and Hillelson's recommendations were within this broad 
programme. 
To conclude, the effects of the different aspects of British administration in the 
Southern Sudan would, with only small variations, be similarly experienced in other 
former British colonies in the continent whose peoples have common or related 
cultures and traditions. As Sevier stated: 
In fact, had the Southern Sudan emerged in 1956 as a sovereign state, 
separate from the North, its history would have been comparable to that 
of neighbouring African countries which also shared in the heritage of 
British colonial rule. 82 
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Conclusion 
This examination of the constraints upon British administration in the Southern 
Sudan has revealed new perspectives. It has been amply demonstrated that although 
the obstacles to development described in the existing literature were real, they do not 
alone provide an adequate explanation. Two factors made the existing understanding 
of constraints gain ascendancy over a fuller and more accurate explanation. 
Firstly, the conventional interpretation of the disparity between Southern and 
Northern Sudan was initiated by British officials of the Sudan Government who were 
conscious of critical voices in both the Sudan and Britain about their administration. 
The likes of MacMichael, Duncan and Henderson tried to convince their critics that 
they did the best they could under such trying conditions. They were absolutely right 
to defend their records, as anyone else would have done. Unfortunately some of the 
scholars who drew much of their evidence from official government statements could 
do little but build upon this existing interpretation, only saying more to strengthen the 
theory of helplessness as advanced by some members of the Sudan Political Service. 
According to Daly, administering Southern peoples became difficult, because they did 
not have recognised leaders. And to explain in part why the railway was not extended 
to the South, Collins argued: 'It was easier to lay track on desert sand than through 
bottomless swamps'. I Yet not even Wingate, the founder of British administration, 
would have gone that far in explaining his difficulties. In reply to a question by a 
visitor who had heard from other people that the Sudan was 'nothing else than a vast 
desert', the Governor-General said: 
That idea comes largely from the bleak and barren sands through which 
the railroad takes travellers on their way to Khartoum. They have also 
read of the immense swamps of the Upper Nile, and, putting the two 
together, they look upon the country as only swamps and desert. The 
truth is the Sudan is ... a 
land of many climates and of all sorts of soils. 2 
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Secondly, the current conflict in the Sudan has meant that the British administration 
remains highly controversial. Sudanese factions do not hesitate to point an accusing 
finger at this or that aspect of British rule in the course of their struggle to determine 
how much of the national cake each should get. Sometimes mere assumptions, 
prejudice or hearsay are converted into 'evidence', which naturally leads to wrong 
conclusions, thereby confusing the problem more than it clarifies things. This thesis 
claims to have provided a sound basis for understanding the later period of Sudanese 
history. 
In investigating the subject, attention has focused on three areas: the legacy of 
the 19th century, the physical and economic constraints, and British preconceptions. 
The experiences of the earlier colonial period have been examined to assess their 
bearing on later developments and were found to be of more impact in only a few 
situations, for example in the mistrust the native peoples had for the British. This 
took a long time to fade: some of the less restrained among government officials 
acted in ways that confirmed the suspicions of the natives, even while the more 
diplomatic and humane patiently cultivated mutual trust with them. It is alleged that 
total anarchy had existed, yet in reality relative order prevailed under which some 
economic development had even started. As to the claim that chaos set in whenever 
the Southerners were not under the control of an overlord, this has been contradicted 
by the evidence of an escalation of violence under Governor Baker, and of a degree of 
co-operation and integration among tribes before the colonial period, when some of 
them collectively faced external adversaries. Gordon's alleged pro-Southern Sudanese 
stance has been put in its proper perspective. His sole concern was the well-being of 
his subjects and in order to achieve this, he sometimes made statements and decisions 
which would appear contradictory to observers. And supposing that all Gordon's 
different actions and attitudes were to be applied to the current Sudanese political 
scene, even just for the sake of finding an outsider to sling mud on, as Sudanese often 
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do, Gordon could also be seen as a forerunner of the futile attempts by Northern 
Sudanese to control and 'care' for Southerners, a people they believe to be too 
backward to determine their own future. 
Equally important is an understanding of the relationship between British 
thoughts about the Southern Sudan in the 19th century, and the preconceptions and 
actions of British officials after the reconquest. The view that the British had long- 
standing interests in the region as an independent object of strategic, economic, 
imperial and cultural importance has been substantiated. Opinions held by many 
British officials about the peoples of the Southern Sudan are seen to have stemmed 
from common cultural attitudes dating from the previous century. Such attitudes 
were reflected in the officials' plans for the socio-economic betterment of their 
charges. On this count, therefore, generalisation of British native policy is possible. 
This will be elaborated further. 
It has been shown that the place of assignment and professional background of 
British officials counted for very little in the undeveloped state of the South. Central 
Government officials were neither ignorant of the region's needs nor were they 
disinterested in it from the colonial point of view, as the previous literature maintains. 
The South was clearly not a negligible appendage, but of paramount imperial standing 
to the British. It was, however, thought to have special needs which dictated special 
treatment as a prelude to the successful attainment of higher objectives. On the slow 
process adopted to reach the level where rapid development could be launched, there 
were no serious differences of views between the Central Government and provincial 
officials, and between soldiers and civilians. There were some persons at both levels 
and in both professions who advocated a more rapid pace, just as there were voices 
counselling delay. But as such views were based on personal assessment of the 
native's potential for social progress as seen from Western ethnocentric perspective, it 
was realised that it would be difficult to reach the desired standard in good time if 
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things remained at the mercy of individual impressions. Moreover, political 
developments in Northern Sudan necessitated the reinforcement of the existing 
protective isolation of the Southern tribes against Islamic influencesfNorthern 
outlook. Islamised urban blacks of Southern origin were prominent in the anti-British 
movement of the 1920s, which culminated in the disastrous armed confrontation of 
1924. This threat had to be confined to the North, 3 else such peoples like the Dinka 
who had of late been known to be 'an imitative people', with 'a tendency to ape the 
Arab' could easily import the Khartoum politics, to the South. 4 Accordingly 
MacMichael summarised those practices and pronouncements by individual British 
officials since the reconquest, whose 'motives and purposes were mixed, combining 
ideas on political, administrative, educational, religious and ethnic questions', 5 into his 
Southern Policy of 1930. 
Of the many and diverse objectives and obligations with which the British 
entered the region, the government took immediate steps to pursue some despite the 
obstacles. This was because it was understood that on their successful realisation 
depended other projects which were to be attended to at a later stage. Matters given 
early priority included commercial prospects in eastern Upper Nile, the Islamic policy 
and the establishment of a military control. Early but limited economic investigation 
was undertaken to confirm the existence of the assumed wealth. Policies were 
initiated to contain the influence of Islam, and to exclude a possible source of 
disruption to government's yet unspecified plans. And a reliable military force was 
necessary to guard the security of the region while possibilities to develop its 
resources and determine its future were considered. 
Those objectives which were shelved for the time being were postponed largely 
because of restraints imposed by the prevailing attitudes towards the natives. It has 
been demonstrated that those preconceptions militated against any early forward 
development policy. This delay was a deliberate decision, because government 
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officials believed that early exposure of such undeveloped societies to sophisticated 
aspects of Western civilisation would do them more harm than good. They had 
therefore to be protected from such disruptive foreign influences until they were 
considered mature enough. A decision not to develop education was one of these 
forms of'protection'. Lack of funds cannot satisfactorily account for the almost total 
absence of government provision for education in the region for so long. If private 
schools could be funded and mosques built in Northern Sudan, the same government 
could have been capable of financing at least one primary school in the Southern 
Sudan. But it could not be done because of the cultural conceptions which weighed 
heavily in the mind of Education officials. These British attitudes were probably as 
important in 'retarding' the development of the Southern Sudan as all the physical, 
financial and manpower constraints put together. The full impact of the 
preconceptions can be appreciated best by briefly considering how the policy of delay 
was maintained into the interwar period. 
Enilo-eue 
The middle interwar period is generally considered to be a time of relative peace 
in which for the first time the Sudan Government took up the question of 
development in the South seriously. This was the time of devolution of power to 
native leaders and the birth of MacMichael's famous Southern Policy. It was Willis, 
appointed governor of Upper Nile Province in 1926, who was the first to be swept 
along by the wind of change that blew from Khartoum. Unlike his counterpart in 
Bahr al-Ghazal, who rejected out of hand a generous offer from Khartoum, Willis 
desperately longed for an opportunity to improve conditions in his province. In 1927 
he submitted an ambitious development programme to the Secretary of Finance. 
Willis wanted money for the implementation of Native Administration, construction of 
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roads, provision of a number of trucks and workshops, and additional British staft: 6 
But the response was not encouraging; the big men in Khartoum still held some of the 
old cultural tradition. Schuster did not see the wisdom of such an expenditure in the 
Southern provinces which, he declared had 'little chance for many years of building up 
a system of agricultural exports which will make them pay. 7 So before any final 
decision could be made, the Civil Secretary, MacMichael went to Upper Nile to 
assess its needs. His findings did not augur well for regional development. Reporting 
back to the Governor-General, MacMichael wrote: 'My impression of Upper Nile 
Province ... was that 
it represented the most dismal portion of the Sudan - that it was 
a Serbonian Bog into which had drifted or had been pushed all the lowest racial 
elements surviving north of the equator ... '8 The govemor's proposal was 
discarded 
on the ground that the tribes were not yet sufficiently advanced for Native 
Administration. 9 Yet when Willis presented another request for funds in 1929, this 
time for military operations against Nuer prophets accused of being the force behind 
the backwardness in Upper Nile, 126,000 was promptly released to the province. 10 
Willis himself was not far from MacMichael in his preconceptions about the 
natives. Even if he had been granted his development budget, it is not clear how he 
planned to carry out his reforms. In a letter to the Secretary of Finance in 1928, 
Willis expressed this opinion about the local peoples: 
It is to be hoped that the rate of progress with these tribes will increase 
appreciably under the system of 'Devolution', but the application of it 
above all things requires time, and I should view with apprehension any 
scheme which involved unduly hastening the stages of development of 
these tribes. 
The past season's work has given abundant evidence of the normal 
difficulties of administering these tribes. The imposition on to their habit 
of a project of irrigation involving the most modern machinery and a 
complicated organisation must create disturbance not merely to their 
material conditions but their moral and mental outlook. 
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Our policy may be described as bringing the natives from the first Chapter 
of Genesis to the Book of Judges, but if we hasten too much, we shall be 
liable to be plunged into Revelations. II 
Willis meant what he said, and tried during his tenure of office to preserve tribal 
standards even against what does not appear to be at all disruptive. The governor 
endeavoured, for example, to discourage 'a tendency in some cases to try and teach 
natives a craft that can be of no obvious application to their own needs eg brick 
making'. 12 
Expansion in education was another source of worry to government officials. 
While R. K. Winter, Secretary of Education, admitted that the education of the African 
had in the past 'been subjected to criticism and even to actual opposition', and 
promising that henceforth it was going to become 'the business of everyone', 13 he did 
not in fact turn his back completely on the past. In 1932 he spelt out his Department's 
policy as essentially to concentrate on elementary vernacular education, 'taking care 
that the teaching given sends the boy back happily to his tribal environment'. Winter 
considered this objective to be 'the ideal'. 14 On the post-elementary education 
provided by the subsidised mission schools, Winter and the three provincial governors 
counselled caution. On behalf of this group, he expressed disquiet about what he saw 
as an alarming annual turn out of about sixty to seventy mission boys: 
I am warned that this kind of progress can only result in dctribalisation 
and the filling of our towns with educated unemployed, If so, is the 
prospect one which we can tolerate? Are we to build up a detribalised 
class to become a danger to morality and good government? We do not 
deny higher education to the few who can assimilate it, but any attempt to 
go too fast must be resisted. 15 
Many years were to elapse before the government felt it should become directly 
involved in Southern education. The first intermediate and a secondary school were 
only opened respectively in 1944 and 1948 at Atar in Upper Nile, and Rumbek in 
Bahr al-Ghazal. The caution seemed to have been heeded. 
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Finally, two more revealing comments from British district officials arc worth 
citing. An administrator in Mongalla Province between 1931 and 1936 described the 
type of relations they maintained with their subjects all over the South thus: 
Our attitude to the tribes and indeed the attitude of all the old Southern 
DC's was very district - proud and we thought our tribes better than 
anyone else's. But we were very paternalistic towards them, seldom 
shaking hands or accepting food as one did in the more egalitarian North 
where one would drink tea in the humblest 1uk!. We thought it our duty 
to help them preserve their way of life ... I was sitting 
in my office at Torit 
once when an irate doctor from the Roan Antelope mine in [South 
Africa], passing through and staying in the rest house, burst into my office 
and said: "You ought to be ashamed of yourself, letting these people go 
naked". It had never struck us so, ... In this way of thinking 
I was a 
supporter of Southern policy but not in favour of christianising them ... 
16 
On the education of Dinka boys in missions schools, M. G. Richards, a long- 
serving British official among the tribe, was apprehensive, as revealed by the case of 
his servants. He had wanted them to become Christians and that meant sending them 
to a mission school, a sacrifice Richards was not prepared to make. Ile feared that if 
they attended such a school, 'they would acquire tricks and arts which would 
presently lead to their dismissal'. He therefore 'had them without change for 18 years 
(and they retired as good pagans)'. The boys' dismissal from school was not the only 
cause for concern. Richards suspected that if they, and any other Dinka boys, ever 
completed a full school course, they would not 'be properly reabsorbed into tribal life'. 
The boys would be a source of local insecurity as they would 'always be unsettled and 
won't know what they are striving for once they get back amongst the cattle and 
spears' for they would 'feel too good to get down to the ashes once again'. The result 
could be 'dissatisfaction and weak links in tribal organisation and life. 17 One of the 
remedies suggested by officials in the South was to have special schools for Dinka 
children (See Appendix III). 
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It is apparent from such instances that even if the physical, financial and 
manpower constraints had not existed, or were there but in manageable proportions, 
the South would still not have advanced significantly because of the rulers' attitudes 
towards its peoples. To be sure, the Southern Sudanese were not alone in receiving 
this colonial treatment, nor were the British the only colonial power practising phased 
development of the African natives. According to one African writer, gradualism was 
a common European policy towards the subjects. 
... the African peoples were to 
be developed slowly, as rapid development 
would have the effect of upsetting the orderly process of evolution, The 
white man was to set the pace of this development. African progress - its 
volume and its rate - was to be given in small doses like prescribed 
medicine lest big quantities destroy the immature African. 18 
The difference with the Southern Sudanese situation is the time factor. They 
remained almost where they were found at the reconquest not because of neglect, or 
lack of funds and other constraints, but mainly because of over-concern - excessive 
protection, if you like. The officials, on the whole, meant well, but the period the 
Southern Sudanese spent in the nursery became too long, for its consequences have 
proved far-reaching. Even in the final years of the Condominium rule when 'much of 
what we did was in response to external events and to meet immediate needs and was 
not part of an orderly policy thought out and promoted on its merits', 19 it was never 
lost on officials that this prolonged incubation period would in the future undermine 
the Southerners' ability to fend for themselves in a united Sudan, When James 
Robertson, Civil Secretary, decided on behalf of the Southern Sudanese in 1947 to 
unite the two parts of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, he did it in spite of warnings of the 
dire consequences of such a move from 'all' those British officials he had consulted. 
They expressed fears that without safeguards, in such a unity, the Southern Sudanese 
'will not be able to develop along indigenous lines' for they 'will be overwhelmed and 
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swamped by the North, and deteriorate into a servile community hewing wood and 
drawing water for a superior Northern aristocracy-. 20 
British officials in the South were particular active in the campaign for 
safeguards. They knew their subjects better than the higher officials in Khartoum who 
were more concerned with political developments beyond the Sudan. The deputy 
governor of Upper Nile Province, J. Winder predicted rebellion by Southern Sudanese 
as early as 1946 - nine years before the Torit incident - if the amalgamation of the two 
parts of colony did not consider the special condition of the South. 21 When the 
revolt of the Equatorial Battalion occurred in August 1955, Major J. W. G. Wyld, a 
long-serving district officer in the Dinka and Zande land did not hesitate to blame the 
incident on the 'ill-conceived experiment' of handing over a backward people to their 
traditional enemies without guarantees. Not only that: Wyld even went further to 
warn all concerned to brace themselves for more serious situations to come: 'No one 
can suppose that the chapter of disaster and misery is closed, only the first page has 
been turned'. 22 Subsequent events have proved both men right. For another 
disappointed campaigner for safeguards for the South, B. A. Carlise, also a former 
district administrator in the South during the 1950s, what British officials did for the 
region has fallen down 'like a pack of cards' in the North-South conflict. His only 
consolation is the survival of the Christian Church. 23 One member of the Sudan 
Political Service, M. Parr, former governor of Upper Nile and Equatoria has, 
however, thrown the challenge to the Sudanese. Parr admitted that a mistake had 
been made, but 'the condominium cannot retrieve that mistake for it no longer 
exists'. 24 
The open admission of mistakes is certainly soothing to the ear of the distressed 
in the war-torn Sudan and should spur the Sudanese on to correct them. But in 
fairness to the British, some of the results of their 'blunders' in the Sudan are the two 
legacies which the Sudanese enshrine today. In the South, the colonial administration 
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fostered a sense of shared identity among the hitherto heterogeneous peoples of the 
region. The practice of a semi-detached regional administration semi-detached from 
that in Khartoum, the effects of missionary education and the introduction of 
Christian religion began slowly to erode tribal allegiances, making the first of their 
educated leaders identify with one another as compatriots. And although the process 
of political integration had not been fully achieved at independence, due in the main to 
the small numbers of Southern graduates, the rural population were faintly aware of 
their new identity. At the Juba Conference of 1947 when the people of the South sat 
down together for the first time ever to take a collective political decision, tribal 
chiefs, police men, and junior clerks spoke not for their respective peoples but for a 
'Southern Sudan' and identified themselves as Southern Sudanese. From that time the 
peoples of the geographical Southern Sudan have continued to rally around this pillar, 
which the Condominium created, for their collective security and socio-economic 
advancement in the Sudan. While some of the Southerners' criticisms of the Southern 
Policy may be justified, people should appreciate this fact of their life. 
A parallel policy of regional consolidation was also pursued by the British in 
Northern Sudan, with the effect of making it more Arab and Muslim. The 
government ban on Christian proselytising has been cited. Arabic was taught as the 
first language, followed by English for higher studies, just the same as in the South 
where the different Southern languages and English were the medium of instruction. 
Arabic was not encouraged in the South because 'there [was] no room ... for the 
introduction of a second foreign language'. 25 
There were other positive developments for the North under the Condominium 
policy of segregation between the two regions. As with many British officials in the 
South who identified with their subjects, so those in the North leaned a great deal 
towards Northern Sudanese. But as the officials in Khartoum were the decision 
makers such association yielded handsome dividends to the local peoples. Their 
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country, seen by some officials as the New Arabia', was 'being methodically equipped 
to take its ultimate place in the comity of Arab peoples'. 26 The Civil Secretary, 
Douglas Newbold, became so much committed to the Northern Sudanese that he had 
little thought for the other Sudanese peoples in the South. 'I don't think I shall ever 
be a good 'African' - tho' I like these blacks - my heart has been too long with Arabs 
in Kordofan and Kassala'. 27 Another intimate attachment of the Arab North to the 
British is demonstrated by the government concern over what could be called a 
personal identity crisis. During the First World War, the Assistant Director of 
Intelligence, C. A. Willis, went on a visit to Jerusalem with a Northern Sudanese 
notable, Sharif al-Hindi. This was at a time when the British fostered closer 
friendship ties with local leaders to prevent the spread of pro-Turkish propaganda. 
Part of the visit was to enable al-Hindi to see for himself the defeat of the Turks 
through the large number of their prisoners-of-war. The other reason, perhaps the 
main, was for the Sudanese dignitary to remove doubts about his pedigree. It appears 
the name 'Hindi' (Arabic for Indian) might have led to his background being 
questioned by his political rivals. Whatever the pressure behind the decision to settle 
this issue once and for all, Willis took al-Hindi to the mayor of Hebron, tutelary head 
of the Ashraf clan, to certify al-Hindi's claims to being an Ashraf. 28 
The concern shown in this personal matter was a fulfilment of Kitchener's 
instructions to Condominium officials to secure 'the better class of native' by friendly 
gestures and by interest shown in their personal affairs. As there were 'pan-African' 
British officials so were there 'pan-Arabs among them. Therefore, a block allegation 
of British victimisation of one Sudanese group or, region would be too sweeping a 
generalisation. In fact the Condominium Government tried until 1947 to preserve 'to 
the full the British tradition of the predominance of the interests of the native in his 
own country over that of the immigrant races', which was the policy pursued also in 
East Africa. 29 For example, when settlers in Kenya pressed for more land and forced 
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native labour, the British Government declared in 1923 that the interests of the 
indigenous peoples must be to the fore, 
and ... 
if and when these interests and the interests of the immigrant races 
should conflict, the former should prevail. The principle of Trusteeship 
for the Natives ... 
is unassailable. 30 
British officials in the Sudan understood this East African policy to be an endorsement 
of their own policies towards the South, and this principle of native trusteeship 
reinforced the existing factors in the relative isolation or insulation of the region. As 
Parr, a member of the Khartoum secretariat when the Southern Policy was 
formulated, wrote: 
The [Sudan Government] were aware of the problems created in Kenya 
and Uganda by the unrestricted entry of Indians who monopolised trade 
and other functions before the natives were sufficiently educated to do 
things for themselves. They were determined that a similar misfortune 
should not befall the Southern Sudan by the unrestricted immigration of 
Arabs or anyone else. 31 
Similar protection was extended in Northern Sudan against the Egyptian settlers, 
most clearly expressed in the field of education. More keen to acquire education than 
the relatively unsophisticated peoples of the North, the settlers occupied most places 
in schools, a development which Cromer condemned. Fie accordingly directed that 
emphasis should be on the education of bona fide Sudanese. 
32 
The circumstances under which British officials operated as well as their 
objectives have been described and assessed. It is apparent that traces of colonial rule 
remain present in the post-independence Sudan, but the question to be asked is: have 
they diminished or been magnified? Surely almost forty years of Sudanese rule should 
have seen a change for the better. But as things seem to go from bad to worse, the 
Sudanese themselves have something to answer for. It is time they started to look for 
internal factors to explain their troubles; to rise to the occasion and abandon the habit 
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of looking beyond their own borders in times of internal crisis to find a scapegoat for 
problems of their own making. The British shadow still looms large in current North- 
South relations, almost four decades after independence. But the big challenge before 
the Sudanese is to prove by deeds that the colonial master was wrong and they are 
right. 
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APPENDICES 
I 
Kitchener's Memorandum to Mudirs, 1899 
(an extract) 
The absolute uprootal by the Dervishes of the old system of Government has 
afforded an opportunity for initiating a new Administration more in harmony with the 
requirements of the Soudan. 
2. The necessary Laws and Regulations will be carefully considered and 
issued as required, but it is not mainly to the framing and publishing of laws that we 
must look for the improvement and the good government of the country. 
3. The task before us all, and especially the Mudirs and Inspectors, is to 
acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to 
a higher level. This can only be effected by the District Officers being thoroughly in 
touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to 
influence the whole population. Mudirs and Inspectors should learn to know 
personally all the principal men of their district, and show them, by friendly dealings 
and the interest taken in their individual concerns, that our object is to increase their 
prosperity. Once it is thoroughly realised that our officers have at heart, not only the 
progress of the country generally, but also the prosperity of each individual with 
whom they come into contact, their exhortations to industry and improvement will 
gain redoubled force. Such exhortations, when issued in the shape of Proclamations 
or Circulars, effect little; it is to the individual action of British officers, working 
independently, but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose 
confidence they have gained that we must look for the moral and industrial 
regeneration of the Soudan. 
4. The people should be taught that the truth is always expected, and will be 
equally well received whether pleasant or the reverse. By listening to outspoken 
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opinions, when respectfully expressed, and checking liars and flatterers, we may hope 
in time to effect some improvement in this respect in the country. 
5. In the administration of justice in your province you should be very 
careful to see that legal forms, as laid down, are strictly adhered to, so that the 
appointed Courts may be thoroughly respected; and you should endeavour, by the 
careful inquiry given by the Courts to the cases brought before them, to inspire the 
people with absolute confidence that real justice is being meted out to them. It is very 
important that the Government should do nothing which could be interpreted as a sign 
of weakness, and all insubordination must be promptly and severely suppressed. At 
the same time, a paternal spirit of correction for offences should be your aim in your 
relation with the people, and clemency should be shown in dealing with first offences, 
especially when such may be the result of ignorance, or are openly acknowledged. In 
the latter case, they should be more than half pardoned in order to induce truthfulness. 
6. Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, 
and that the Mohamedan religion is respected. 
7. Mosques in the principal towns will be rebuilt, but private mosques, 
takias, zawiyas, sheikhs' tombs, &c., cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they 
generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism. Any request for permission on 
such subjects must be referred to the Central authority. 
8. Slavery is not recognised in the Soudan, but as long as service is willingly 
rendered by servants to master it is unnecessary to interfere in the conditions existing 
between them. Where, however, any individual is subjected to cruel treatment, and 
his or her liberty interfered with, the accused can be tried on such charges, which are 
offences against the law, and in serious case of cruelty the severest sentences should 
be imposed. 
Source: Annual Report for 1899, pp. 55-56. 
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II 
A. List of Provincial Governors of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1924 
Governors of Bahr al-Ghazal Province 
1. W. S. Sparkes, 1901 -8 March 1904 
2. W. A Boulnois, 9 March 1904 - 30 May 1905 
3. A. Sutherland, 1 October 1905 -1 October 1906 (Acting from 30 May 1905) 
4. H. B. Hill, 1 October 1906 -3 June 1908 
5. R. V. Savile, 3 June 1908 - 28 December 1908 
6. H. Gordon, 28 December 1908 - 12 November 1910 
7. R. M. Feilden, 12 November 1910 -1 April 1917 
8. Viscount Hawarden, 1 October 1917 - 22 June 1920 
9. M. J. Wheatley, 1 January 1921 - 22 July 1928 
Governors of Berber Province 
1. H. W. Jackson, 1899 -1 January 1900 
2. F. J. Nason, 1 January 1990 - 31 December 1901 
3. H. W. Jackson, 1 January -1 June 1902 
4. A. de S. McKerrell, 1 June 1902 -5 July 1903 
5. H. B. Hill, 2 October 1903 -I October 1906 
6. A. Sutherland, 1 October 1906 -1 November 1907 
7. E. B. Wilkinson, 1 January 1908 -1 January 1910 
8. C. H. Townsend, 1 January 1910 - 28 May 1913 
9. G. C Kerr, 28 May 1913 - 19 August 1913 
10. C. P. Browne, 1 November 1914 - 15 December 1921 
11. T. A. Leach, 15 December 1921 - 10 August 1924 
12. H. C. Jackson, 10 August 1924 - 24 September 1926 
Governors of Darfur Province 
1. P. J. V. Kelly, 23 May 1916 - 11 May 1917 
2. R. V. Savile, 11 May 1917 -1 November 1923 
3. P. Munro, 1 November 1923 -1 January 1925 
Governors of Dongola Province 
1. T. E. Hickman, 1898 -9 December 1900 
2. A. de S. McKerrell, 10 December 1900 -1 June 1902 
3. H. W Jackson, 1 June 1902 - 21 March 1922 
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4. G. E. Iles, 21 March 1922 - 10 August 1924 
5. W. R. G Bond, 10 August 1924 - 22 September 1926 
Commandants of Fashoda District and Governors of Upper Nile Province 
1. H. W. Jackson, 1898 - 1899 
2. W. S. Sparkes, 1899 - 1900 
3. W. Hayes-Sadler, 1900 
4. A. Blewitt, 7 December 1900 - 28 May 1902 
5. G. E. Matthews, 27 May 1902 -6 January 1910 
6. H. D. E. O'Sullivan, 6 January 1910 - 16 August 1911 
7. F. W. Woodward, 1 January 1913 - 23 March 1916 
8. J. R. Bassett, 23 March -2 October 1916 
9. C. H. Stigand, 12 May 1917 - 16 March 1919 
10. K. C. P. Struve, 16 March 1919 - 17 December 1926 
Governors of Gezira Province (sometime Blue Nile Province) 
1. A. Blewitt, 28 May 1902 - 18 August 1903 
2. E. B. Wilkinson, 7- 16 October 1903 
3. E. A. Dickinson, 1 January 1904 - 17 March 1914 
4. G. E. Iles, 17 March 1914 - 21 March 1922 
5. A. J. C. Huddleston, 21 March 1922 -1 January 1928 
Governor of Halfa Province 
1. F. G. Anley, 1898 - 1899 
2. C. James, 1900 
3. W. Hayes-Sadler, 1901 - 21 December 1904 
4. G. E. Iles, 1905 (Acting) 
5. H. H. S. Morant, 5 December 1905 - 29 March 1908 
6. E. D Young, 29 March 1908 -9 March 1909 
7. C. H. Townsend, 16 September - 31 December 1909 
8. St. C. M. G. MacEwen, 1910 (Acting) 
9. C. Percival, 1911 (Acting) 
10. G. E. Iles, 1 April 1912 - 17 March 1914 (Acting until 1 January 1913) 
11. C. E. Lyall, 1 March 1921 - 17 March 1914 
12. S. A. Tippetts, 6 April 1917 -2 August 1922 
13. J. W. Sagar, 2 August 1922 -7 November 1924 
14. R. A. Bence-Pembroke, 7 November - 31 December 1924 
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Governors of Kassala Province 
1. J. Collinson, 1898 - 29 August 1901 
2. St. G. C. Henry, 12 March 1902 - 16 October 1903 
3. E. B. Wilkinson, 16 October 1903 -1 January 1908 
4. A. Cameron, 1 January 1908 - 28 May 1913 
5. C. H. Townsend, 28 May 1913 -5 April 1917 
6. C. E. Lyall, 6 April 1917 - 15 December 1921 
7. C. P. Browne, 15 December 1921 - 26 May 1926 
Governors of Khartoum Province 
1. J. G. Maxwell, 1899 - 12 February 1900 
2. E. A. Stanton, 1900 - 24 February 1909 
3. C. E. Wilson, 24 February 1909 - 28 May 1913 
4. R. E. More, 1 March 1914 -1 January 1920 
5. A. J. C. Huddleston, 1 January 1920 - 21 March 1922 
6. E. N. Corbyn, 21 March 1922 - 10 August 1924 
7. T. A. Leach, 10 August 1924 -1 January 1925 
Governors of Kardofan Province 
1. B. T. Mahon, I February 1901 - 28 April 1903 
2. J. R. O'Connell, 25 September 1903 - 31 December 1907 
3. H. D. W. Lloyd, 1 January - 28 December 1908 
4. R. V. Savile, 28 December 1908 - 11 May 1917 
5. J. W. Sagar, 11 May 1917 -2 August 1922 
6. J. D. Craig, 2 August 1922 -1 January 1926 
Governors of Mongalla Province 
1. A. Cameron, I January 1906 -1 January 1908 
2. R. C. R. Owen, 28 February 1908 -1 February 1918 
3. C. S. Northcote, 1 February 1918 - 16 March 1919 
4. C. H. Stigand, 16 March -8 December 1919 
5. V. R. Woodland, 1920 -6 October 1924 
6. R. A. Bence-Pembroke, 6 October -7 November 1924 
7. A. W. Skrin, 7 November 1924 -4 August 1929 
Governors of Sennar Province 
1. D. F. Lewis, 1898 - 1900 
2. G. de H. Smith, 1901 
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3. G. F. Gorringe, 11 December 1901 - 30 December 1904 
4. C. E. Wilson, 30 December 1904 - 24 February 1909 
5. G. S. Nickerson, 24 February 1909 - 31 December 1911 
6. A. A. C. Taylor, I January 1912 - 28 May 1913 (Acting) 
7. A. Cameron, 28 May 1913 -5 September 1921 
Governors of the White Nile Province 
1. J. Butler, 1 January 1905 - 16 November 1913 
2. K. C. P. Struve, 1 March 1914 - 16 March 1919 
3. E. N. Corbyn, 16 March 1919 - 21 March 1922 
4. J. D. Craig, 21 March -2 August 1922 
5. W. Nicholls, 2 August 1922 - 24 September 1926 
Source: Selected from MW Daly, 'Principal Office - Holders in the Sudan 
Government, 1898 - 1955', July 1983 SAD725 
B. List of Civilian provincial Governors of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898- 
1924 (for the provinces in 'A'. 
1. Butler 
2. Lyall 
3. Browne 
4. Iles 
5. Struve 
6. Leach 
7. Sagar 
8. Tippetts 
9. Huddeston 
10. Munro 
11. Craig 
12. Woodland 
13. Corbyn 
14. Bond 
15. Nicholls 
Source: Sudan Political Service, 1899-1956 
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III 
An Extract from a Proposal for a Dinka Government School, by G. Janson 
Smith, Inspector of Education, Epuatoria Province, to Director of Education, 
May 1939 
General Desiderata 
(i) The school will stress the fact that it is a response to a definite need, that it is a 
Dinka School based on Dinka social ideas and institutions, a corallary in the 
educational sphere of local self-government. 
(ii) The school would have its own herd and would pay great attention to following 
out in practice the principles of mixed farming. 
(iii) An elected body of local chiefs and elders would possibly be set up to advise in 
matters where the school came in contact with Dinka ideas and customs ... 
Contacts with Dinka life going on around the school would be as close as 
possible. 
(iv) The Christian religion would not be taught in the school, but there would be 
teaching in Ethics developing ideas which are already to be found amongst the 
Dinka such as their belief in God (Nhialic), their sense of responsibility to 
family, clan and chief, and their respect for tribal elders. 
Source: SAD664/9/1-12 
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Note: When the school was opened after the Second World War at Tonj, it had a herd 
attended by a cattle-chief-and a council of Dinka elders. And to maintain the link 
between the school and the rural Dinka life, where males enjoyed nudity, the pupils 
were allowed to strip off their clothes after lessons and joined the villagers in their 
social activities (Sanderson and Sanderson, Education. Religion and Politics, p. 264. 
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IV 
Excerpts from: 'Note on the Suggestions made by the Sudan Administrative 
Conference, Committee "A", on the Method of Including the Southern 
Provinces with Those of the North in a First Step towards the Independence of 
the Sudan as a Whole which was Foreshadowed by his Excellency the Governor 
General's Speech to his Advisory Council on April 17th 1946 
by John Winder, November 1946 
(4) The Southern Sudan, non arab, [sic] black in colour, pagan or christian [sic] for 
the most part in religion, is very different from the mainly arab [sic] and nearly 
wholly Muslim North. It is surely dangerous to try to unite too closely such 
divergent types. At present the South is inarticulate and, in any case, so 
unaware of what is afoot, that, even if it could speak, it could not do so to the 
point... Is the future of the Southern Sudanese to be decided for them by 
unilateral action in the North? Is the Southerner, with his very different 
background, and his memory of the Northerner as the son of his slave raiding 
father, to be made to sink his identity with the North before he is grown up 
enough to know what he is about? Is the girl child of the South to be subjected 
to a marriage with a nearly full grown son of the North? 
(7) Historically, where a Union of people nothing like so different as are those of 
the Northern and Southern Sudan has been tried, it has usually been a failure: 
even such comparatively similar parties as Norway and Sweden, with their 
political good sense, found that complete union would not work and, after after a 
trial, agreed to part again and search for some looser association ... The union 
of Ireland and England is perhaps the greatest blunder in history. The Thirteen 
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American States tried Union and quickly found they had to invent something 
looser if they were to hold together politically: they invented the idea of the 
Federal Union whereunder the cultural development of each member was left 
undisturbed while the questions necessary for the political good of the whole 
were delegated to a sovereign assembly. The Federal idea was adopted in 
Canada and it is doubtful whether a closer form of union would have held the 
French Canadians. Federalism enabled the Swiss to harness in sufficiently close 
national unit the German, French and Italian communities among which the 
country is divided. 
(8) In not a single case quoted above has the divergence between the parties which 
it was desirable to unite been no great as that between the mainly crab [sic], 
arabic [sic] speaking and Mohamedan Northern Sudan and the predominantly 
African, pagan or Christian South, with its differing languages. Surely enough 
has been written to show how dangerous a cultural and social as well as 
political and economic amalgamation can be and to point to some much looser 
union as being essential in their case. 
(9) There is however one major difficulty. In no case in history, I believe, has there 
been a Federal Union between two or more parties where each member has not 
been financially and economically solvent, and it is probably true to say that the 
Federal Idea would not work in such a case. It is clearly not desirable, even if 
possible, that one party should be financially dependent on the other or others. 
This has been realised in the case of the Federal Union of Australia where the 
Northern Territory is not yet regarded as a Member State due to its economic 
poverty, though there is little double that, as soon as it has been adequately 
developed, it will take its place in the Federal Union. The United States of 
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America only incorporated new territory as a State of the Union after due 
economic development had taken place. 
(10) Lying behind all the above is the plea that before a Union takes place between 
the Northern and Southern Sudan, the eventual economic position of the South 
should have been uncovered. If the South is always to remain a poor relation of 
the North, then by all means let it be realised for then the South, having no 
other future will have to sink its identity in the North. But, if as a result of a 
thorough Survey, it can be shown that the South possesses resources which 
being developed will enable it one day to be solvent, then let the example of the 
Northern Territory of Australia be followed: let it be developed as a special area 
in order that, in time, it may stand on its own feet and make its proper 
contribution to the Sudan as a whole. 
(11) The above plea is reinforced when it is realised what immense practical 
difficulties confront an immediate union on the lines suggested by Committee 
"A". Even if the Southern Provinces could produce 18 delegates who could 
understand questions under debate in the General Assembly, they would only 
represent their own small local tribal units. This state of affairs can only be 
remedied by a spread of education and the passing of time. Of course education 
must be pressed on as fiercely as possible in the South, but apart from financial 
difficulties there are all sorts of obstacles to quick returns. Then, neither the 
North or [sic] the South has an insight into the problems of the other, and there 
are geographical and linguistic reasons which will perpetuate such a state of 
affairs. Further, there is the fact that the Northerner despises the Southerner 
and the latter is deeply suspicious of the good intentions of the former: only 
association on equal terms over a long period can be expected to overcome this. 
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(12) Many of the Southern Peoples have character and ability, though much of the 
latter is still latent. ' I feel that a policy of 100% Union, as advocated by 
Committee "A", since it is bound largely to arabicise [sic] and Mohamedanise 
the South, and, consequently, to cut the Southerner off from the sources of his 
own culture further south, will retard the development of the South and make 
the Southerner, in every sense a poorer partner for the North. If the South can 
never be solvent this may be inevitable and must be accepted, but I believe that 
it is by no means certain that the South must always accept an inferior status 
and that adequate research may well show the opposite to be true, in which 
case, under some form of federation, the South could join the North with 
political and economic ties while retaining the freedom to develope [sic] socially 
and culturally unfettered by what is alien to it. 
John Winder 
Malakal November 1946 
Source: SAD541/8/8-12 
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V 
Wheatley's Reflections on: 
The Modern Sudan 10 May, 1949 
The Sudan is divisible into three very distinct areas. 
1. Northern Sudan extending from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum. 
2. Middle Sudan which contains (a) the old Fung Kingdom centring on the Blue 
Nile above Khartoum and (b) Kordofan on the West side of the White Nile between 
Khartoum and Malakal. 
3. The Southern Sudan or Sudd region extending from Malakal to Mongalla, and 
to the boundary between Uganda and the Sudan. 
In (1) the inhabitants favour in the main, it is believed, union with Egypt. 
In (2) the great majority, it is believed, favour an independent Sudan. 
In (3) there is no public opinion in this region in favour of either of the two 
parties (a) pro Egyptian or (b) for the Independence already mentioned. It is believed 
they then would prefer British beneficent rule. 
Neither (1) or (2) have a strong, if any, wish to be saddled with (3), nor do any 
of them recognise the immense potentialities of the area. The people in (3) 
themselves do not recognise its immense value. 
The potential value of (3) is enormous. It is a plan of some 40,000,000 acres. 
It is not a "level" plain in every direction. It has a slope from south to north which 
will allow of fairly easy drainage for a great part of the land, the remainder can be 
drained by pumps acting under low heads. 
Today it is useless because the river spreads over it at all seasons of the year but 
of course much more during the flood season than at other times. 
All the water so spilled out of the river is evaporated away from the plain. 
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Tomorrow when Egypt trains the river as she now intends to do this land will 
be free for cultivation of any kind. 
In view of the belief of the Middle and Northern Sudan would be glad to be rid 
of the Sudd area it is suggested that Great Britain should arrange with the Sudan to 
take care of the area and the people, all of whom are in a very primitive state of 
civilisation. 
This can be done by suggesting either of two courses. 
(1) That the Sudan agrees to separate the area and leave it under British 
supervision and at Britain's cost for all time, or 
(2) That Britain now appoints in collaboration with the Sudan supervising 
officials, and that British law and fiscal arrangements alone apply to the area for an 
indefinite period. 
Under either of these arrangements the development of the area could be taken 
in hand as soon as the control of the river in Egypt's interest become effective during 
the next ten years. The potentialities of the Sudd Region are greater than in any other 
area of Africa for land development. It has some rainfall which is an asset. In the 
earlier stages cattle and timber may be the main products. 
Source: SAD703/1/1-47. 
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VI 
Anonymous Perspectives on: Missionaries and Education in Pagan Africa 
In the majority of African Colonies education is largely in the hands of the 
Missionaries. One cannot but admire the self-sacrifice and perseverance they had 
shown in their uphill task and the conviction that has carried them on through adverse 
criticism and even ridicule and opposition from their fellow countrymen and professed 
Christians. 
How many Converts have they? This is the first question asked by the average 
layman who seeks to estimate the value of Missionary enterprise among the pagan 
peoples of Africa. 
Many Government Officials and other white residents have hitherto been 
inclined to accept "Conversions" as the criticism by which ' they may judge the 
missionary's success, but this shows a lamentably superficial examination of the 
subject. 
What is the object of Christianity and civilisation? Surely to better the general 
state of these poor savages and educate them to higher ideals. The mere fact of 
persuading a pagan to profess Christianity does not, as will be readily admitted by all, 
necessarily attain that end. The reply to the opening question should be in the form of 
further questions. Are those who have been brought into contact with the 
missionaries whether as actual converts or as inhabitants of their stations or as their 
employees better men and women or not? Are they less savage, are they less unruly, 
are they less intractable? If the answer is in the affirmative than [sic] there can be 
little doubt that the missionaries are succeeding although they may not be able to 
claim a large number of actual converts. Except by force conversion is bound to be 
slow. The native is naturally suspicious and conservative - he clings to his old 
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customs and although ready enough to acknowledge the superiority of the missionary 
ideal as shown by the lives of the members of the mission and their teaching, he will 
not give up his ancient customs and profess his adherence to the new faith with, from 
his point of view, all its disabilities. History seems to show that on first contact with 
whitemen and civilisation the savage deteriorates. How can any other result be 
expected? Unfortunately the first who came to his country as representatives of 
civilisation are more often than not, the very reverse of Christian either in their 
manner of living or in their treatment of the native. They are often petty traders out 
to exploit the native in every possible way. Their standard of civilisation is so low 
that is can hardly be called by that name. No wonder the native deteriorates from his 
own savage state. According to his lights he may be upright and moral and with a 
clear natural bias towards honesty. The whiteman's intellectual superiority is obvious 
and the wild man succumbs. This is a phase. As the country open up a better class of 
man arrives - mission stations are opened and the native is shown a different standard 
but it takes time to wean him from all the vices he has learnt to associate with the 
whiteman. Let us wait till education has spread - till the second and third generations 
have arrived - then let us take stock of the situation. I believe the majority of 
missionaries in these days own that the original efforts were not on the best lines - 
converts were the measure of their own success. It is generally recognised that 
education, industrial and otherwise, must be taught side by side with religious ideals. 
One is useless without the other. Education does not mean purely clerical teaching 
but general education - all forms of industrial work - how to build better houses - how 
to improve cultivation - elementary sanitation etc. etc. Often one hears criticism 
about the pupils . of missions - that 
they ape the whiteman in apparel, are lazy and (to 
put it in the vernacular), become too big for their boots: that they profess Christianity, 
but actually practice their former customs. This criticism may be partly justified but it 
may be pointed out that many Europeans professing Christianity often stay by the 
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wayside. The question of clothes is surely immaterial. These primitive people arc 
only children in intellect. The whiteman's clothes are of a revelation and being 
naturally vain and fond of dressing they obtain and wear these fine feathers which 
apart from pleasing their vanity is after all an outward sign that they [arc] on the road 
to civilisation. In itself it is a proof they have in fact forsaken their former savage way 
of living. The great drawback to a more rapid advance is the paucity of schools. If 
only education could be made general and all children given a chance to attend 
schools instead of the very small number who at present have that opportunity. For 
some reason or other education seems to be left to the last when we set out to 
administer a country. It is not that missionary effort is at fault - it is that the 
authorities neglect this most important preliminary to civilisation - namely education - 
and with secular education must go hand in hand as already pointed out - moral 
education - the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount. 
I suggest that greater success would attend the missionaries, if the churches 
could see their way to a broader minded policy.. Is it impossible for a man brought up 
to the custom of a plurality of wives, to be a good man - to follow the teaching of the 
Sermon on the Mount - Civilisation, education and economics will in time bring him 
to the Christian ideal of one wife but it seems asking for the impossible to expect a 
negro to change his character in this respect all at once - Cannot time be allowed to 
work the cure - See how education is teaching the Mohammedan 
in this matter - how 
many now have only one wife - how many of their wives give up the customs of the 
harim when visiting Europe and even in their own countries. Why should not the 
same hope be held as regard the pagan of Africa? Surely the first step should be to 
make a better man of him and let time change his customs in the course of mental and 
moral development. I am no theologian but I cannot help feeling that strict adherence 
to monogamy is delaying the good work instead of advancing it and that by 
demanding obedience to one of, the highest Christian ordinances at the outset the 
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missionary drives many a promising case away - Do not call them Christians to start 
with - let that be the final degree of their advancement. To a mind brought up to a 
plurality of wives there is nothing impure in the fact. There are more women than 
men; what is to become of the unmarried women? They have no outlook beyond 
marriage. The question of employment of the many women who do not marry had 
been accounted one of the great social problems in the civilised world. Why force it 
in these uncivilised peoples so early in their development? 
There are other serious obstacles. In the nature of things there are in the early 
stages more male than female converts and it is difficult for the men to obtain wives. 
Pagan parents object to their daughters marrying Christian men as difficulties arise 
over the mahr (payment made by the bridegroom) and over the question of divorce 
and the latter is further complicated when the mission is of the Roman Catholic 
persuasion, for the Roman Catholic do not recognise divorce. 
How is the administrator to view these questions? Do what he will to support 
the missions he is continually being run into a corner over the marriage complications. 
Many chiefs and others would send their children to the mission schools but they are 
suspicious as to what is to become of them. They feel their children will be practically 
lost to them, for as Christians and churchmen they will turn from the family. Cannot a 
system be evolved under which the children would be educated mentally and morally 
then returned to their homes without turning them into churchmen? 
That I suggest might come in the later generations. Gradual development, it 
appears, should be the aim of the missionary. The children could take back to their 
homes the moral teaching they had learnt and by degrees there would be a leaven of 
good and higher ideals in the tribe or village. Do not keep them too long in the 
missions and thus make their natural and primitive life distasteful to them. Let them 
go while they are still young enough to be under parental control and as they grow up 
better workers and altogether more useful members of Society. I Pere would be the 
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field for the missionary pure and simple - Let the first stage be not mission stations 
where the primary object is conversion but schools presided over by Christian men 
and women. 
As regards missions enterprise per se I very diffidently suggest that the village 
parson would have much more influence and consequently greater success than a 
community of missionaries, such as is usually found. 
Source: 703/5/1-3, undated, but found in Wheatley's papers 
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A. Primarv Sources 
1. Archival Material 
(i) NRO 
B. G. P. 1/1/2; 1/2/7; 1/3/18. 
CivSec 1/13/43; 5/5/26; 16/2/3; 17/1/2; 57/2/8; 1/9/30. 
Equatoria 1/4/14; 1/4/19. 
Intel 1/20/109; 2/27/216; 2/27/217; 2/30/247; 2/30/250; 2/48/408. 
Palace 5/1/1. 
South 1/16/158; 1/17/161. 
(ii) PRO 
F0371/452; 371/10880; 371/10905 
(iii) SAD 
Cited in this category are papers of thirteen former Condominium 
officials: Arber, Bell, Bolton, Carlisle, Clayton, Cox, htacMichacl. 
Philip, Wheatley, Willis, Winder, Wingate and Wyld: From 
Arber's: 715/9/1-62 736/2/1-27; Bell's: 700/6/1-59; Bolton's: 
722/1/1-39; Carlisle's: 725/10/1-22; Clayton's: 469/1/1.10; 469/7/1- 
80; Cox's: 663/13/1-37; MacMlichacl's: 403/7/1-66; Philip's: 
721/5/1-28; Wheatley's: 702/12/1-46; 703/1/1-47,703/5/1-3; 
Willis's: 212/5/1-53; 212/9/1-92; 212/10/14; 212111/1.34; 
212/13/1-59; 212/15/1-24; 212/16/1-8; Windcr's: 104/13/1-16, 
541/8/1-14; Wingate's: 103/4/1-55; 103/5/1-72; 106/4/1-33; 
110/11/1-89; 122/3/1-37; 122/4/1-101; 133/22/1.105; 157/5/1.68; 
157/6/1-50; 158/10/1-59; 159/1/1-128; 180/3/1.179; 181/1/1.68; 
181/1/186-321; 181/3/1-159; 182/2/1-152; 182/2/153-310; 
185/1/179-283; 187/2/109-216; 187/3/1-139; 188/2/1-207; 189/1/1- 
58; 189/3/1-130; 190/1/1-71; 190/2/55-158,191/3/1-111; 192/2/1- 
248; 194/3/1-137; 195/1/88-186; 196/2/203-316; 196/3/281-412; 
197/1/123-234; 197/2/1-91; 199/1/1-219; 199/2/1-101; 202/2/1-69; 
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218/2/150-151; 218/2/153; 219/8/1-5; 225/4/1-95; 227/4/149; 
261/1/1-53; 271/6/1-26; 272/1/1-49; 272/2/1-82; 272/4/1-89; 
272/5/1-62; 272/6/1-47; 273/1/1-52; 273/10/1-27; 275/2/1-49; 
275/3/1-35; 275/4/1-60; 275/5/1-38; 275/8/1-59; 275/9/1-64; 
276/1/1-82; 276/4/1-99; 276/6/1-79; 277/1/1-86; 277/2/1-82; 
278/2/1-126; 278/3/1-73; 278/6/1-37; 279/2/1-79; 279/3/1-69; 
280/2/1-97; 280/3/1-130; 281/1/1-120; 281/5/1-120; 281/7/I-5I; 
282/1/1-76; 282/5/1-108; 283/1/1-110; 283/3/1-95; 283/4/1-95; 
288/4/1-126; 288/6/1-126; 290/1/1-163; 290/3/149-285; 291/I/I- 
40; 292/21/1-157; 298/1/1-77; 298/2/1-175; 300/1/1-133; 300/3/I- 
176; 300/5/77-212; 301/2/1-130; 301/3/1-111; 301/4/1-77; 301/6/1- 
89; Wyld's: 779/7/1-28. 
2. Official Publications 
(i) Annual Reports 
These exist in two separate publication: a detailed report compiled 
in Khartoum and an edited version which the British office in Cairo 
sent to the Foreign Office. They are referred to here respectively as 
Reports on the Finances. Administration and Condition of` the 
Sudan and Annual Report. 
Cited in the text for the first category are Reports for the years: 
1902,1903,1904,1905,1906,1907,1908,1913,1921 and 1925, 
Annual Report is for: 1899,1900,1901,1902,1902,1905,1906, 
1908,1909 and 1914. 
(ii) Sudan Government Gazette 
Sudan Government Gazelle nos: 34, April 1902; 47, May 1903; 55, 
December 1903; 86, January 1906; 94, April 1906; 129, March 
1908 and 396, June 1922. 
(iii) SIR 
SIR nos: 60,1898; 106, May 1903; 174, January 1909; 261. April 
1916; 304, November 1919; 321, April 1921; 322, May 1921; 323, 
June 1921; 324, July 1921; 328, Novcmbcr 1921; 332, March 1922 
and 333, April 1922. 
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B. Secondary Sources 
1. Published Works 
(i) Books 
Abd al Rahim, M., 
Abdin, H., 
Ali, A. I. M., 
Alier, A., 
Alford, H. S. L. and 
Sword, W. D., 
Artin, Y., 
Baker, S. W., 
Beshir, M. O., 
(ed. ), 
Browne, W. G., 
Carbites, P., 
Casati, G., 
Collins, R. O., 
(ed. ), 
Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. 
Oxford, 1969 
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